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Infinite growth in material consumption in a finite world
is an impossibility
E. F. Schumacher
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ABSTRACT
This thesis contributes to the environmental economics and policy o f sustainable 
municipal solid waste management. Significant market and government failures are 
present that lead to inefficiently high levels of waste generation and distort the 
optimal allocation o f waste to the various disposal options available. The aims o f the 
thesis are to identify and analyse the socio-economic, policy, spatial, as well as 
attitudinal determinants o f municipal solid waste generation, disposal and recycling, 
at the international macro-economic level and at the household level. The former is 
conducted using cross-sectional time-series data from the 30 member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) over the period 
1980 to 2000, whereas the latter is undertaken using original survey data collected 
from 188 households in London, UK. Three distinct methods have been adopted to 
undertake this investigation namely panel data econometrics, spatial econometrics 
techniques, and the stated preference choice experiment method. Conforming with 
previous studies, the results from the panel data econometrics indicate that waste 
generation is income inelastic. However, higher income levels are associated with 
smaller proportions o f municipal solid waste disposed o f at landfills and greater 
proportions o f paper/cardboard and glass recycling. The role o f urbanisation, 
population density and waste management policies are also examined. Moreover, 
spatial interaction is present in waste management and policy-making suggesting that 
governments may be acting strategically in their decision-making processes. Finally, 
the results from the choice experiment indicate that households are willing to pay for 
the number o f ‘dry’ materials collected, and the collection o f compost, while textile 
collection and the frequency o f kerbside collection is less important. These insights 
into municipal solid waste management can assist policy-makers in designing and 
implementing efficient and cost-effective policies in developed countries, helping to 
promote sustainable municipal solid waste management.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction to the Thesis
13
1.1 An Introduction to Municipal Solid Waste Management
This dissertation analyses the concept o f municipal solid waste management policy 
and its implementation. The concept o f sustainable or integrated waste management 
aimed at providing the correct incentives for waste disposal has been gaining 
increased attention in both the US and Europe over the past two decades. Heightened 
recognition o f the issues related to waste has developed as a result o f often 
monotonically increasing waste levels, land scarcity for landfill developments in 
certain regions, increasing public opposition associated with the ‘not-in-my- 
backyard’ (NIMBY) phenomenon in relation to landfill and incinerator siting, as well 
as global externalities contributing to climate change from landfill emissions.
Waste, as defined by the Basel Convention, is “substances or objects which are 
disposed o f or are intended to be disposed o f or are required to be disposed o f by the 
provisions o f national law”. More specifically, “waste is generated when a product or 
material begins to be treated as waste, and managed as such. Thus, waste generation 
includes material that is generated, collected and then recycled, composted, burned 
with or without energy recovery, or landfilled” (OECD, 2004). Though no single 
definition o f sustainable waste management exists, the concept refers to the efficient 
use o f material resources to reduce the amount o f waste produced and, where waste is 
generated, to managing it in a way that actively contributes to the economic, social 
and environmental goals o f sustainable development1.
From this perspective, waste generation levels are often excessively high and the 
allocation o f  waste to the various disposal options inefficient. This is due to a lack o f 
appropriate pricing signals, as the full social costs o f landfilling, incineration, and 
recycling are not adequately reflected in the market. The underpricing o f landfills, for 
example, makes the waste stream larger than it otherwise would be, since recycling 
and conservation are rejected in favour o f artificially cheap landfilling. Furthermore
1 The most widely used definition o f  sustainable development is “development that meets the need o f  
the present without compromising the ability o f  future generations to meet their own needs”
(Brundtland Report, 1987).
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the underpricing o f landfills represents a subsidy2 to the landfilling business 
bestowing the landfill business with an unfair advantage, a competitive edge in the 
marketplace, which has the effect o f discouraging private initiative in the 
development o f disposal alternatives. Related to this are o f course the environmental 
externalities associated with waste disposal.
In contrast to some other environmental problems that initially increase with 
economic growth and then eventually decrease after reaching a turning point, waste 
generation levels do not seem to be on the decline (Shafik et ah, 1992; Cole et ah, 
1997). Only a very few number o f countries have recently managed to decouple waste 
generation levels and economic growth and as developing countries begin to follow 
suit, appropriate waste management practices will become a more significant issue for 
these nations too.
The issue o f waste management is an important one, representing a potentially large 
source o f misallocation of resources, and the environmental externalities associated 
with waste disposal are both significant and long-term. In the OECD countries4, over 
35% of known public and private sector environmental-related expenditures are 
directly linked to waste (OECD, 2000). Current expenditure on waste management in 
the European Union (EU) amounts to approximately 48 billion Euro per year (around 
14 per cent o f which is related to packaging), which constitutes 0.6-0.7 per cent of 
GDP and 40 per cent o f total environmental expenditure (Linher, 2005). It is evident 
that concerted policy action will be required to mitigate and reverse the trends in 
waste generation, and to dispose of the waste stream in the most efficient way. 
Indeed, the current EU Sixth Environment Action Program identifies waste
2 i.e., paid for by the government or general public.
3 Though econom ic growth and waste generation are closely correlated, a small number o f countries 
have recently managed to decouple economic growth and municipal waste generation (e.g., Denmark, 
the Netherlands, and Switzerland) (EEA, 2003).
4 The OECD countries are the 30 member countries o f the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development.
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prevention and management as one o f its four top priorities, and in the UK waste 
policy is arguably the second largest environmental challenge after climate change5.
The purpose o f this chapter is to provide a synopsis o f the current state o f waste 
management trends and the waste legislation that has evolved to address the above 
mentioned issues. This is intended to provide a contextual background leading to the 
final section in which the aims and overview o f this thesis are presented.
The remainder o f this chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 describes existing 
trends in the generation and composition o f waste in OECD countries. The disposal 
options and financial costs o f waste are addressed in section 1.3 and section 1.4 
focuses explicitly on the environmental costs of the three primary methods o f  waste 
disposal, namely landfill, incineration, and recycling. Developments in waste 
legislation related to waste management are discussed in section 1.5 at both the EU 
level and in the US, along with other notable examples from developed countries. 
Finally, section 1.6 presents the aims and objectives o f this thesis.
1.2 Trends and Composition of Waste
The scale and significance of the waste problem can best be illustrated by considering 
the development o f waste arisings over time. Reported total waste generation in 
OECD Europe grew by nearly 10 percent between 1990 and 1995 (EEA, 1998). Most 
recently available data estimate that more than 3,000 million tonnes o f waste is 
generated in Europe every year (EEA, 2003)6. The main waste-producing sectors are 
the manufacturing industry, construction and demolition, mining and quarrying, and 
municipal waste (see Figure 1.1).
5 Waste Not, Want Not -  A strategy fo r  tackling the waste problem  in England, Strategy Unit, 
November 2002.
6 Comparative figures for the US are not available as the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
does not require states to report the total amount o f  waste generated. Based on information provided by 
Pennsylvania’s Department o f Environmental Protection, it is estimated that municipal waste accounts 
for perhaps less than 20% o f  the total waste stream.
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F i g u r e  1.1 T o t a l  w a s t e  g e n e r a t i o n  by  s e c t o r  in
W E Not  d e c l a r e d  
E n e r g y  product ion 2 %
/  Mining a n d :
. .  -
M unici pal  w a s t e  
14%
Co ns t ru ct i on  and 
d e m  olition
31 %
I ndustr ial  w a s t e  
15%
Source: EEA, 2003.
NB: Figure does not include Belgium, Iceland, Luxembourg, Sweden, Spain, and 
Switzerland.
W aste from manufacturing industries consists o f food, wood, paper, chemicals, non- 
metallic minerals, basic metal and other waste. This sector accounts for about 740 
million tonnes o f waste per year and has been on the rise since the mid-1990s in most 
European countries for which data is available. Waste from construction and 
demolition, which includes the renovation o f old buildings, has generally also been 
increasing in Western Europe (WE).
Municipal waste is estimated to account for 14 percent o f total waste arisings in 
Western Europe and 5 percent in Central and Eastern Europe (EEA, 2003). Table 1.1 
shows the best available data on municipal waste generation for a number o f OECD 
countries in 1980 and 2000. Between 1980-2000, total municipal waste arisings in the 
OECD increased by 54 percent. Albeit not as rapidly, municipal waste generation per 
capita has also increased significantly over the same time period. These trends are 
depicted in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 below.
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Table 1.1 Generation o f Municipal Waste in the OECD Countries
1980
thousand
tonnes
2000
thousand
tonnes
Percent
change
1980-2000
1980
kg per 
capita
2000
kg per 
capita
Percent
change
1980-2000
USA 137560 208520 51.6 600 760 26.7
Japan 43995 51446 16.9 380 410 7.9
Belgium 3499 5588 59.7 360 550 52.8
Denmark 2046 3546 73.3 400 660 65.0
Greece 2500 4550 82.0 260 430 65.4
Italy 14041 29000 106.5 250 500 100.0
Luxembourg 128 278 117.2 350 640 82.9
Netherlands 7050 9691 37.5 490 610 24.5
Norway 1700 2755 62.1 550 620 12.7
Poland 10055 12226 21.6 280 320 14.3
Portugal 1980 4531 128.8 200 450 125.0
Sweden 2510 4000 59.4 300 450 50.0
Switzerland 2790 4681 67.8 440 650 47.7
Turkey 12000 24945 107.9 270 390 44.4
EU-15 125000 188000 50.4 370 520 40.5
OECD 358000 551000 53.9 420 560 33.3
Source: OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002
Figure 1.2. Total MSW Generation Rates (thousand tonnes)
— ~ .  ■■■  v .  ■ -  !— r—------■
— :
N. America
EU-15
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Source: OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002
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Figure 1.3 Average Per Capita MSW Generation Rates (kg)
1980
Source: OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002
This amounts to more than 550 million tonnes that are collected each year, or on 
average, 560 kg/capita. This ranges substantially from 310 kg/capita in Mexico to 760 
kg/capita in the US (OECD, 2002). Regarding its composition, municipal waste
Figure 1.4 Composition of municipal waste in WE
Textiles
2%Bulky waste 
4 %
Plastic: 
\ 7% IOrganic
material
27%
Metals'
5%
Source: Eurostat 2003
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consists mainly o f organic materials, paper, and other waste. This is followed by 
plastics and glass, and finally metals, bulky waste and textiles (see Figure 1.4). In 
most countries, municipal waste consists o f 60% or more o f household waste 
(Eurostat, 2003).
It is important to note that existing waste data availability and quality, in comparison 
with other environmental data, is relatively poor and that the definitions are not 
always consistent between countries. In France for example, municipal waste is 
defined as also including sewage sludge, whereas in Austria and Ireland a larger 
fraction o f non-household waste is included.
Despite these data discrepancies, the discemable trend is that waste generation levels 
are increasing. Moreover, this waste challenge is not limited to OECD countries. 
Though reliable statistics are hard to come by, the UN Commission for Sustainable 
Development forecasts that “the amount o f waste produced in developing countries 
will double within just ten years, and that global waste generation may increase five­
fold by 2025.” (OECD, 2000).
1.3 Disposal Options, Costs and Trends
The existence o f  landfill sites dates back to as fa r  as 3000BC in Knossos, the 
capital o f  Crete where waste was placed  in large p its  and layered with earth.
One thousand years later, in Europe, bronze was recovered from  waste and  
reused, and composting was practised in China. By 500 BC, the government 
in Athens had opened the fir s t municipal landfill site one mile outside the 
city. Forms o f  reuse and recycling were common throughout the world, as 
people fe d  vegetable waste to animals and used manure and green waste as 
fertiliser.
Source: www.wasteonline.org.uk History of Waste and Recycling Information 
Sheet.
As with the creation o f all matter, the generation o f waste requires that it be disposed 
of in one form or another. In general, waste can either be deposited at landfills,
7 In the US the figures are: Paper: 35.2%; yard trimmings: 12.1%; food scrap: 11.7%; plastic:] 1.3%; 
metal: 8.0%; rubber, leather, textiles: 7.4%; glass: 5.3%; wood: 5.8%; other:3.4% (EPA, 2003).
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incinerated, or recycled. Landfilling entails the deposition o f waste onto or into land 
(i.e., underground) which has been specified as a waste disposal site. Incineration 
refers to the thermal treatment of waste with or without recovery o f the combustion 
heat generated. Finally, recycling is a resource recovery method involving the 
collection and treatment of a waste product for use as a raw material in the 
manufacture o f the same or similar product. Alternatively, the waste can be 
composted which refers to the controlled decomposition o f  organic matter such as 
food and yard wastes. Emerging waste disposal technologies also include hydrolysis 
and pyrolysis, gasification, and thermolysis.
To date, the disposal methods adopted have been driven primarily by the availability 
o f land space, public opposition to air pollution from incinerators in certain areas 
(e.g., in California and the UK), and the costs o f disposal. For example, in the north­
eastern portion o f the US, where population densities and land values are high, 
approximately 40% of generated waste is incinerated. In Northern Europe (e.g., 
Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland) a larger fraction o f waste is incinerated and 
recycled, partly a result o f land scarcity and related policy. In contrast, other countries 
such as the UK, Ireland, and Greece rely almost exclusively on landfills.
Costs have been a strong motivating factor for the UK in the popularity o f landfills 
amongst waste management companies, as they are the least expensive option (DTI, 
1997). This is partly due to geological reasons but also because o f advances in the 
construction and maintenance o f landfill sites. Indeed, in nearly all EEA countries, 
average treatment prices for landfill use are lower than for incineration (see Figure 
1.5).
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Figure 1.5
T re a tm e n t p rices  fo r in c in e ra tio n  and  d isposal
0
CL
C(L ■ o  - - - - - - - - -  — . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
ED n  r1 -  —1H 0  f t J k to n1 n H i ,
E3 Incineration  
■  Landfilling
LU AT WO NL FR DE BE LI IE DK SE UK ES FI GR
C ou n try
Source: ElONET EEA ETC/W, 1998. NB: Excludes waste tax and VAT.
It is worth noting that the generation o f revenues from energy production, known as 
waste-to-energy incineration, can also partially offset the cost o f incineration, 
although there are typically less expensive forms o f energy production available. The 
relative proportion o f MSW treated and disposed o f in the various alternatives is 
depicted in Figure 1.6.
F i g u r e  1.6 T r e a t m e n t  and d i s p o s a l  o f  m u n i c i p a l  w a s t e
In W E
BE 199 8
DK 2 0 0 0
FR 2 0 0 0
□  R ecycling
□  Com posting
□  Inc ine ra tion
□  Land fill
UK 2 0 0 0
LU 19 99
A T  1999
FI 2 0 0 0
IS 2001
CH 2 0 0 0
0 % 2 0 % 4 0% 60% 80% 1 0 0 %
Source: Eurostat 2003
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Though there has been an increase in the proportion of municipal waste disposed of in 
landfills in the Netherlands and Portugal, the general trend in Europe is one of 
decline. This is especially true in Spain (about 20% per annum) whereas in Sweden 
and Iceland the trend is relatively negligible. Looking at the new EU member states, 
with the exception of Malta, over 90% of MSW is managed by landfill, and in 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, it is the only method of disposal 
used (Eurostat, 2003).
•Austria
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Nonway
Poland
Sweden
•United Kingdom 
United States
Figure 1.7 Landfill Disposal Rates
Source: Eurostat 2003
The proportion o f waste incinerated also varies considerably between countries. In 
densely populated countries like Japan, Denmark, and the Netherlands, at least 50% 
of all waste is incinerated. This is partly because they are able to benefit from 
economies of scale that keep the average cost o f incineration down. In the US only 
about 11% o f waste is incinerated, a figure that has remained nearly constant over the 
past decade (Fullerton and Raub, 2004).
Recycling rates vary substantially between types of material and countries and are 
affected by barriers to both the supply o f recyclate available to the market and the 
demand for recycled products and materials. With regard to supply, variation is often 
due to limited collection infrastructure, contamination o f supply, low cost of waste
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disposal, and the high cost o f collecting and recycling waste. On the demand side 
there is competition from low priced virgin materials, limited application to recyclate, 
and in some sectors, price volatility for recyclate (Environmental Council, 2002). 
Overall, recycling rates in OECD countries for metals exceed 80 percent, 35-40 % for 
glass, and 40-55% for paper and cardboard. In Ireland for example, paper recycling is 
only 10%, whereas in Germany it is 70%. More generally, recycling rates are highest 
in the Scandinavian countries, and lowest in the OECD Mediterranean (Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, and Turkey) (de Tilly, 2004).
Figure 1.8 Glass Waste Recycling Rates
■Austria 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
• Portugal 
■Spain 
Switzerland 
•UK 
USA
100
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20
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Source: OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002
—♦— Austria 
—■— Germany 
Japan 
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USA
Figure 1.9 Paper/ Cardboard Waste Recycling Rates
Source: OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002
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The choice of waste disposal and treatment methods adopted has important 
environmental implications that often are not factored into the market price, thus 
leading to external effects and social inefficiencies. These issues are reviewed in the 
next section.
1.4 Environmental Costs of MSW Disposal
In addition to the financial costs associated with solid waste disposal, there are also 
external environmental costs that must be taken into consideration. These vary 
according to the type o f waste and disposal methods adopted and are a result o f 
adverse impacts on surface water, groundwater, soil and air quality, as well as the 
global environment with regard to impacts on climate change, and finally, risk to 
human health.
When waste is deposited at a landfill, the biodegradation o f the organic fraction o f the 
waste results in the generation and release o f methane and carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere, contributing to the global problem o f climate change. Estimates suggest 
that 6%  o f all methane emissions to the atmosphere occur from landfill sites (Beede
o
and Bloom, 1995) . Trace gases are also present and over 100 types o f volatile 
organic compounds have been identified such as benzene and vinyl chloride. In 
addition to air emissions, the breakdown o f organic matter combined with moisture 
can result in the formation o f leachate. In general, the quantity of leachate generated 
depends on the net precipitation and the type o f landfill covers that are used. During 
the initial phase in the lifetime o f the landfill, leachate typically contains very high 
concentrations of organic carbon, ammonia, chloride, potassium, sodium and 
hydrogen carbonate. This in turn can leak into aquifers or run off into surface waters, 
contaminating drinking water supplies and adversely affecting human health. Few 
attempts have been made to quantify and evaluate soil and water externalities from
8 Doom and Barlaz (1995) estimate a range o f  3-19% o f global anthropogenic source o f methane 
emissions.
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landfills as these tend to be highly site specific and vary depending on the quality of 
the soil, the location o f the landfill and its proximity to groundwater reservoirs and 
receiving waters. There is also a time dimension in evaluating these effects; 
eventually all landfills will start to leak and can continue to do so for hundreds of 
years9.
There are also disamenity effects associated with landfills such as visual impacts, 
noise, smell and litter, as well as those caused by the transportation o f  waste to the 
sites. Finally, there are risks to human health. Eschenroeder and Stackelback (1999) 
compare the health risks o f landfills and incinerators and conclude that the cancer- 
causing risk factor associated with landfills is approximately 100 times higher than 
that for waste incineration. Bridges et al. (2000) find similar results with respect to 
airborne pollutants. In contrast, Elliot et al. (2001) find no increase in the rates of 
cancer in populations living close to landfill sites. They do however find a one 
percent increase in the rate o f congenital anomalies in populations living within 2 km 
o f a landfill site, and a seven percent increase for those living within a 2km radius of 
a landfill site containing hazardous waste.
In addition to the financial and external environmental costs associated with landfill, 
there is also the opportunity cost o f land and the user cost which should also be 
incorporated to adequately reflect the full social cost o f landfill disposal.
In the case o f incineration, though the weight and volume o f waste is significantly 
reduced (up to 75 and 90 per cent respectively), the process o f burning results in 
emissions of carbon dioxide, metals such as mercury, lead and cadmium, acidic 
pollutants (sulphur dioxide and hydrogen chloride), and particulate matter, among 
others, resulting in adverse effects to human health and the natural environment. 
Incineration also involves a flue gas cleaning process which may contaminate 
wastewater. Residual products (bottom ash, fly ash, and air pollution control residues) 
are disposed o f at landfills (COWI, 2000). There are also external costs associated
9 The issue o f  discount rates in evaluating these costs is therefore a relevant one (COWI, 2000).
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with disamenity effects. Table 1.2 provides some estimates o f total landfill disposal 
and incineration costs.
Table 1.2 Private cost, external cost and energy gain per ton of waste from landfilling and 
incineration in five OECD countries (1997 US dollars per ton)._______________________
Private cost External cost Energy gain Total cost
Germany
Landfill 51 3-15 not estimated 53-66
Incineration 104-192 5-14 58-106 52-100
Sweden
Landfill 16-24 3-15 not estimated 19-39
Incineration 57-65 7-15 35-42 29-37
United Kingdom
Landfill 8-51 3-15 not estimated 11-66
Incineration 84-96 24-33 63-77 46-62
USA
Landfill 15-57 3-15 not estimated 18-72
Incineration 69-137 11-20 49-66 31-91
Netherlands
Landfill 49 36 13 74
Incineration 155 56 57 153
Source: Porter, 2002
The estimates cited above are from Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (1997) for the 
Netherlands and from Miranda and Hale (1997) for the remaining four countries. In 
the latter study, the landfill external costs are composed o f air emissions and leachate. 
Given that landfill emissions were not available for each o f the countries, the 
emissions estimate is based on data available from only one o f  the countries, the US. 
The resulting cost from leachate is relatively low and thus the overall result should 
not be significantly affected by this assumption. The air emissions estimate is based 
on the assumption that 84% of the landfills do not practice methane energy recovery 
and 16% do. Looking at the UK in particular, incineration presents much larger 
external costs than landfills and is due to the less stringent air emissions standards for 
sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions compared with the other countries.
It is therefore important to bear in mind that though the results provide an indication 
o f the magnitude o f the external costs o f landfill (and incineration), that these may not 
accurately represent the true external costs for each o f the countries. Moreover, the
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results may be somewhat outdated given that new landfills may be required to 
practice methane energy recovery.
In general, the external costs associated with landfills are likely to vary based on the 
landfill characteristics and the characteristics in which the landfill is sited. Factors 
such as facility size, type, design, operational parameters as well as the host 
community characteristics such as the adjacent land uses, local hydrology, population 
density, local infrastructure, among others will play a role in the site-specific landfill 
under consideration.
For incinerators, the external costs represent a small fraction of the production cost. 
Landfilling is clearly a less expensive option than incineration when only the 
production cost is considered. Miranda and Hale (1997) caveat that there are 
uncertainties about the value o f external impacts, especially about the impact o f 
methane on global climate as well as the human health impact from air toxics from 
incineration that could affect the total social costs o f each option.
More recently, Davies and Doble (2004) use data from the United Kingdom to obtain 
an external marginal cost o f landfill disposal o f £5 per metric ton. The disamenity 
values i.e., the nuisance value o f landfill sites from noise, odour, visual intrusion etc, 
are estimated at approximately £2/tonne o f waste. These estimates are derived from 
values in the US where most o f the recent estimates were available. The estimates of 
non-disamenity value are approximately £3/tonne o f waste (from CSERGE et al. 
1993). The robustness of the disamenity estimates were later confirmed in 1999 when 
the UK Government commissioned a study to estimate the disamenity costs o f landfill 
in Great Britain. These were between £1.52 to £2.18 per tonne of landfill (DEFRA, 
2003).
The final option for waste management is recycling and/or composting, regarded as 
the most environmentally benign. The main external costs are transport related. 
Furthermore, there may be substantia] pollution and energy-use externalities
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associated with recycling. In particular, reprocessing of glass, paper and metals can 
involve significant energy requirements, although these are lower than those involved 
in processing virgin materials and in the case o f aluminium are substantially lower 
(OECD, 2005). This method is hampered by some limitations due to the feasibility of 
recycling certain materials and the prohibitive costs associated with the separation, 
transportation and reprocessing of the waste.
Today, the concept and adoption o f ‘integrated waste management’ has become 
synonymous with the acceptance o f a waste hierarchy in which disposal options are 
ranked according to their environmental costs as follows:
1. Source reduction
2. Re-use
3. Recycling
4. Incineration (and energy recovery)
5. Landfill
In the US, though the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also follows a 
hierarchical approach in its waste policy, the EPA explicitly mentions indifference 
between the final waste disposal methods of landfill and incineration. Thus, the 
results on the external costs o f landfill versus incineration summarized in Porter 
(2002) above tend to be in contradiction with the waste hierarchy in the case o f the 
UK and the Netherlands. For Sweden and Germany, this is less clear.
Notwithstanding some controversy regarding the waste hierarchy with respect to the 
ranking o f  incineration and landfills (see also Brisson, 1997), the past two decades 
have witnessed an expansion o f waste management policies implemented in OECD 
countries with the aim o f diverting waste streams higher up on the hierarchy. The 
next section describes the main developments in waste legislation and policy with a 
focus on OECD countries.
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1.5 Developments in Waste Legislation and Policy
The earliest example o f  a regulation pertaining to waste management seems to be the 
1848 Public Health Act in the UK. The Act made provision for waste to be stored in 
heaps next to properties, called midden heaps: “They were not actually heaps but 
large holes where rubbish and sewage was left until fu ll, then dug out and taken away 
by horse and cart fo r  disposal. ...The major change in waste collection came soon 
after in the fo rm  o f  the 1875 Public Health Act, a result o f  a cholera outbreak in 
London, which claimed many lives. The main thrust o f  the 1875 Act was to charge 
Local Authorities with the responsibility to remove and dispose o f  waste. Scavenging 
was replaced by a regular collection o f  waste from  each household”.10
Most o f  today’s relevant waste legislation and policy was established primarily after 
World War II when the growth o f the industrial base and changing lifestyles resulted 
in a major increase in air, water and solid waste emissions. As the only international 
convention addressing waste issues is the 1989 Basel Convention, which deals 
explicitly with the import and export o f hazardous wastes, the subsections below 
discuss the important waste legislation and policies that have emerged at the regional 
and local context in Europe and the US, with reference to other countries in the 
OECD11.
1.5.1 The European Context
At the European Union level, a number o f initiatives have been undertaken to more 
explicitly address the issues o f waste disposal and minimisation. These were first 
formalised under the 1975 Framework Directive on Waste and the subsequent 1978 
(amended 1991) Framework Directive on Hazardous Waste. Since then, several other
10 Source: http://www.integra.org.uk/. Integrated Waste Management Initiative
11 Sands (2003) argues that given the massive increase in the generation o f all types o f waste resulting 
from industrialisation, the lack o f a well-developed area o f  international law for waste represents a 
major shortcoming. At the global level, no UN or other body has overall responsibility for waste, 
which has led to a fragmented, ad  hoc and piecemeal international response (p. 675).
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Directives have been established setting up more specific guidelines and requirements 
for waste management.
The 1975 Framework Directive on Waste (75/442/EEC)12 sets out general principles, 
procedures and requirements for legislation regarding waste management and 
resource use. The starting point for the drawing up o f the Directive was the 
introduction o f national waste regulations in the Member States. Prior to the mid- 
1970s, most Member States regarded waste as a local or regional matter. The 
different national provisions on waste in place or in preparation at that time were seen 
as creating unequal conditions o f competition that would affect the functioning o f the 
common market. It is also stated that ‘the essential objective o f  all provisions relating 
to waste disposal must be the protection o f  human health and the environment against 
harmful effects caused by the collection, transport, treatment, storage and tipping o f  
waste
As amended in 1991, the Framework Directive incorporates key elements o f 
Community waste management strategy, including the waste hierarchy and what have 
become known as the principles o f proximity and self-sufficiency. These require the 
disposal o f waste in the closest suitable facilities and that waste produced in the 
Community should not be disposed of elsewhere. It further obliges M ember States to 
establish waste management plans and a procedure for licensing companies involved 
in waste disposal or recovery (House of Lords, 1998).
To explicitly address the regulation and control o f toxic and dangerous waste, another 
Framework Directive was established in 1978 on Hazardous Waste (91/689/EEC).13 
Herein, Member States are asked to encourage the reduction o f waste arisings, re-use 
and recycling activities, and to authorise installations handling toxic and hazardous 
waste. The annex o f the Directive lists 27 different groups o f hazardous or toxic
12 Official Journal L 194 , 25/07/1975 P. 0 0 3 9 -0 0 4 1 .
13 Official Journal L 377 , 31/12/1991 P. 0020 -  0027, amending Council Directive 78/319/EEC.
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waste for which special authorisation, control and surveillance procedures are 
introduced.
The 1994 Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (94/62/EEC)14 aims to 
harmonise national measures in order to prevent or reduce the impact of packaging 
and packaging waste on the environment and to ensure the functioning o f the Internal 
Market. It contains provisions on the prevention o f packaging waste, on the re-use of 
packaging and on the recovery and recycling o f packaging waste, and calls for an 
information and monitoring system o f waste packaging. Furthermore, it establishes 
some quantitative limits, including a requirement that Member States should ensure 
the recovery o f 50-65% o f packaging waste by 2001.
The purpose o f the 1999 Landfill Directive (99/31/EEC)15 is to harmonise controls 
relating to the landfilling o f waste between all Member States. The directive mainly 
affects local authorities that are the major drivers for recycling and composting 
targets, and business and industry in which companies will be required to separate 
their hazardous and non-hazardous waste. A primary objective o f the Landfill 
Directive is to reduce the landfilling o f biodegradable municipal waste to 75% of 
1995 levels by 2006, 50% by 2009, and 35% by 2016. Biodegradable waste refers to 
garden waste, kitchen waste, park waste, as well as scrap paper and cardboard. As 
mentioned earlier, anearobic decomposition o f this type o f waste in landfills produces 
emissions o f methane, a greenhouse gas that is associated with climate change and is 
8-10 times more potent than carbon dioxide emissions.
The Directive also bans the co-disposal o f hazardous and non-hazardous wastes and 
places bans or restrictions on the landfilling o f liquid waste, clinical waste and other 
materials. Existing landfills need to comply with the Directive eight years after it is 
implemented in M ember States, i.e., by 2009.
'4 Official Journal L 365 , 31/12/1994 P. 0010 -  0023.
15 Official Journal L 182 , 16/07/1999 P. 0001 -0 0 1 9 .
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The most recent Directive relating to waste was put forward in 2000 on the 
Incineration o f  Waste (00/76/EEC)16. This calls for reductions in emissions of nitrous 
oxides (NOx), sulphur dioxide (S 0 2), hydrogen chloride, cadmium and mercury as 
well as for controls on releases into water. The Directive also targets the incineration 
of non-hazardous waste, which is identified as the largest source of emissions of 
dioxins and furans into the atmosphere.
Also established in 2000, the Directive on E nd o f  Life Vehicles (2000/53/EC)17 lays 
down measures that aim, as a first priority, at the prevention o f waste from vehicles 
and, in addition, at the reuse, recycling and other forms o f recovery o f  end-of life 
vehicles and their components. Its purpose is to reduce the disposal o f waste and 
improve the environmental performance o f all relevant economic operators involved 
in the life cycle of vehicles, focusing particularly on the operators directly involved in 
the treatment o f end-of life vehicles.
Though there have been significant developments in the development o f legislation
and regulations relating to waste, it is interesting to note a more general trend in
environmental policy over the past decade or so towards the attainment o f ‘optimal’
or efficient control. This entails the balancing o f marginal costs and benefits or
alternatively, a trend toward the use o f more cost-effective policies (i.e., away from
exclusive use o f command and control approaches to environmental policy towards
the adoption o f economic instruments such as environmental taxes and/or emission 
18trading programs). Although this trend seems to be less prevalent in the waste 
management Directives established within the E.U., some interest in the use o f such 
instruments has nevertheless ensued. A recent Communication from the Commission 
states that:
16 Official Journal L-145 , 31/05/2001 P. 0052 -  0052.
17 Official Journal L 269 , 21/10/2000 P. 0034 - 0043.
18 Examples include explicit language regarding the use o f economic instruments in many o f the 
protocols o f the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution convention and the Kyoto Protocol under 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, inter alia.
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A t E U  level the development o f  fram eworks fo r  the use o f  waste taxes or 
charges, re-use or recovery systems, financial and voluntary instruments should  
he examined; Possibilities to support the creation and efficient functioning o f  
markets fo r  recycled products should he examined at E U  and national level; 
The concept o f  producer responsibility specifically addressed in some M ember 
States should be further explored at E U  level.19
Indeed, a number of European countries have introduced economic instruments as a 
means o f attaining their waste and related environmental objectives at a lower total 
economic cost. Several countries have introduced landfill and incineration taxes for 
example, and a few communities have introduced pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) 
programs (e.g., in Sweden and Germany). The purpose o f a landfill tax is to increase 
the unit price paid for landfill disposal, thus providing municipalities with economic 
incentives to reduce the amount o f waste they deliver to landfills and to stimulate 
recycling programs. In the UK, the landfill tax, implemented in 1996, was the first tax 
specifically directed at equating the level o f  the tax with the marginal external cost 
i.e., a true Pigouvian tax. Pay-as-you-throw, or unit pricing programs, aim to provide 
households with direct economic incentives to reduce the amount o f waste generated 
for disposal and encourage recycling.
Interestingly, the case of the UK illustrates the extent to which waste management 
policy is driven by economic optimality or other considerations. Though the initial 
landfill tax in the UK was set on an assessment o f externalities, an HMCE review 
published in 1998 found that the existing (optimal) tax had little impact on reducing 
the volume o f active waste to landfills. This was becoming a policy imperative due to 
the targets established in the Packaging Directive and the forthcoming EU Landfill 
Directive. There was thus a shift in policy to setting rates to achieve environmental 
targets. The landfill tax on active waste was therefore increased from £7 to £10 per
19 Source: Progress Report on Implementation o f  the European Community Programme o f  Policy and 
Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development “Towards Sustainability” 
[COM(95) 624] (www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment')
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tonne from March 1, 1999, with the possibility to further increase the tax in the 
future.
The aforementioned concept of extended producer responsibility (EPR) refers to the 
extension o f the responsibility of producers to include the social costs o f waste 
management for their products. An example o f this is the deposit refund system 
(DRS) whereby a deposit is levied on the production or sale o f goods, and the refund 
is given to the household or to the producers that use recycled materials in 
production. Examples o f  these are currently in place in Austria (e.g., refrigerators), 
Belgium, Denmark (e.g., glass bottles), Finland (e.g., beverage cans), Germany (e.g., 
car batteries), Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, as well as Australia and 
South Korea (e.g., tires and washing machines).
Another form o f extended producer responsibility is a manufacturer take-back 
program. The German Packaging Ordinance of 1991 is one example wherein 
manufacturers are required to pay to recycle their post-consumer packaging. 
Originally, firms were required to recycle 80% o f all packaging. This was amended to 
50% in 1996 and then 60% in 1998 (OECD, 1998). In order to benefit from 
economies o f scale, the Duales System Deutschland (DSD) was formed, whereby 
local waste management firms collect all recyclable bottles o f member organisations 
in exchange for payment from the DSD. The Green Dot on packaging identifies DSD 
members. (On economic criticism of EPR programs see Runkel, 2003 and Fullerton 
and Raub, 2004).
As o f April o f 2005, the UK has also established a Landfill Allowance Trading 
Scheme (LATS), designed to implement Article 5(2) o f the Landfill Directive. The 
UK’s landfill Directive targets have been divided between the four constituent 
countries: England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Trading o f allowances is 
permitted in England, and in Scotland it is currently subject to discretion o f the 
Scottish Executive until 2008, whereupon it will be permitted freely. As such, it
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represents the first example of a permit trading program applied in the field o f waste 
management.
1.5.2 The US Context
In the US, federal legislation has largely vested responsibility for waste management 
. with states and localities. The first federal law on the disposal o f household, 
municipal, commercial and industrial waste, the Solid Waste Disposal Act o f  1965 , 
initiated a small program of technical and financial assistance to be given to state and 
local governments for MSW disposal demonstration projects (Macauley and Walls, 
2000). The Resource Recovery Act of 197021 established federal authority to issue 
general guidelines for waste management. It is in the 1976 Resource Conservation 
and Recovery A ct (RCRA)22 and 1984 Hazardous and Solid  Waste Amendments23 that 
the federal government takes a more direct, though limited, role in MSW 
management. The primary goals o f the RCRA are to protect human health and the 
environment from the potential hazards o f waste disposal, to reduce the amount of 
waste generated, to ensure that wastes are managed in an environmentally sound 
manner, and to conserve energy and natural resources. Subtitle D, which deals with 
MSW, sets forth criteria that restrict the location o f landfills, establish guidelines for 
their design and operation, require the monitoring o f groundwater near landfills, and 
establish rules for opening and closing landfills. As a result, about 900 landfills 
closed that year.
RCRA also assigned to the states the responsibility o f regulating the market for 
household solid waste collection and recycling. The reason behind this was the 
inherent differences in industry practices and environmental conditions across the 
states (Callan and Thomas, 1997). It is thus at the state and local levels that waste 
legislation in the US becomes more interesting, and indeed a wide variety o f policy
20 Public Law (Pub. L) 89 - 272, Oct. 20, 1965, 79 Stat. 997, as added.
21 Pub. L. 91-512.
22 Pub. L. 94-580.
23 Pub. L. 98-616
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approaches have been adopted. The most common is to set a goal for recycling as a 
percentage o f the solid waste stream (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995) where more 
than forty states have legislatively mandated specific, quantified recycling and/or 
waste reduction goals24.
Moreover, a number o f states have passed laws that require all municipalities to 
implement curbside recycling programs25 and to pass local ordinances making 
household participation in the recycling program mandatory. Today there are more 
than 9,000 communities in the US with curbside recycling programs26. More than 23 
states have also banned certain wastes, such as yard waste, from being disposed o f at 
landfills (Kinnaman, 2005). Other materials banned from landfill disposal include 
automobile tires and batteries. In addition, at least 13 states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted minimum recycled content standards for newsprint (Palmer, 
Sigman, and Walls 1997), and California and Oregon have recycled content standards 
for glass and plastic containers (Macauley and Walls, 2000). Furthermore, 47 states 
provide some form o f tax credits, low-income interest loans, or grants for recycling 
facilities (Kinnaman, 2005).
In 1971, the State o f Oregon was the first to pass legislation for a Deposit Refund 
System (DRS) for empty beverage containers. This was followed by nine other 
states27 in the 1970’s and 80’s and more recently Hawaii in 2002 (Fullerton and Raub, 
2004). California and Florida adopted advance disposal fees (Macauley and Walls, 
2000).
Though the US has not embraced the concept o f landfill taxes for MSW, several 
states have introduced taxes on either the generation or disposal o f hazardous waste 
(Sigman, 1996). The US was also the first to introduce unit-based pricing or pay-as- 
you-throw (PAYT) programs on the West Coast in the mid-1980’s. The number of
24 Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) find no significant impact o f these goals on recycling quantities.
25 i.e., 22 states as o f 1998 (Kinnaman, 2005).
26 www.epa.gov/epaoswer
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these has expanded dramatically and is currently implemented in approximately 6,000
• • 28communities .
With regard to EPR, the closest the US has come to instituting a similar program is 
the Mercury-Containing and Rechargeable Battery Management Act, passed by 
Congress in 1996, facilitating a national voluntary take-back system for nickel- 
cadmium rechargeable batteries (Macauley and Walls, 2000).
To summarise, in Europe much o f the waste policy is influenced by requirements 
specified at the EU level. Individual Member States are then allowed the flexibility to 
adopt their own policies and measures to implement the requirements and attain the 
targets imposed. In contrast, in the US most o f the responsibility is vested with states 
and local authorities and there is no effective federal plan in place to minimise waste 
and maximise recycling.
Despite these legislative and policy developments, significant government and market 
failures continue to exist in the field o f waste management and need to be addressed 
in order to mitigate and reverse the trends in waste generation, its inefficient disposal, 
and the externalities they cause.
27 California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and 
Vermont.
28 www.epa.gov/epaoswer
1.6 Aim and Overview of the Thesis
The focus of this thesis is exclusively on municipal solid waste management and 
policy. Though MSW does not form the largest fraction o f waste, its characteristics 
are such that much o f it is biodegradable and thus associated with emissions from 
landfill sites, and some o f it is recyclable and hence subject to recovering and 
recycling policies. The thesis examines the issues o f waste generation, disposal and 
recycling at the macroeconomic and household level. The main purpose o f this thesis 
is to shed some light on the determinants o f municipal solid waste generation and 
disposal, on recycling behaviour and preferences, and on policy implications for 
effective MSW management.
To begin, Chapter 2 presents a broad overview o f the current state o f the literature on 
sustainable MSW policy incentives and their implementation. The efficient or 
‘optimal’ levels of waste generation and disposal are defined and the use o f economic 
instruments to attain the optimal allocation o f waste to the various waste streams (i.e., 
landfill, incineration, recycling) is reviewed. Finally, existing gaps in the literature are 
identified and discussed.
Chapter 3 examines the determinants o f MSW generation, analysing macro-economic 
OECD country data to identify the driving forces between inter-country differences. 
Using recently available cross-sectional time-series data, a reduced structural 
equation is estimated to establish whether MSW generation levels continue to 
increase monotonically, as has been found in a handful of studies conducted in the 
1990s. Subsequently, the effect of additional economic, demographic and policy 
variables on MSW generation is examined, and the implications for sustainable MSW 
management are discussed.
Chapter 4 follows directly from chapter 3, providing a panel data analysis of the 
determinants o f MSW disposal and recycling. With regard to disposal, the focus is on 
the proportion o f MSW that is disposed of at landfills. For recycling, the dependent
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variables examined are the proportion o f paper and cardboard that is recycled (as a 
percentage o f apparent consumption), and similarly, the proportion o f glass that is 
recycled. The results of the analysis provide insights into the economic, demographic, 
and public policy characteristics that have an important impact on MSW disposal and 
recycling rates.
This analysis is then augmented in Chapter 5 with the use o f spatial econometric 
techniques. Using this approach, it is possible to examine whether national 
governments are influenced by waste management trends and policy decisions in 
countries located nearby. With the use o f a spatial weights matrix, spatially weighted 
values o f the dependent variables are created and included in the regressions. Perhaps 
more interestingly, the chapter also examines whether OECD countries are engaged 
in strategic environmental policymaking by investigating the determinants o f landfill 
tax rates. The evidence suggests that spatial interaction does exist in certain cases, an 
element that has not previously been examined in the waste management literature.
As described above, recent developments in national waste management policy has 
prompted considerable interest into alternative waste management programs that 
would divert a portion o f the MSW stream from landfills. Chapter 6 examines 
household preferences for kerbside recycling services and uses a stated preference 
choice experiment to estimate the magnitude o f these in monetary terms. Using a 
sample o f 188 households in the London area, the empirical analysis yields estimates 
of the willingness to pay for the number o f ‘dry’ materials collected, the collection of 
compost, textile collection and the frequency o f collection.
Finally, chapter 7 draws together the main conclusions o f the thesis and discusses the 
implications for sustainable MSW policy. Contributions to literature on MSW 
management are also discussed. The thesis closes with suggestions for future research 
to further assist decision-makers in designing policies and programs that can achieve 
more efficient and sustainable municipal solid waste management.
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CHAPTER 2
Municipal Solid Waste Policy and Implementation: 
A Literature Review
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2.1 Introduction
The issue o f MSW management remains a practical concern in most regions 
throughout the world, while waste managers and policy-makers continue to search for 
appropriate methods to manage this issue more efficiently. Implicit in the concern 
about MSW management is that in the absence o f government intervention there will 
continue to be excess production of waste, and that this waste will be misallocated 
between each o f the possible disposal methods i.e., landfill, incineration, and 
recycling. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the way MSW is 
managed, and the number of waste related policies that have been implemented 
continues to increase. Despite these efforts, serious market and government failures 
still remain and MSW generation levels continue to rise.
The purpose o f this chapter is to provide an up-to-date review o f the key concepts and 
issues in the literature on efficient waste management and policy. The chapter 
discusses the inefficiency of waste generation and disposal in the absence o f 
government intervention and presents the various regulatory and economic incentive 
methods that can be used to address the waste issue at different stages o f the life­
cycle. Efficient policies for waste management are presented and their effectiveness is 
reviewed. The available evidence on the costs and benefits o f waste disposal options 
and household preferences for recycling are also discussed.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 begins by defining the socially 
efficient level o f waste generation and disposal, and briefly introduces the available 
regulatory and economic instruments that aim to foster the correct incentives for 
sustainable MSW management. These include inter alia unit pricing programs, virgin 
materials taxes, and deposit-refund mechanisms. These are presented in more detail in 
section 2.3, and section 2.4 reviews their implementation and their effectiveness 
along with some other related issues. Finally, section 2.5 concludes and identifies 
existing gaps in the waste literature.
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2.2 Solid Waste Generation and Disposal
The overarching goal o f waste management is to minimize the generation of waste 
while maximizing the ability to re-use and recycle it, in a way that is in line with the 
basic principles of environmental effectiveness, social equity, and economic 
efficiency.
Several waste management evaluation and assessment tools have evolved over time 
and have been applied to waste management. Morrissey and Brown (2004) divide 
these into three categories: Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), Life Cycle Assessment 
(LCA), and Multi-Criteria Decision-making Analysis (MCDA). CBA enables 
decision-makers to assess the positive and negative effects of a set o f scenarios by 
translating all impacts into a common monetary measurement e.g., by estimating how 
much individuals are willing to pay for an environmental improvement. The scenario 
with the greatest net benefits is the preferred option.
LCA is a tool that studies the environmental aspects and potential impacts throughout 
the product’s life, from raw material acquisition through production, use and final 
disposal (i.e. from cradle to grave). This takes a holistic approach for comparing 
different products or waste management systems so that environmental improvements 
can be made. McDougall et al. (2001) link the concept of integrated waste 
management (IWM) with that o f LCA. IWM systems combine waste streams, waste 
collection and treatment, and disposal methods with the objective of achieving 
environmental benefits, economic optimization, and social acceptability. Though 
LCA allows the trade-offs o f different options to be assessed and comparisons to be 
made, it cannot guarantee which choice is optimal because it cannot assess the actual 
environmental effects o f the product, package or service system1.
Finally, MCDA is a technique for comparing impacts in ways that do not involve 
giving all impacts monetary values. MCDA often involves combinations o f some
1 For examples o f LCA studies see Powell (2000) and Bovea and Powell (2006).
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criteria measured via monetary terms and others for which monetary evaluations do 
not exist. It takes individual and often conflicting criteria into account in a 
multidimensional way. The criteria chosen could include a risk assessment or an 
environmental impact assessment. The result is a ranking o f alternatives. However, 
the allocation o f weights to different criteria is a subjective decision, and changing 
these can lead to different preferred options or ranking o f alternatives. The 
subjectivity that pervades this can be a matter o f concern. Its foundation, in principle, 
is the decision m akers’ own choices for objectives, criteria, weights and assessments 
o f achieving the objectives, although ‘objective’ data such as observed prices can also 
be included. One limitation of MCA is that it cannot show that an action adds more to 
welfare than it detracts. Unlike CBA, there is no explicit rationale or necessity for a 
Pareto Improvement rule that benefits should exceed costs. Thus in MCA, as is also 
the case with cost effectiveness analysis, the 'best' option can be inconsistent with 
improving welfare, so doing nothing could in principle be preferable.
Moreover, these models take into account waste once generated and do not generally 
consider waste prevention, waste minimisation, or product design for the environment 
which would eliminate the production o f materials which cannot be reused, recycled, 
or naturally biodegraded2 (Morrissey and Brown, 2004).
CBA aims to maximise, as far as possible, the aggregate social values in the decision­
making process and is thus the approach taken here for organising the framework of 
analysis. It takes both private and social stakeholders into account, where the latter 
includes a wider social and environmental perspective and the jurisdiction may be 
local, national, regional or global.
From this perspective, the demand for waste services can be described as a derived 
demand, arising from the consumption o f commodities or from the production of 
products and services. As these economic activities inevitably lead to the generation 
of residuals, a demand for waste services is created. In most communities today
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municipal solid waste services are paid for using general revenues or monthly fees 
that do not vary per unit of garbage collected. Households thus behave as if more 
garbage is free. This public provision might be warranted if the service were non- 
rivaF, but in fact the marginal cost o f collecting and disposing of another unit of 
waste is decidedly nonzero. The community must pay for additional labour, truck 
space, and tipping fees at regional landfills and incinerators. Additionally, free public 
provision would be warranted if  the service were non-excludable4, but it is indeed 
possible to charge a price per unit of waste collected (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000).
Figure 2.1 illustrates the demand curve for waste collection services (DWS). As the 
price o f  these services declines, their demand increases. If the price is independent of 
the quantity o f waste that is disposed, then households are in effect faced with a zero 
price o f waste disposal. This results in an over-consumption o f waste services 
equivalent to W inducing a welfare loss to society equal to the shaded area L. In 
contrast, if  a household faced a unit price for waste, equal to the marginal social cost 
(MSC) o f waste services, P*, then the quantity of waste requiring disposal would 
decline to W*, the optimal quantity o f waste generation.
2 For examples o f  MCDA studies, see Vaillancourt and Waaub (2002) and Higgs (2006). For a 
discussion o f  this approach see Fawcett et al. (1992).
J A non-rival good or service is one whereby the consumption by one individual does not reduce the 
amount o f  the good or service available for consumption by others.
4 A non-excludable good or service is one whereby it is not possible to exclude individuals from the 
goods or services’ consumption.
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DWS
■ MSCp*
Quantity o f waste 
generated/ services
W*
Figure 2.1 Demand for MSW Services
Source: Jenkins (1993)
The marginal social cost o f waste services reflects the full cost to society of 
disposing/treating an additional unit o f waste and is composed o f two terms: the 
financial or private marginal cost (PMC) and the marginal external cost (MEC). In the 
case o f  landfills for example, the latter consists o f the opportunity cost o f the land 
(OP), the marginal user cost (MUC) which reflects the use o f a finite resource, and 
the marginal external environmental cost (MEEC).
MSC = PMC + MEC
where for landfills,
MEC = OP + MUC + MEEC
Thus the optimal level o f waste generation can be defined. This level occurs at the 
point where the marginal costs o f source reduction equals the marginal benefit of
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source reduction, which is also equal to the avoided marginal social cost o f waste 
collection and disposal.
Once the optimal level o f waste generation (and demand for waste services) has been 
ascertained, the next issue is to determine how to optimally dispose of and treat the 
waste. Since reuse is only feasible for a very small fraction o f the MSW stream, the 
management options are assumed to be landfilling, incineration, and recycling. Using 
a simple optimisation model, Brisson (1997) shows how this can be done. Formally, 
the objective is to minimise the net social costs (NSC) o f waste management for all 
waste, subject to the total amount o f waste, W, to be disposed of, where
w = WL + w, + WR
and W l. W j, and Wr refer to the waste disposed o f at landfills, incinerated and 
recycled respectively. Note that the net social costs consist o f the financial costs of 
waste disposal as well as the external costs of waste disposal, and that waste 
management (or treatment) can also provide some benefits to society. In the case of 
recycling for example, benefits are derived from selling the part o f the material 
recovered; for landfills and incineration, benefits are derived from selling the 
recovered energy5. The Lagrangian for this problem is therefore to minimise the NSC 
of each, subject to the constraint:
L = N SC(W l) + NSC(Wi) + NSC(W r) + X (W -W l  - W, - WR)
The first order conditions are:
MNSCl = M NSQ = MNSCr
where MNSC is the marginal net social cost. The solution is shown graphically in 
Figure 2.2 below.
5 Nakamura (1999) shows that in the case o f  paper recycling the benefits may be substantial.
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MNSCr MNSCi MNSCl
Wl
MNSCr
W
Figure 2.2 Optimal Waste Management Levels
Source: Brisson, 1997
M N S C r+i+l represents the total amount o f waste that can be managed at any given 
marginal net social cost. The minimum marginal net social costs MNSCmjn at which 
all waste can be managed is also shown in the figure. The optimal level o f each o f the 
disposal options is read o ff the individual MNSC curves by following the dotted lines.
In comparing this figure to the waste hierarchy discussed in chapter 1, it is worth 
noting that the hierarchy seems to assume constant ranking at all levels o f pollution. 
In fact, the waste hierarchy appears to be based on some form o f ‘green intuition’ and 
presents a ranking order through which waste disposal should rise. It should not be 
interpreted as implying that all waste should be recycled. In reality, we do not know 
what the optimal allocation of waste to the different disposal/treatment routes is. In 
fact, optimal levels o f landfill, incineration, and recycling may depend on other 
factors as well. Highfill and McAsey (2001) for example examine the decision 
between landfilling and recycling under the assumption that income is growing, and
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find that municipalities with low incomes should rely less on recycling than those 
with high incomes. The general consensus however is that, due to special tax 
treatment for extraction of virgin materials, energy subsidies, and other legal and 
regulatory measures, waste generation is excessive, and that the existing markets tend 
to encourage the disposal o f waste at landfills and incinerators.
A number o f regulatory and economic instruments are available which can be 
implemented at various stages o f the life-cycle o f products to provide the necessary 
incentives for the optimal management o f waste. These can affect the design, 
production, packaging, sale, use and disposal (Fullerton and Wu, 1998). Regulatory 
instruments include, inter alia , mandates a) on the disclosure o f toxic materials used, 
and b) on consumer separation o f materials for recycling or diversion rates for various 
materials; the establishment and tightening o f existing regulations; and bans or phase 
outs o f hazardous chemicals. The economic instruments that are available are listed in 
Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1 Economic Policy ! nstruments for Waste Management
Life-cycle stage Economic instruments
A. Raw material extraction 
and processing
1. Eliminate special tax treatment for extraction o f virgin 
materials, and subsidies for agriculture.
2. Tax the production of virgin materials.
B. Manufacturing 1. Tax industrial emissions, effluents, and hazardous 
wastes.
2. Establish tradable emissions permits.
3. Tax the carbon content o f  fuels.
4. Establish tradable recycling credits.
5. Tax the use o f virgin toxic materials.
6. Create tax credits for use o f recycled materials.
7. Establish a grant fund for clean technology research.
C. Purchase, use, and 
disposal
1. Establish weight/volume-based waste disposal fees.
2. Tax hazardous or hard-to-dispose products.
3. Establish deposit-refund system for packaging, 
hazardous products.
4. Establish a fee/rebate system based on product energy 
efficiency.
5. Tax gasoline
D. Waste management 1. Tax emissions or effluents from waste management 
facilities.
2. Establish surcharges on wastes delivered to landfills or 
incinerators
Source: Office o f Technology Assessment, cited in Fullerton and Wu, 1998
An expanding literature has developed that analyses many o f these instruments to 
determine which are most able to achieve first-best (and in some cases, second-best) 
outcomes. This literature is reviewed in the next section.
2.3 Efficient Policy Incentives for Waste Management
By far, most o f the theoretical literature on efficient policy instruments for MSW 
management has examined the appropriate design of a tax and/or subsidy policy to 
achieve the efficient allocation o f waste to the disposal options available. In general 
these papers develop models in which households maximize utility subject to a 
budget constraint that incorporates a unit price for waste collection. The models form 
the basis for solid waste disposal and recycling demand equations (Jenkins et al.
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2003). Kinnaman and Fullerton (1999) and Fullerton and Raub (2004) provide a 
skeletal model to frame the subsequent discussion of optimal policy design. Assume n 
identical consumers each maximising utility subject to a budget constraint and a 
mass-balance equation given by c=c(g, r) where c is consumption which produces 
waste that must either be disposed of as garbage g  or recycled r. The total amount of 
solid waste disposed is given by G = ng, and utility is a function of all o f these: U = 
u[c(g, r)]. Note that consumption c has a positive effect on utility and garbage G has a 
negative effect on utility. The household budget constraint is therefore given by:
y =  ( P c + t c )  c(g, r) + (pg + tg) g + (pr + t r)  r
where y  is income, p  is price, and each t is a tax rate. The price pr may be negative if a 
private firm pays consumers for recycled material, and any tax can be positive or 
negative. With no government intervention and hence all taxes set to zero, households 
will fail to internalise the full social costs o f their disposal decisions, resulting in too 
much garbage and too little treatment in a decentralised economy. Instead, 
households can be taxed on each unit o f garbage disposed (at rate tg), or subsidised 
for their recycling effort (at rate - tr). Alternatively they may be required to pay an 
advance disposal fee at the time o f purchase (tc). Producers in the model will produce 
c according to the production function c = f(v, r) where v is virgin material inputs and 
r  recycled inputs. Given input prices p r and pv the producers chooses output to 
maximise profits:
7i = pcf(v, r) -  (pv + tv)v -  (pr -  sfr)r
where the producer’s use o f virgin materials could be taxed (at rate tv), or the use of 
recycled materials could be subsidised (s&).
2.3.1 Unit-Based Pricing
Unit-based pricing refers to the imposition o f a tax (tg) on each unit o f garbage 
deposited, which can be levied either by volume or by weight. It has been shown that
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taxing garbage directly is sufficient to achieve the efficient allocation o f resources as 
long as households face the full social costs of their disposal decisions (Fullerton and 
Kinnaman, 1995; Palmer and Walls, 1994; Fullerton and Wu, 1998; Calcott and 
Walls, 2000). Households are charged with a tax per unit of garbage disposed and are 
thus provided with appropriate incentives for reducing disposal and participating in 
recycling activities. Furthermore, such unit pricing can also induce firms to produce 
the optimal amount o f packaging per unit and to engage in the optimal amount o f 
green design (Fullerton and Wu, 1998; Eichner and Pethig, 2001). Several potential 
problems have however been identified with the use o f such a mechanism, namely:
• Illegal dumping
• Administrative costs o f implementing pricing garbage by the bag
• Different social costs associated with different waste streams
• Prohibitive monitoring and enforcement costs
• Absence o f functioning markets for recyclables
• Effect o f household reduction effort.
Higher prices on the disposal o f waste may induce households to partake in illicit or 
illegal dumping6. Illegal disposal o f waste is associated with high external costs, such 
that these, or the additional monitoring, enforcement and collection costs associated 
with illegal waste, may outweigh the benefits o f reducing legally disposed o f waste. 
Under this scenario, Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) have found that the optimal tax 
on legal garbage disposal may well be negative. In another study conducted in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, they find that the administrative and enforcement costs o f a 
unit based program exceed the $3 per person social benefits o f recycling (Fullerton 
and Kinnaman, 1996). This may not be a universal phenomenon however; in a study 
o f the Dutch municipality o f Oostzaan, Linderhof et al. (2001) find that the net costs 
o f waste collection and processing did not increase as a result of a unit pricing 
program, as any cost increases were offset by lower waste-treatment costs.
6 Fullerton and Kinnaman (1999) list several empirical studies that examine the evidence for illegal 
dumping. The results are mixed.
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Dinan (1993) raises the issue that a uniform tax on all types of garbage may be 
inefficient if materials within the waste stream produce different social costs. For 
example, the social costs associated with the disposing o f flashlight batteries are 
likely to be significantly higher than those associated with newspaper disposal. Again 
however, administering a differentiated tax may be exceedingly costly.
Calcott and Walls (2000) argue that the efficiency o f the tax depends on the 
assumption that households are being paid for recycling. They find that in the absence 
of a functioning recycling market, policy instruments need to be targeted at both 
disposal and recycling. To attain a feasible constrained optimum they argue for a 
deposit system that entails two rates, one applying to recyclable products and the 
other to non-recyclable products (see discussion on the modified deposit refund 
scheme below). Fullerton and Wu (1998) also find that this problem can be corrected 
with the use of a subsidy on ‘recyclability’ combined with an output tax and a tax on 
packaging.
Choe and Fraser (1999) extend these models and incorporate the concept of 
household waste reduction effort with illegal waste disposal. They focus on waste 
reduction effort by firms and households, and on illegal waste disposal by 
households. When household reduction effort is significant, the monitoring o f illegal 
waste disposal becomes necessary and they find that a Pigovian tax is sub-optimal. 
Instead, the second best policy requires a positive waste collection charge on the 
household, explicit monitoring of illegal waste disposal, and a positive environmental 
tax on the firm. This is because, with household reduction effort, the waste collection 
charge will induce households to reduce their waste. This may also result in illegal 
waste disposal, which needs to be monitored at an additional cost. Higher waste 
collection charges aimed at inducing the efficient amount of waste disposal will 
necessitate higher monitoring costs that may be prohibitive. Instead, the regulator can 
indirectly tax household waste through an environmental tax on the firm.
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These results indicate that though unit-based pricing can be implemented with a 
relatively simple mechanism to achieve efficient outcomes, it will be necessary to 
evaluate whether the administrative and enforcement costs outweigh the social 
benefits o f recycling and will need to assess the likelihood o f illegal dumping as this 
can undermine the efficiency o f the program.
2.3.2 Virgin Materials Tax
In response to these issues, economists have examined alternative policies that may 
result in a more efficient waste disposal outcome, including a tax on virgin materials. 
The intended purpose o f  such a tax is to increase producer demand for recycled 
inputs, raise the price paid for recycled materials and increase the economic benefits 
to households that deliver recyclable materials to secondary markets (Fullerton and 
Kinnaman, 1999).
Miedema (1983) finds that a tax on virgin materials set equal to the social marginal 
costs o f disposing any resulting waste material produces greater welfare gains than 
other instruments such as a recycling subsidy to producers or an advanced disposal 
fee. Sigman (1995) compares the use of a) taxes on the use of virgin materials, b) 
deposit/refund programs, c) subsidies to recycled material production, and d) recycled 
content standards, specifically looking at cost-effectiveness in achieving reductions in 
lead from automobile batteries. She finds that the virgin m aterials tax and the deposit- 
refund are the best (i.e., least-cost) policies and equivalent in the incentives they 
create.
However, subsequent studies have found that virgin material taxes may not be able to 
attain the efficient outcome. For example, Dinan (1993) argues that a tax on virgin 
materials does not provide an incentive to increase the use of, say, old newspapers in 
products where it does not displace virgin materials (e.g., exports and animal 
bedding). Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) find that virgin materials should only be 
taxed if  their extraction has a negative externality (e.g., strip mining). Alternatively, if 
a tax on virgin materials is in place, it needs to be implemented alongside a tax on all
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other inputs except recycling. Palmer and Walls (1994) find that a virgin materials tax 
discourages production and consumption in the economy, thus leading to an 
inefficiently low quantity o f waste. They find therefore that a virgin materials tax 
needs to be combined with a subsidy on the sales o f final goods.
Thus, the overall weight of the evidence on virgin materials taxes suggests that the 
efficient introduction of such a tax requires it to be combined with a number of 
additional economic incentives, thereby complicating the administrative aspects of 
its’ implementation.
2.3.3 Recycling Subsidy
In lieu o f taxing garbage disposal or virgin materials, studies have also investigated 
the possibility of subsidising recycling. A recycling subsidy has the effect o f lowering 
the cost o f waste disposal and subsidising consumption (Palmer and Walls, 1994; 
Palmer et al. 1997). This instrument cannot therefore attain the optimum level unless 
it is coupled with a tax on consumption (or advance disposal fee, see below).
2.3.4 Advance Disposal Fee
An advance disposal fee (ADF) assesses a charge on the final product based on the 
implied disposal cost for the associated packaging, i.e., it is a charge on all 
consumption o f the final material. Palmer et al. (1997) examine the use o f an ADF at 
the producer level rather than the household level, which increases the price of final 
material to all demanders, including recyclers and nonrecyclers. They find that 
though the ADF (or upstream tax) has an output effect i.e., it decreases output 
because o f the increase in the production costs brought about by the fee, the ADF 
does not have an input substitution effect, i.e., o f recycled for virgin material inputs. 
Thus it is not able to attain the optimum on its own.
2.3.5 Deposit Refund Scheme
An alternative waste policy that has received strong support in the literature is a 
deposit refund scheme (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1995; Dinan 1993; Sigman 1995;
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Palmer et al. 1997). This is in effect a combination o f an ADF (or a tax on output) and 
a recycling subsidy. Under such a scheme, the consumer only bears a cost if the
product is discarded. Goods that are produced and then recycled avoid disposal cost
charges. It is therefore equivalent to unit-pricing in which households pay for the 
amount o f disposal, but avoids the problem o f illegal dumping.
Dinan (1993) compares a deposit refund scheme with unit-based pricing and makes 
the following conclusions: (1) A deposit refund policy may be more appropriate for 
items with higher than average disposal costs. This is because unit-based pricing 
programs usually charge households a constant fee per unit o f garbage, irrespective o f 
their contents; (2) A deposit refund policy is better than unit-based pricing in 
communities where illegal disposal is prevalent or for goods that pose high 
environmental costs when illegally disposed of; (3) To address administrative costs a 
deposit refund policy should be targeted for selected items in waste stream e.g., old 
newspapers, old tires, and lead acid batteries.
Palmer, Sigman and Walls (1997) suggest the deposit refund scheme be placed
upstream to avoid the transaction costs o f dealing with households7. They compare 
three price-based policies, namely deposit refunds, ADFs, and recycling subsidies and 
find that the deposit refund is the least costly, and the recycling subsidy the most 
costly option for attaining a specified percentage reduction o f disposal. Sigman 
(1995) finds similar results with respect to deposit refund schemes in her analysis of 
lead recycling from automobile batteries.
A generalisation o f the deposit refund scheme is suggested by Fullerton and 
Wolverton (2000) whereby the scheme is applied to any waste from production or 
consumption, including solid, liquid, or gaseous wastes. The tax is on a purchased 
commodity -  a normal excise tax on output, paid by the seller or consumer; the 
subsidy to clean activity (e.g., abatement, recycling, landfill disposal), and is paid to
56
the household or to the waste-processing firm. To minimise administrative costs, the 
subsidy could be paid per ton o f waste at the sanitary landfill or per ton of recycled 
material such as aluminium or glass. The subsidy is to be passed on to consumers 
through market prices, e.g., for a recycling firm to receive higher subsidy payments, 
they will be willing to offer incentives to consumers such as the free collection of 
recyclable waste. This approach achieves the same equilibrium as a pigovian tax on 
‘dirty’ activity but does not require the measurement o f emissions or dumping. 
Several implementational issues are considered including the inducement o f theft of 
waste to earn a subsidy; the generation of variable amounts o f waste with different 
marginal external damage costs; and open economy issues.
Despite the theoretical superiority o f DRS in comparison to most other policy 
incentives, in practice, DRS is only feasible for a limited number o f products, e.g., 
glass bottles and batteries, and is therefore not suitable for a large fraction o f the 
MSW stream.
2.3.6 Modified Deposit Refund
Calcott and Walls (2000) examine a scenario under which a recycling subsidy is not 
feasible. They argue that in most communities, garbage is collected for free and that 
the cost o f implementing a subsidy to recycling may be prohibitively expensive. 
Thus, in the absence of functioning markets for recyclables, they solve for a second 
best instrument, namely a modified deposit-refund program. The deposit depends on 
whether or not a product is eligible for recycling i.e., attaining the threshold level of 
recyclability necessary for recyclers to be willing to collect the product from 
households. Producers of products that are recyclable pay a tax up-front that is 
equivalent to the refund received by recyclers; if not recyclable, producers pay an 
‘advance disposal fee’ which is a tax equal to the marginal social cost of disposal.
7 Thus, beverage can producers would pay the deposit (or ADF) when they purchase aluminium sheet, 
and the refund (or recycling subsidy) would be granted to collectors o f the used beverage cans who 
subsequently sell them for reprocessing.
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A somewhat similar scenario has also been examined by Fullerton and Wu (1998) 
who argue that if  illegal disposal is an issue, free garbage collection may be 
necessary. In such a case, manufacturers must be provided with the correct incentives, 
consisting of a tax on packaging and a subsidy to designs that improve recyclability. 
This involves three instruments, but suffers from substantial informational 
requirements.
2.3.7 Landfill and Incineration Taxes
A landfill or incinerator tax is a unit tax on each ton of waste disposed o f at the site, 
and can alter the configuration o f waste disposal depending on the relative positions 
and steepness o f  the marginal financial costs curves o f each. In the case o f industrial 
or commercial waste, a fee linked to the quantity o f waste is normally charged for 
disposal. A tax increase would therefore provide industry or commerce with an 
economic incentive to reduce the amount o f waste they deliver to landfill (or 
incinerators), which could be achievable via source reduction, recycling, or illegal 
dumping. Households will not face these incentives unless there is a unit-based 
pricing scheme. Sigman (1996) argues that a tax system directed at environmental 
releases such as air emissions from incineration and ground water contamination from 
landfills would more accurately reflect environmental costs, especially if  these varied 
with geographic factors such as hydrology and population density. More recently, 
Kinnaman (2004) argues that a Pigouvian landfill tax set equal to the external 
marginal cost o f garbage collection, transportation, and disposal, will induce 
municipalities to adopt individual solid waste management policies efficiently, and 
that central governments should abstain from mandating kerbside recycling or user 
fees for all of their municipalities.
2.3.8 Recycled Contents Standards
Finally, a small literature has developed examining how regulatory approaches to 
waste policy can generate the optimal amount o f  disposal, but these studies generally 
conclude that economic instruments tend to be preferable. Palmer and Walls (1997) 
examine the use o f recycled contents standards which require that products be
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manufactured with a certain minimum amount o f recycled materials as a fraction of 
total virgin plus recycled materials. They find that, in order to generate the optimal 
amount o f  disposal, these must be combined with additional taxes on both the final 
product and other inputs to production. However, the informational requirements of 
implementation are high, and the authors conclude that the deposit-refund approach is 
generally preferable. In a subsequent paper (Walls and Palmer, 2001), they find that 
regulatory standards with taxes can also attain first best. If  the standard is set per unit 
o f polluting input, then a tax on that input is also necessary. If  the standard is set per 
unit o f output, an output tax is necessary. They also find that there may be a role for 
ADF to correct for life-cycle externalities, but only when these are in conjunction 
with pollution standards per unit o f output.
Sigman (1995) also looks at recycled content standards but assumes trading between 
firms is allowed, thus enabling cost minimisation if  the permit market is competitive.
2.3.9 Manufacturer Take-Back Requirements
Manufacturer take-back requirements are another form o f regulatory instrument. The 
rationale for take-back requirements is that firms would have the correct incentives to 
reduce packaging and to design for recyclability if  they were made responsible for the 
disposal o f their own packaging and products. Fullerton and Wu (1998) find however 
that the take-back requirement in itself is not sufficient to attain an efficient outcome, 
and it needs to be complemented with a tax on garbage.
In a more recent paper, Shinkuma (2003) argues that when the first-best policy is not 
attainable (due to the potential for illegal disposal and the existence o f transaction 
costs associated with a recycling subsidy, i.e., a refund, or deposit refund system), 
then when the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is 
relatively high, a producer take-back requirement is the second-best policy.
To summarise briefly, the overall weight of the evidence supports the use o f unit- 
based pricing (and deposit refund schemes on the number o f products where this is
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feasible). However, local authorities will need to assess the likelihood of residents 
partaking in illegal dumping. This assessment will need to consider/identify the 
conditions under which illegal dumping is most prevalent (e.g. population density 
characteristics) and the attitudinal/cultural characteristics o f the cohort in question 
(i.e. that some cultures may be more prone to illegal dumping than others, similar to 
e.g. tax evasion). Pilot programs would be a useful way to investigate these issues, 
along with obtaining implementation experience and real data on the administrative 
and enforcement costs. The following section turns to examine the empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness o f these instruments.
2.4 Implementation and Effectiveness of Solid Waste Policies
Some o f the earliest empirical papers on solid waste examined the impact o f socio­
economic factors on waste generation. With regard to the effect o f  household income, 
the results indicate that this has an inelastic impact on the household demand for solid 
waste management services. For example, in his study o f two Detroit suburbs, Wertz 
(1976) finds an income elasticity o f demand o f 0.27. Richardson and Havlicek 
(1978), in their study in Indianapolis, report estimates o f 0.24. The income elasticities 
from a number o f  other studies are summarised in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Estimated Income Elasticities
Study Data Estimate
Wertz (1976) Households in two Detroit suburbs 0.27
Richardson and Havlicek (1978) Neighbourhoods in Indianapolis 0.24
Hong et al. (1993) 2300 households in Portland, Oregon 0.05
Jenkins (1993) American municipalities 0.41
Reschovsky and Stone (1994) 3040 households in upstate New York 0.22
Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) 756 municipalities in U.S. 0.31
Podolsky and Spiegel (1998) 149 municipalities in New Jersey 0.55
Hong (1999) 3017 households from 20 cities in Korea 0.10
Johnstone and Labonne (2004) 30 OECD countries 0.15-0.69
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Other socio-demographic factors o f waste generation that have been examined 
include average household size, age composition, urban versus rural households, and 
the effect of education on waste generation levels. Increases in household size tend to 
decrease the per capita quantity o f waste disposal (Jenkins, 1993; Kinnaman, 1994; 
Podolsky and Spiegel, 1998) as do education levels (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 1997; 
Van Houtven and Morris, 1999). Jenkins (1993) finds that an increase in the 
proportion of population aged 18 to 49 increases waste arisings. The effect of urban 
versus rural households on waste generation is more ambiguous. Some studies show 
that urban households generate less solid waste (Podolsky and Spiegel, 1998; Van 
Houtven and Morris, 1999), whereas others indicate that rural communities tend to 
have lower waste generation levels (U.S. EPA, 1994; Johnstone and Labonne, 2004). 
In support of the latter, it is argued that this is perhaps because rural households grow 
and prepare a greater portion of their food at home, reducing the generation o f 
packaging waste (U.S. EPA, 1994), and because there may be a number o f waste 
management alternatives (e.g., composting, burning, illegal disposal) (Beede and 
Bloom, 1995).
2.4.1 Unit-Based Pricing
The success o f market based policies described in section 2.3 depends on the 
elasticity o f demand for waste disposal services. For example, a unit pricing program 
will only affect the disposal o f waste if  the demand for disposal services is sensitive 
to the price o f disposal services. The wide-spread proliferation o f unit-based pricing 
programs in the U.S. in the mid-1980’s and 1990’s resulted in a number o f studies 
that empirically investigate the effectiveness o f these programs in (a) reducing the 
amount of waste disposed of, and (b) encouraging recycling. The earliest study is 
conducted by Wertz (1976) who compares the average quantity of garbage collected 
in San Francisco, a town with a user fee, with the average town in the United States 
and finds a price elasticity of demand equal to -0 .15. In a more comprehensive study, 
Jenkins (1993) gathered monthly data from 14 towns in the U.S., 10 of which had 
unit-pricing programs and also found inelastic demand for waste collection services.
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A 1% increase in the user fee is estimated to lead to a 0.12 % decrease in the quantity 
o f garbage.
Hong et al. (1993) investigate the role o f price incentives and other socio-economic 
factors in household solid waste recycling using self-reported household data. 2298 
households were surveyed in the Portland metropolitan area where a variable service 
fee based on volume (per additional 32-gallon can), i.e., a block payment system, was 
in place. The results suggest an increase in the frequency o f household participation 
in kerbside recycling but that such a system did not significantly reduce demand for 
garbage collection services.
Reschovsky and Stone (1994) use a dummy for the presence o f unit pricing programs 
in upstate New York and find that the price o f garbage has no significant impact on 
the probability that a household recycles. Instead, when user fees are combined with a 
kerbside recycling program, recycling rates increase by 27 to 58% depending on the 
type o f material.
Miranda et al. (1994) also use self-reported household data from 21 cities throughout 
the U.S. over an 18 month period. They find that introducing unit pricing and 
recycling programs have a dramatic effect on the quantity o f MSW generated. Towns 
reduce garbage by between 17 % and 74 % and increase recycling by 128 %.
In contrast to the above mentioned studies, Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) use data 
from Charlottesville, VA, where waste has been physically measured for volume and 
weight at 75 households and where a $0.80 fee per 32-gallon bag or can was 
introduced. They find that a household’s actual weight o f wastes generated fall by 14 
%, the volume falls by 37 %, and the weight o f recycling increases by 16 %. Note that 
the impact on weight is more important than that of volume since waste is compacted 
by collectors and at landfills anyway. The change in space used in the landfill is better 
measured by the change in the weight at the curb. Furthermore, their results indicate
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that illegal dumping o f waste may account for between 28 to 43 % of the reduction in 
garbage. They conclude therefore that the incremental benefit o f unit pricing is small.
Morris and Holthausen (1994) use data from Perkasie, PA, to calibrate a household 
production function model and find that unit pricing does have an effect on disposal 
with a price elasticity of 0.51 to 0.60. Callan and Thomas (1997) look at the percent 
of total waste stream recycled using community-level data in Massachusetts. By 
including a dummy for the presence o f unit pricing programs, they predict that the 
portion o f recycling increases substantially with a unit fee, and especially so when 
there is also a kerbside recycling program in place.
In 1995, South Korea implemented the first nation-wide unit pricing program. In a 
sample o f households, Hong (1999) finds that unit-based pricing has a significant 
positive effect on the recycling rate and that the price elasticity o f recycling is 0.46. 
The price elasticity of demand for solid waste collection services is very low (-0.15).
In contrast, Podolsky and Spiegel (1998) find a very large price elasticity o f demand 
(-0.39) in a large data set of the U.S., and estimate the economic benefits o f charging 
per unit o f garbage to be as high as $12.80 per person per year. In another U.S. study 
of 959 communities, 114 o f which have user fees, Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) 
estimate the demand for garbage collection as a function o f the price o f  garbage, the 
presence o f kerbside recycling, and other relevant variables. They allow for the 
possibility o f endogenous policy choices (e.g., regional tipping fees, population 
density, state policy variables, demographic characteristics) and find that correcting 
for endogenous policy increases the effect o f the user fee on garbage and the effect of 
kerbside recycling collection on recycling. A $1 fee per bag is estimated to reduce 
garbage by 412 pounds per person per year (44%) but only to increase recycling by 
30 pounds per person per year.
Linderhof et al. (2001) are the first to estimate short and long run price elasticities and 
they are also the first study to examine unit-based pricing in a European municipality,
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namely that o f Oostzaan in the Netherlands. They use actual waste data for both 
compostable and non-recyclable waste from 4080 households over a period o f 42 
months. The elasticities are reported in Table 2.3 below.
Jenkins et al. (2003) analyse the determinants o f household recycling by examining
(a) a kerbside recycling program and (b) a unit pricing program. They also examine 
the impact o f these two programs on different recyclable materials as these have 
different costs of recycling as well as different values on the open market. They look 
at glass bottles, plastic bottles, aluminium, newspaper, and yard waste, using a large 
household-level data set representing 20 metropolitan statistical areas in the U.S. The 
data set used therefore also facilitates the identification o f policies and demographic 
variables that are significant across regions. Results indicate that access to kerbside 
recycling has a significant positive effect on the percentage recycled o f  all five 
materials. Furthermore, they find that the price of disposal is not a significant 
determinant o f the intensity o f household recycling effort for any o f the materials.
Another material-specific study is that by Halvorsen and Kipperberg (2003) who 
examine household recycling in Norway. They use information on the recycling of 
six materials, namely carton, paper, plastics, metals, glass, and food, and find that 
both differentiated disposal fees and convenient recycling programs such as kerbside 
recycling and local drop-off centres positively affect recycling levels (in contrast to 
Jenkins above).
Interestingly, Klein and Robison (1993) are the only ones who estimate the impact of 
disposal fees on commercial behaviour and find that firms reduce solid waste 
generation when faced with higher disposal rates.
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Table 2.3 Estimated Price Elasticities
Study Data Model Estimate
Wertz (1976) San Francisco Comparison 
of means
8 = -0.1 5
Jenkins (1993) Panel of 14 cities over 1980-88 
(10 with user fees)
8 = -0.12
Hong, Adams, and 
Love (1993)
4306 households in Portland, 
Oregon
Ordered 
probit and 
2SLS
No significant impact
Miranda et al. (1994) 21 cities in Unites States over 18 
months
Significant impact
Morris and 
Holthausen (1994)
Perkasie, Bucks County, PA 8 = -0.51 to -0.60
Stratham et al. 
(1995)
Portland, Oregon metropolitan 
area
OLS s = -0.11
Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1996)
75 households in Charlottesville, 
VA
OLS 8 = -0.076 (weight) 
8 = -0.226 (volume)
Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1997)
OLS
2SLS
s = -0.23 
8 = -0.28
Podolsky and 
Spiegel (1998)
159 towns in New Jersey (12 
with user fees)
OLS 8 = -0.39
Van Houtven and 
Morris (1999)
Marietta, Georgia Tobit 8 = -0.26
Hong (1999) 3017 households in 20 cities in 
Korea
3SLS e = -0.15
Kinnaman and 
Fullerton (2000)
959 communities in the United 
States (114 with user fees)
2SLS 8 = -0.28
Linderhof et al. 
(2001)
4080 households in Dutch 
municipality over 42 months
LSDV 8 = - 1.10 short run8 
s = -0.26 short runb 
8 = -1.39 long run8 
s = -0.34 long runb
Jenkins et al. (2003) Household data in the United 
States
Ordered logit No significant impact
Halvorsen and 
Kipperberg (2003)
Norway Ordered logit Significant impact
Source: Adapted from Kinnaman and Fullerton (1999) anc Jenkins et al. (2003).
8 = for compostable waste;b = non-recyclable waste.
On looking at the evidence as a whole, the findings are somewhat ambiguous with 
regard to the effects o f unit-based pricing versus the introduction o f a kerbside 
recycling program, and the effects these have on waste generation and recycling rates. 
The demand for waste disposal services is clearly inelastic. We turn now to examine 
the empirical evidence for alternative economic incentive waste policies.
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2.4.2 Virgin Materials Tax
There are few examples o f actual virgin materials taxes in place, and as such, little 
empirical evidence on their performance. The only available study seems to be a 
simulation model by Bruvoll (1998) who finds that a hypothetical tax o f 15 % on 
plastic and paper virgin materials in Norway would result in an 11 % reduction in the 
use o f these materials.
2.4.3 Recycling Subsidies and Advance Disposal Fees
Evidence on these instruments is also scant. One exception is Kinnaman (2005) who 
provides indirect effects o f subsidies by looking at the availability o f recycling 
programs. He finds that state subsidies for industries that recycle materials, as well as 
state recycling goals and bans on materials from landfills have no statistically 
significant impact on the availability of recycling programs.
Palmer et al. (1997) conduct empirical analysis on supply and demand elasticities for 
waste reduction using several price-based policy interventions for solid waste 
reduction namely deposit/refunds; advance disposal fees; and recycling subsidies. 
They develop a simple partial equilibrium model o f waste generation and recycling to 
evaluate the relative cost-effectiveness o f these policies and include the following 
components o f the waste stream: paper, glass, plastic, aluminium, and steel. They find 
that a deposit/refund mechanism is the most cost-effective and would achieve a 10% 
reduction in all wastes with a $45 per ton fee. In contrast, the same reduction would 
be attained with an $85 per ton ADF or a recycling subsidy o f $98 per ton. 
Furthermore, from a cost-benefit perspective, they find that only a modest reduction 
in MSW would be efficient if it could be accomplished without large administration 
and transaction costs8.
2.4.4 Deposit Refund Schemes
Porter (1983) analyses the effects o f a deposit refund scheme that was introduced in 
Michigan in 1978 on containers of packaged beer and carbonated soft drinks (i.e.,
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beverage containers). Beverage-related litter fell by some 85 % and the rate o f return 
o f containers for the refund was approximately 95 %. The study estimates the costs 
and benefits o f the mandatory deposit refund scheme and an overall welfare 
assessment of the program is conducted. The results indicate that the program does 
not necessarily pass the cost-benefit ratio.
In a study examining the impact of the California Beverage Recycling and Litter 
Reduction Act on consumers, Naughton et al. (1990) find that the Act will 
significantly reduce beverage container solid waste and litter, but that the net benefits 
o f the Act depend critically on consumers' valuations of intangible benefits.
Interestingly, Kinnaman (2005) finds that a deposit-refund program decreases the 
availability o f kerbside recycling by 4.6% (though the coefficient is not statistically 
significant). He argues that municipalities may avoid implementing municipal 
recycling programs in these states if they believe that consumers would take 
aluminum (the most valuable recycled material) and glass beverage containers 
directly to outlets for a return on their deposit.
2.4.5 Landfill Taxes
Martin and Scott (2003) provide a qualitative analysis o f the effectiveness o f the U.K. 
landfill tax and argue that the tax has not been effective in diverting waste away from 
landfills. Only inert waste has decreased as a result o f the tax, and it seems that the 
recycling o f construction and demolition waste has been stimulated. There is also 
anecdotal evidence for illegal waste disposal. In Denmark, a 225% rise in the landfill 
tax in 1990 shows a 15% reduction in waste deliveries, demonstrating a very low 
elasticity (Sedee et al. 2000). Given the low elasticity, the ability o f the tax to divert 
waste will be small, but the revenues earned may be substantial and could be 
earmarked for sustainable waste management programs.
8 This is based on marginal avoided social waste disposal cost estimate o f  $30 to $33 per ton o f waste 
disposed o f at landfill
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Empirical analyses on the impacts of landfill or incinerator taxes are few and far 
between. A study on the effects o f hazardous waste taxes on waste generation and 
disposal is provided by Sigman (1996). Using plant-level data from U.S. EPA ’s 1987- 
1990 Toxic Release Inventories, she examines the impact o f variation in state taxes 
on chlorinated solvent waste from metal cleaning. The econometric analysis suggests 
that firms’ generation o f chlorinated solvent waste is very sensitive to waste 
management costs but that due to the existing low level of taxes, the effect on waste 
generation is small. The analysis also suggests that high taxes on disposal encourage 
generators to choose treatment over land disposal.
The potential effects o f landfill taxes may be discerned from examining tipping fees. 
Strathman, Rufolo, and Mildner (1995) estimate the elasticity o f demand for landfill 
disposal o f municipal solid waste. In estimating demand for solid waste services, they 
distinguish between point o f generation and point of disposal. They take the latter 
approach using information on tipping fees and the quantity of waste that is 
landfilled. Using data from the Portland, Oregon metropolitan area, they specify tons 
o f landfilled waste per thousand residents as a function o f  tipping fees, average 
weekly income o f manufacturing workers (as a proxy for income in the region), and 
construction employment (proxy for local business cycle). They find that a 10 % 
increase in the tipping fee decreases garbage disposal at the landfill by 1.1 % - though 
costs may not have been passed on to households.
Interestingly, Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) also find that higher landfill tipping 
fees in the U.S. increase the likelihood o f implementing a recycling program. 
Specifically, a $1 increase in the tipping fee (from the average tipping fee o f $26) 
increases the likelihood by 0.78%. A more recent study however does not find the 
tipping fee to be statistically significant (Kinnaman, 2005).
Another strand o f literature on waste models optimal tipping fees for landfills. It is 
possible to model optimal tipping fees based on Hotellings rule if  landfill space is 
characterised as a depletable resource that should be used efficiently over time.
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Harold Hotelling (1931) examined the rate at which an exhaustible resource should be 
depleted and postulated that in continuous time, the rate o f change o f royalty must 
equal the social discount rate for there to be optimal depletion o f a natural resource. It 
is thus possible to examine the optimal time path o f extraction o f landfill space, given 
a backstop technology o f either incineration or recycling.
The earliest study involving tipping fees is probably by Berkman and Dunbar (1987) 
who discuss the effects of underpricing o f landfills when the tipping fees fail to cover 
the full costs o f disposal (i.e., the opportunity cost o f land, the depletion o f older 
landfills, and potential environmental damage). Tipping fees should increase over 
time as marginal costs rise with increases in the annual waste stream.
In a more formal paper, Ready and Ready (1995) model the waste reduction decision 
in two different ways. First they consider the problem of optimal waste reduction by 
waste generators and haulers. An increase in the tipping fee induces more waste 
reduction, resulting in a decrease in the flow of waste into the landfill. They find that 
the optimal tipping fee equals the variable cost o f handling the waste plus a user fee 
that reflects the scarcity of the landfill, whereby the fee grows at the real interest rate. 
The optimal tipping fee for a regional landfill is based on the problem o f optimal 
pricing o f depletable resource with an added component that the depletable resource 
can be replaced at some cost, i.e., when a landfill becomes full, a new landfill can be 
constructed. They find that after a landfill is depleted and a new one is built, the 
optimal price falls. They also consider the regional governm ent’s problem o f whether 
and when to invest in a large-scale waste reduction technology such as kerbside 
collection o f recyclables, centralised composting o f yard waste, or waste sorting 
facility. Using data from a Michigan landfill study, they are able to estimate optimal 
pricing policies and compare these to the best constant and break even price. 
Interestingly, they find that the optimal prices fall well below the break-even price of 
$23.35 suggesting that “many municipalities may be overpricing their landfill space, 
which could mean too much effort is spent on reducing the volume of waste flowing 
to the landfill” (p. 316).
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In Huhtala (1997), additional variables are included that are under the planner’s 
control. Huhtala uses recycling efforts as an upper bound on the costs o f using a 
landfill and includes set-up costs. The need for landfill space is implicitly determined 
given the amount o f waste generated and the costs and constraints on recycling. 
Optimal recycling and landfill disposal paths over time are derived in a theoretical 
model. A simulation is then undertaken of an optimal waste management plan using 
data from the Helsinki region in Finland. She finds that the optimal recycling rate lies 
in the range o f 31-51% under different scenarios suggesting that the existing 
mandates for achieving 50% recycling in municipalities are not unrealistic and are 
both economically and environmentally justified.
Interestingly, Aadland and Caplan (2004) conduct a study to examine the social net 
benefits o f recycling. The benefits are estimated using 4000 household surveys from 
across 40 western U.S. cities, and costs are obtained from previous U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency studies and interviews. They find that the 
estimated mean social net benefit o f kerbside recycling is almost exactly zero. In 
contrast however, another study estimating WTP for large-scale recycling and 
incineration in Finland finds that recycling is the preferred method o f waste disposal, 
and that the benefits o f recycling exceed the costs (Huhtala, 1999).
And finally, Kinnaman (2005) finds that these preferences or local tastes for recycling 
have a significant impact on the probability that a municipality will adopt a recycling 
program. The second important contribution is that o f state legislature and policies. 
Recycling mandates increase the population with access to recycling programs by 
roughly 10 % and therefore the recycling rate by roughly 2 %. In contrast, state 
recycling goals, bans on materials from landfills and subsidies for industries that 
recycle materials have no statistically significant impact on the availability of 
recycling programs.
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2.5 Conclusions and Gaps in the Literature
Attention to waste management issues from both policymakers and academics has 
increased substantially over the past two decades and the solid waste collection and 
disposal industry has undergone significant changes. During this period, a number of 
policy instruments have been implemented at national and community levels to more 
adequately address the inefficient generation and disposal o f MSW. The extent to 
which some o f these programs produce positive net benefits is debated.
Some of the economic predictions have been confirmed by empirical work: Higher 
incomes are found to increase waste for disposal and, to a lesser degree, a higher 
price per unit of garbage is found to reduce demand for waste services, though the 
availability o f kerbside recycling is also significant. Gaps in the literature on waste 
remain. Several of these are identified below.
(a) Given the most recently available data, what are the current trends in MSW 
generation and disposal today? Is there a decoupling with economic growth or is 
waste generation likely to continue to be an issue o f growing concern? Though there 
have been a number of studies that have empirically examined the determinants of 
waste generation and recycling rates at the household or community level, there is a 
distinct lack o f available literature examining this at the international level. Indeed, 
Beede and Bloom (1995) and Johnstone and Labonne (2004) provide the only two 
examples that examine the determinants o f waste generation. It is therefore o f interest 
to extend these studies, and to also examine the determinants o f waste disposal and 
recycling at the macroeconomic level.
(b) Though there is some evidence indicating that households’ behaviour with regard 
to recycling is influenced by the behaviour of their neighbours (Gamba and Oskamp, 
1994; Werner and Makela, 1998), there have been no studies to date to test this type 
of hypothesis at the national level, i.e., to assess for the possibility of so-called spatial 
interaction between countries with regard to their waste management performance
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and policy-making. There is today a small but rapidly expanding literature that 
evaluates the degree o f strategic behaviour in policy-making across regions and 
countries. This has focused primarily on income tax policies, and to a lesser degree on 
environmental policy stringency. However, there have been no applications of this 
approach (called spatial econometrics) to the case o f waste management and landfill 
taxes.
(c) Though studies have examined WTP for recycling, these have focused primarily 
on U.S. data. The existing studies use contingent valuation and contingent ranking 
techniques but no study to date has employed the choice experiment method to 
investigate household preferences for recycling and composting. Specific countries 
such as the U.K. and Greece could benefit from these studies greatly, given their low 
recycling performance, and the fact that they are required to increase these 
substantially in the near future.
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CHAPTER 3
The Determinants of MSW Generation:
An Analysis of OECD Inter-Country Differences
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3.1 Introduction
As trends in municipal solid waste (MSW) generation continue to increase, policy­
makers proceed to grapple with the issue of increasing landfill scarcity for landfill 
developments in certain regions, the public opposition associated with the ‘not-in-my- 
backyard’ (NIMBY) phenomenon in relation to landfill and incinerator siting, as well 
as global externalities contributing to climate change from landfill emissions. These 
phenomena raise important public policy issues such as environmental justice and 
intragenerational and intergenerational equity.
An understanding o f the driving forces of waste generation is important in 
determining the circumstances under which these are likely to change. This has direct 
policy implications for identifying the role o f public policy and government 
intervention in promoting more sustainable MSW management and for the choice and 
implementation o f different policy instruments.
As awareness o f these issues have increased in the public and political arena, so too 
has the theoretical and empirical literature devoted to efficient and sustainable solid 
waste management and policy. Most studies have focused on either theoretical 
models or empirical analyses at the household or community level. Very few studies 
however examine municipal solid waste (MSW) generation at the country, or 
macroeconomic, level. Using cross-sectional time-series data from OECD countries 
over the period 1980-2000, the purpose of this chapter is to add to this scant literature 
by examining the determinants of MSW generation and to assess the policy 
implications of these inter-country differences.
The chapter begins by exploring one o f the most dominant themes in the economy- 
environment debate o f the 1990’s, namely the so-called environmental Kuznet curve 
(EKC). The EKC refers to the relationship between income per capita and 
environmental quality where, in the initial stages o f development as economic activity
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increases, environmental quality deteriorates. Eventually, continued development 
leads to improvements in environmental quality -  hence the inverted U shape, similar 
to the Kuznet curve for economic development and income inequality. This 
relationship is tested for in the context o f MS W generation.
Though some of the earlier macroeconomic studies on waste generation emerged as a 
result o f the debate on the EKC curve (Shaflk et al. 1992; Cole et al. 1997; Lim, 
1997), very little empirical analysis has been conducted to examine how additional 
variables may affect MSW generation at the macroeconomic level. Demographic and 
policy factors that may influence MSW per capita generation rates include population 
density, geographic location, household size, waste legislation, public attitudes, 
source reduction and recycling initiatives, and the frequency o f garbage collection 
(Reinhart, 2004). Two exceptions are those by Beede and Bloom (1995) and 
Johnstone and Labonne (2004) and are reviewed below. The chapter therefore 
proceeds by examining the effects of additional economic, demographic and policy 
variables in MSW generation.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 presents an overview o f the 
economic growth and environment debate, and reviews the existing macroeconomic 
literature on the determinants o f MSW generation. In section 3.3, the methods used 
for the analysis are presented along with a description o f the data, and the results are 
presented. Conclusions and policy implications are discussed in section 3.4.
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3.2 Economic Growth and the Environment
The EKC has received much attention in the literature over the past decade and a half. 
The renewed interest between economic growth and the implications this has for 
environmental quality initiated, in part, as a result o f the debate on trade 
liberalisation. Environmental groups have argued that the expansion o f  markets and 
economic activity leads to increased pollution levels and a faster depletion o f scarce 
natural resources. The existence o f the EKC relationship was first suggested by 
Grossman and Kruger (1991) who examined sulphur dioxide and “smoke” 
concentrations and their relationship with economic growth, using a cross-country 
sample o f  comparable measures o f pollution in various urban areas. They found an 
inverted U shape for sulphur dioxide and dark matter suspended in the air, and a 
monotonically decreasing curve for the mass o f suspended particles in a given volume 
o f air.
Since then, a number o f empirical studies have examined the relationship between 
environmental quality (either through levels o f emissions or ambient concentrations 
in the air) and economic growth. The environmental pollutants and natural resources 
that have been studied to date include: Sulphur dioxide, total suspended particles 
(TSPs), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, methane, CFC 
emissions, automotive lead emissions, rates o f deforestation, drinking water, urban 
sanitation, as well as the state o f oxygen regime, fecal contamination, and 
contamination by heavy metals o f river basins (i.e., measures for river quality), and 
finally, municipal waste. These studies typically employ panel data and regress a 
flexible functional form of income per capita on the measure o f environmental 
quality:
E;/ = a  + (31Y // + p2Y"„+ (33Y \  + (kit + (3 5V/, + zlt (1)
76
where E is emissions, a is a scalar, Y is income, t is a time trend to account for 
technological change, V reflects other explanatory variables, and s is a stochastic 
error term. The subscripts i and t denote a country and a time index respectively.
Unlike structural models, these reduced-form models do not require a priori 
information on numerous parameters and enable the influence o f income on 
environmental quality to be directly estimated. Reduced-forms however do not 
provide information on the underlying causes of changes in environmental quality 
(i.e., whether reductions in pollution levels are achieved due to stricter environmental 
regulations or due to autonomous structural and technological changes), and are 
therefore not well-suited for policy analysis. In an attempt to obtain a better 
understanding o f the underlying factors o f the EKC, several authors have included 
explanatory variables such as trade-related measures (Suri and Chapman, 1998) and 
population density, as well as policy variables such as ‘contract enforceability’ to 
proxy for quality o f institutions (Panayotou, 1997) or GINI coefficients to proxy for 
inequality and power (Torras and Boyce, 1998). Other studies have formulated 
structural models that disaggregate the growth-environment relationship into a scale 
effect, a structural or compositional effect, and an abatement effect (de Bruyn, 1997; 
Antweiler et al. 1998). Potential explanations that have been offered for the existence 
o f an EKC can be categorised under behavioural changes and preferences, 
institutional changes, technological and organisational changes, and international 
relocation o f consumption and production (de Bruyn and Heintz, 1999). Theoretical 
models include those by Lopez (1994), the adaptation o f the Forster model to the 
EKC by Selden and Song (1995), a trade and environment model by Copeland and 
Taylor (1999), a growth model by Chaudhari and Pfaff (1999), and a consumption- 
based model by Gawande et al. (2001), among others.
Just as the causes underlying the EKC have remained largely undetermined, the 
empirical findings o f panel data studies have been somewhat ambiguous. The general 
consensus is that the EKC exists for local air pollutants, while more global or indirect 
impacts tend to increase monotonically with income (Cole et al. 1997; Ekins, 1997).
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In general, the use o f different data sets, functional forms (e.g. logarithmic vs. levels), 
and estimation methods can lead to very different results (Ekins, 1997; Cole, 2003). 
There has also been econometric criticism o f the EKC, namely that studies ignore the 
issue o f heteroskedasticity which is likely to be present in cross-section data and that 
studies that use only OECD data may estimate turning points at lower per capita 
income levels than those using data from the world as a whole. Furthermore, most 
EKC studies estimate a quadratic relationship between pollution and income and 
therefore fail to allow for the possibility o f emissions beginning to increase again at 
high income levels (Cole, 2003). More recently therefore, emphasis and analysis has 
been placed on a more systematic and rigorous application o f econometric models 
and the econometric techniques applied to test for the EKC have thus developed in 
sophistication and consistency (Stem, 2003).
Despite the fact that some o f the earliest studies on waste generation emerged as a 
result o f the debate on the EKC, only a very limited number o f studies have in fact 
explicitly examined the existence o f an EKC for MSW. These are by Shafik et al. 
(1992), Cole et al. (1997), and Lim (1997) (see Table 3.1 for a summary o f results). 
Using city level information for 39 countries compiled for the year 1985, Shafik et al. 
(1992) find that municipal waste per capita unambiguously rises with increasing 
GDP. The log linear specification performed best. Cole et al. (1997) use data from 13 
OECD countries over the period 1975-1990 and adopt generalized least squares 
(GLS) to estimate the relationship between municipal waste per capita and income1. 
They also find that waste increases monotonically throughout the observed income 
range. In Lim (1997), time series data is used from South Korea over an 11-year 
period. Wastes are divided in two categories, domestic and industrial. With regard to 
the daily disposal o f domestic wastes, the estimated result follows the inverted-U 
shape curve, and the regressions show that the double-log and quadratic specification 
has the strongest explanatory power. In contrast, industrial waste increases
1 GLS was undertaken following Kmenta (1986), Elements o f  Econometrics, London: Collier 
Macmillan., to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The Hausman test statistic indicated 
that the fixed effects estimation is favoured to random effects. The data on income is from Penn World 
Tables Mark 5.6; data on waste is from the OECD Environment Data Compendium 1995.
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unambiguously with rising per capita GDP. Note that none o f these studies include a
2
time-effect in their analysis to proxy for technological development .
Table 3.1 Previous Empirical EKC Results on MSW
Constant Y Y 1 ' "  Y ^ AdjR2 Obs
Shafik et a l l 992 Cross-sectional
Log linear 2.41
(5.51)
0.38
(7.69)
- - 0.6 39
Quadratic 11.02
(2.50)
-1.7
(-1.60)
0.13
(1.96)
- 0.63 39
Cubic -33.96
(-0.99)
15.08
(1.08)
-3.95
(-1.10)
0.08
(1.17)
0.64 39
Cole et al. 1997 Panel data
Logs
quadratic
- -17.46
(-5.50)
0.96
(5.69)
- 0.93
Buse
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Levels
quadratic
- -35.04
(-5.40)
0.0022
(8.89)
- 0.99
Buse
52
Lim 1997 Time series
Linear-Log -751.4
(-2.342)
101.51
(2.342)
-3.420
(-2.336)
- 0.603 11
Double-log -531.57
(-3.541)
71.694
(3.535)
-2.415
(-3.525)
- 0.552 11
Linear-Log 43786
(2.944)
-8927
(-2.963)
606.57
(2.982)
-13.735
(-3.001)
0.746 11
Double-log 25443
(3.182)
-5190.3
(-3.204)
352.87
(3.226)
-7.995
(-3.248)
0.796 11
^-statistics in parenthesis
The studies on municipal solid waste generation thus consist o f cross-sectional, panel, 
and time series approaches across developed and developing countries. Only the 
results o f Lim (1997) exhibit an EKC relationship, though MSW in absolute levels 
rather than per capita levels are used. Shafik et al. (1992) conclude that because solid 
waste disposal can be transformed into a localised problem, particularly in areas that 
are not densely populated or are low-income communities, higher incomes are not 
associated with reductions in waste generation. Cole et al. (1997) who also observe 
monotonic increases in waste generation throughout the observed income range 
suggest that the lack of an EKC is because municipal waste only indirectly harms the
2 Another study by De Groot et al. (2001) examines industrial solid waste generation. Using panel data 
from thirty regions in China over the period 1982-1997, they examine the relationship between gross 
regional product (GRP) and solid waste in levels, in per capita terms, and in per unit o f GRP. They find
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environment by representing an increased use o f resources and generating methane 
when disposed o f at landfill sites, which are global air pollutants and therefore do not 
create sufficient incentives to reduce emissions unilaterally.
Recently available data from the OECD (2002) however suggests that there has been 
a relative decoupling3 of waste going to final disposal from private final consumption 
(PFC) since 1995. Moreover, nine OECD Europe countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland) 
recorded a significant absolute decoupling4 with the amounts of waste going to final 
disposal. Given this information, a current re-examination o f the EKC for municipal 
solid waste generation seems timely and warranted.
Albeit providing a useful first step towards answering the question o f how economic 
growth affects the environment, the EKC has on occasion been referred to as a ‘black 
box’ in that it does not provide any information on the method in which the income- 
environment relationship works (Panayotou, 1997). Moreover, though there are a 
number o f studies that examine the determinants o f MSW generation using 
household-level or community-level data within a single region or country5, very few 
studies have been undertaken to examine the determinants o f MSW generation at the 
macroeconomic level. One exception is a study by Beede and Bloom (1995) who 
investigate the relative importance o f growth in real per capita income and population 
in MSW generation rates. Using data from a cross-section o f 36 countries they find 
that income elasticity is 0.34 and that population elasticity is 1.04. They also conduct 
time-series analysis for the U.S. (1970-1988) and Taiwan (1980-1991) and find that 
income elasticity is 0.86 and 0.59 respectively, and that population elasticity is 0.63 
and 1.63 (not statistically significant). The second exception is by Johnstone and 
Labonne (2004) who apply a model based on household utility maximisation 
proposed by Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997). Each household is assumed to derive
an N-shaped curve for the first, statistically insignificant coefficients on the second, and a statistically 
significant but negative relationship for the third variable.
3 Relative decoupling when MSW increases at a lower rate than GDP
4 Absolute decoupling when MSW decreases as the GDP rises.
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utility from a single aggregate consumption good and household municipal solid 
waste collection services whereby the use of household MSW collection services is 
considered to be dependent upon a vector o f demographic characteristics such as 
household size and the degree o f urbanisation. The demand for the use o f MSW 
services is therefore a function of these variables as well as the cost o f provision of 
such services which depend on the density of residential development. As such, they 
regress household solid waste generation on final consumption expenditures per 
capita, the degree of urbanisation, population density, and the percentage of children 
in the population. They find that household MSW generation rates are relatively 
inelastic with respect to household final consumption expenditures (0.15 -  0.69), that 
population density and more ambiguously the degree o f urbanisation have a positive 
effect on MSW generation, and finally the proportion of children has a significant and 
negative influence on MSW generation.
This type of analysis can help to assess the relative importance o f a number of 
potentially significant factors that have an impact on the rate of MSW generations 
and can provide insights into which, if any, o f these can be influenced by government 
policy.
3.3 The Determinants of MSW Generation: Methods and Results
3.3.1 Econometric Methods and Description o f the Data
The data set used is a combination of cross-sectional and time-series data, suggesting 
the appropriateness o f a panel data analysis. Panel data analysis has the advantage of 
improving the reliability of the estimates and can control for individual heterogeneity 
and unobservable or missing values (Baltagi, 2003). As before, denoting the cross- 
section dimension / where i = 1, . .. ,  N  and the time-series dimension /, where t — 1,
. . . ,  T the model is the following:
5 Refer to Chapter 2 for a review o f these.
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y lt = a  + p ’x it + s it (2)
s,t= i^ + vlt (3)
The term j l i, denotes the unobservable individual-specific time-invariant effect that 
takes account o f any individual specific effect not in the regression. The vit denotes 
the disturbance. Assume that pi are fixed parameters to be estimated and the 
remainder disturbance is stochastic with vit independently and identically distributed, 
iid (0, a v2). If  the set o f regressors x„ are assumed to be independent from the \ it for 
all / and t, then Fixed Effects (FE) regression is the appropriate model specification, 
in which ordinary least squares (OLS) is applied to:
y,■, - y ,
r - \  
X „ - X ,
-  \
P + \ v„ - V ,
where for instance:
y, = -=Y,y ,
■I / =  1
The fact that the FE estimator can be interpreted as a simple OLS regression of 
means-differenced variables explains why this estimator is often referred to as the 
within-groups estimator. That is, it only uses the variation within  an individual’s set 
o f  observations. Random Effects (RE) assumes pj is not correlated with the regressors 
and is a (matrix) weighted average o f the estimates produced by the between and 
within estimators. It applies generalised least squares (GLS) to estimate the 
coefficients (Wooldridge, 2002; Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2005).
The generally accepted way o f choosing between fixed and random effects is running 
a Hausman test (1978). Statistically, fixed effects are always reasonable with panel 
data as they always give consistent results. However, they may not be the most 
efficient model to run. Random effects will provide better P-values as they are a more
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efficient estimator, so RE should be run if it is statistically justifiable to do so. The 
Hausman test checks a more efficient model against a less efficient but consistent 
model to make sure that the more efficient model also gives consistent results. The 
Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed 
effects estimator. If  they are (insignificant P-value, Prob>x2 larger than 0.05) then it 
is safe to use random effects. If the P-value is significant however, fixed effects 
should be used.
The description and sources of the data used in the EKC analysis as well as the 
subsequent analysis where additional variables are included are described in Table 3.2 
below. The analysis is restricted to OECD countries because good quality 
internationally comparable data on municipal solid waste generation is not available.
Table 3.2 Description and Sources of the Data
MWPC Waste generated per capita (municipal and household). 1980-2000 in 5 year 
intervals. Source: OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002.
GDPPC Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, in 1995 prices and purchasing power 
parities (PPP) in U.S. dollars. 1980-2004.
Source: World Development Indicators, 2004
POPD Population density, defined as people per square kilometre. 1980-2004 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2004.
URB Urban population, defined as percentage of total. 1980-2004 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2004.
POLDX Waste legislation and policy index. 1995
Source: Adapted from Guerin et al. 2001; European Environment Agency 1998.
Due to some missing observations, the data constitutes an unbalanced panel. The 
analysis is restricted to OECD countries because of the existence of higher quality 
waste data for these countries and the fact that definitions and survey methods for 
MSW and data collection vary more substantially if  non-OECD countries are 
included. The OECD dataset is more consistent and reflects existing and ongoing 
work on waste classification at the international level6.
6 Furthermore, studies have found that single global EKC models may be a 
misspecification (Islam 1997, List and Gallet 1999, Stem and Common, 2001).
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The OECD defines municipal waste as waste that is collected by or on the order of 
municipalities. It includes waste originating from households, commercial activities, 
office buildings, institutions such as school and government buildings, and small 
business that dispose o f waste at the same facilities used for municipally collected 
waste. Note that there are differences between waste classification used by different 
countries. The waste legislation and policy index (POLDX) assigns scores based on 
national government policy to implement inter alia waste management plans, 
packaging eco-taxes, producer responsibility, prevention, and recovery /recycling 
programs, and whether the government has ratified the Basel Convention on the 
control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. Due to limited data 
availability, this is an aggregated index with a single score for each o f the countries. 
This implies that though the index can provide an indication o f  the effects of waste 
policies on waste management performance in general, it will not be possible to 
discern the individual effects o f these policies on waste management performance 
levels7. The full list o f countries with further information on the waste legislation and 
policy index is reported in Appendix 3.1. The descriptive statistics o f the data are 
reported in Appendix 3.2. The correlation matrix o f all variables indicates that none 
of the independent variables are highly correlated.
For each o f the variables, total variation is decomposed into between and within class 
variation and an F test is conducted to test the hypothesis that between classes 
variation is large relative to within class variation. For all o f  the variables, Prob > F = 
0.000, indicating that between class variation is large relative to within (Table 3.3).
7 Note that despite this weakness in using aggregate indices, there are a number o f examples in the 
literature that do indeed use them. These include Guerin et al. (2002), Dasgupta et al. (1995), Eliste 
and Fredriksson (2002), and Pellegrini and Gerlach (2005), amongst others.
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Table 3.3. Analysis o f Variance for the Data
Variable Between Within Total F test
GDPPC 3.074e+10 1.000e+10 4.074e+10 76.32
POPD 11168657 47867.975 11216525 5792.82
URB 114956.95 6401.52 121358.47 445.85
MWPC 1511445 497260 2008705.5 8.79
POLDX 2420 0 2420 -
3.3.2 Investigating Income Per Capita and MSW Generation
To examine the relationship between income per capita and MSW generation, both 
quadratic and cubic functional forms are postulated in both levels and logs for 
comparative purposes. All econometric analysis is undertaken using the statistical 
software package STATA 8.0. The models thus take the following form:
MWPC,, = a  + p) GDPPC,, +p2GDPPC„: (+ p3GDPPC„3) + z„ (5)
log MWPC,, = a  + p, logGDPPC,, + p2logGDPPC„: (+ pjlogGDPPC,,3) + e„ (6)
The estimates from equations 5 and 6 using fixed effects (FE) and random effects 
(RE) are presented in Table 3.4 below.
Table 3.4 El<LC for MSW Generation.
Constant GDPPCa GDPPC2 GDPPC3 R2 Obs/
Groupsb
Logs 23.08 -4.091 0.241 - W/n = 0.455 110
Quadratic (4.00) (-3.39) (3.80) B /w  = 0.480 29
RE * * * * * * * * * O/a = 0.513
Logs 21.01 -3.701 0.222 - W/n = 0.456 110
Quadratic (3.23) (-2.74) (3.17) B /w  = 0.477 29
FE *** * * * * * * O/a = 0.506
Levels 145.57 0.021 -1.61e-07 - W/n = 0.519 110
Quadratic (3.15) (5.79) (-2.40) B /w  = 0.438 29
RE * * * * * * * * * O/a = 0.497
Levels 101.534 0.024 -1.94e-07 - W/n = 0.519 110
Quadratic (L93) (5.33) (-2.53) B /w  = 0.439 29
FE * * * * * * * * * O/a = 0.496
Logs 168.748 -50.184 5.086 -0.169 W/n = 0.490 110
Cubic (2.78) (-2.62) (2.53) (-2.78) B /w  = 0.506 29
RE *** * * * * * * * * * O/a = 0.539
Logs 179.77 -53.961 5.505 -0.184 W/n = 0.493 110
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Cubic
FE
(2.69) 
* * *
(-2.54) 
* * *
(2.47) 
* * *
(-2.37) 
* * *
B/w = 0.504 
O/a = 0.532
29
Levels 352.73 -0.013 1.32e-06 -1,80e-l 1 W/n = 0.586 110
Cubic (3.39) (-1.34) (3.39) (-3.86) B/w = 0.453 29
RE * * * * * * * * * O/a = 0.565
Levels 327.39 -0.012 1.29e-06 -1.77e-ll W/n = 0.586 110
Cubic (4.06) (-1.07) (3.03) (-3.54) B/w = 0.453 29
FE *** * * * * * * O/a = 0.563
*** significant at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% leve!
Notes: a The minimum and maximum levels of per capita income are $3,657 and $51,637, 
respectively. b MWPC data not available for New Zealand.
The nature o f the relationships are determined by the signs o f the coefficients. In the 
quadratic case, if f3]> 0, 0, and fb = 0, this implies the inverted U shape o f the
EKC. In the cubic case, if (3] > 0, p2 < 0, and p3 > 0, the relationship is N-shaped, 
implying that there is a first increasing, then declining but finally again increasing
o
relationship between emissions and per capita income . Alternatively, if  pi < 0 p2 > 0 
and p3 < 0 then there is a sideway-mirror-S-shape (Ekins, 1997).
As can be seen from Table 3.4, the results are somewhat ambiguous. For the logs 
quadratic, the relationship is monotonically increasing whereas for the levels 
quadratic there seems to be an EKC. In comparison, the results in Cole et al. (1997) 
indicate consistent signs for both the log and levels quadratic case. Quadratic in levels 
imposes a symmetric shape on the EKC however. Stem (1998; 2004) argues that 
logarithmic specification is preferred. The log-linear specification implies non­
negativity restrictions upon the variables which the linear model does not. The 
restriction that emissions cannot be negative is not unreasonable in this case. For the 
cubic form, the cubic terms are always statistically significant and in both levels and 
logs the signs are consistent, indicating a sideway-mirror-S-shape9. This implies two 
turning points (as opposed to one turning point in the inverted U curve). Overall, the 
measure o f goodness o f fit, R2, is adequate, and the log-linear specification performs
8 Ekins (1997) points out that the N shape holds only if  the absolute values o f P3<(32<f31.
9 Household final consumption (HFC) was also used as the explanatory variable in order to test for 
decoupling as this is where some trend seems to be apparent (OECD, ibid). Data on private final 
consumption was not available, therefore household final consumption is used instead. These 
regressions did not exhibit an EKC and are not reported here.
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better than levels in the quadratic model whereas the levels performs better than the 
log-linear specification in the cubic model.
To test whether the random effects or the fixed effects model is preferred the 
Hausman statistic is used which is a test of Ho: that random effects is consistent and 
efficient, versus Hi: that random effects is inconsistent. (Note that fixed effects would 
certainly be consistent.) The result o f the test is a vector of dimension k (dim(p)) 
which will be distributed x2(k)- If the Hausman test statistic is larger than the critical 
X2 (k), one must use FE; if the statistic is smaller, one can use RE. The preferred 
regression model varies according to the model used10. In the logs quadratic case, the 
RE model is preferred [crit. x2 (2) = 5.99 > 0.79], whereas in the logs cubic case, the 
FE model is preferred [crit. x2 (2) = 5.99 < 19.28] (Greene, 2000. p. 577).
Diagnostic tests are conducted to test for the presence o f heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation, indicating the presence o f both of these in the data. The x2 (1) test in a 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test is equal to 6.27 with Prob > x2 = 0.0123. For 
panel data, the Wooldridge test for serial correlation can be used which is a Wald test 
o f no first-order serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2002). The test indicates the presence 
o f autocorrelation with F (l, 19) = 26.215, Prob > F =0.0001. (Note that in this 
particular case, because the MWPC data is in 5-year intervals and therefore not 
consecutive, the interpretation of the test is not identical).
Unfortunately, it is not possible to correct for both o f these problems in the presence 
o f a fixed effects model with a large number o f missing observations. STATA does 
allow for estimation of panel data with missing variables, where the error terms are 
heteroskedastic and/or serially correlated in the generalized least-squares procedure. 
More specifically, it assumes that the error terms across panels are heteroskedastic
10 STATA 8.0 suggested scaling the variables when conducting the Hausman test on the levels 
specification for both the quadratic and cubic case and that the results o f  the Hausman test may 
otherwise be misleading. These test results are therefore not reported.
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and that there is uniform AR(1) serial correlation within the individual panels 
(STATA, 2003). The results are presented in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 Feasible Generalized Least-Squares Estimates o f MSW Generation
Co-efficient Std. Error Z P>|zj
GDPPC -4.895 1.226 -3.99 0.000
GDPPC2 0.283 0.064 4.41 0.000
Constant 26.854 5.843 4.60 0.000
Wald %\2) = 143.60, Prob > %2 =0.000 
Log likelihood = 74.6126
Co-efficient Std. Error Z P>|z|
GDPPC -65.264 20.609 -3.17 0.002
GDPPC2 6.648 2.154 3.09 0.002
GDPPC 3 -0.223 0.075 -2.98 0.003
Constant 217.168 65.621 3.31 0.001
Wald x2(3) = 183.25, Prob > x2 =0.000 
Log likelihood = 73.3248
The results from the FGLS procedure are similar to those above. The cubic term 
remains statistically significant but the relationship between income and per capita 
municipal waste generation is monotonically increasing over the observed income 
range11. Hence, as a first investigation of the trends in MSW generation, the results 
from the RE, FE, and FGLS models do not provide any robust evidence for the 
existence of an EKC relationship between income and waste levels in the 29 OECD 
countries for which data is available. These results therefore conform to earlier 
findings of the 1990’s, and more recently available data does not seem to make a 
difference.
These results are in line with alternative viewpoints regarding the nature of emissions 
and the income relationship as illustrated in Figure 1.
11 The turning point for the quadratic expression is (x= 8.648, y= 5.668). The turning points for the 
cubic expressions are: (x= 8.86, y= 6.45) and (x= 10.9, y= 6.79).
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Figure 3.1. EKC: Different Scenarios.
Source: Dasgupta et al. (2002)
Stem (2004) neatly summarises these alternative viewpoints:
‘The “new toxics’’ scenario claims that while some traditional pollutants 
might have an inverted U-shape cui~ve, the new pollutants that are replacing 
them do not. As the older pollutants are cleaned up. new ones emerge, so 
that overall environmental impact is not reduced. The “race to the bottom ” 
scenario posits that emissions were reduced in developed countries by 
outsourcing dirty production to developing countries, which will f in d  it 
harder to reduce emissions. Moreover, the pressure o f  globalisation may 
also preclude further tightening o f  environmental regulation in developed  
countries and may even result in i t ’s loosening in the name o f  
competitiveness ’.
The issue o f the “race to the bottom” in environmental waste policy is examined in 
more detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Finally the revised EKC scenario suggests that 
the U-shape curve is shifting downwards and to the left over time due to 
technological change. As stated earlier, the EKC has been criticised because it does 
not provide any information on the method in which the income-environment 
relationship works (Panayotou, 1997). As such, the next section examines how 
additional economic, demographic and policy variables may affect MSW generation.
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3.3.3 A M acroeconom ic A nalysis o f the D eterm inants o f  M SW  Generation
In contrast to Johnstone and Labonne, 2004, the analysis here examines total MSW 
generation, rather than household solid waste generation12. This provides a more 
comprehensive and comparable picture for the subsequent analysis in Chapter 4 when 
MSW disposal is examined (defined as the waste disposed of at landfills as a percent 
of total MSW), rather than just household solid waste. Similarly, the percentage of 
paper/cardboard and glass recycled is from apparent consumption from all MSW 
sources, not just household sources o f waste.
It is considered that the use o f total MSW collection services is considered to be 
dependent upon a vector o f economic, demographic as well as policy characteristics 
of a country such as per capita income levels, the degree o f urbanisation, the cost o f 
provision of such services, and the public policies that have been introduced to 
address waste generation. Waste generation levels are expected to rise with increases 
in per capita income levels. The variable URB is expected to be important, as 
residents in rural areas for example may be more likely to grow and prepare their own 
food, thus reducing the generation o f packaging waste. Some evidence to this effect is 
apparent at least in the U.S. (U.S.EPA, 1994). As such, URB is anticipated to be 
positive. The anticipated sign on the demographic variable POPD is somewhat 
ambiguous. Some argue that it is likely to be positive because there are significant 
economies o f scale in the provision o f waste collection services, thus reducing the 
cost o f service provision (Johnstone and Labonne, 2004). In contrast, others argue 
that high population densities imply scarce land resources and thus more pressure to 
preserve land and environmental quality, and thus improve waste management 
(Matsunaga and Themelis, 2002). Finally, higher waste legislation and policy indices 
(POLDX) are expected to be inversely related to M W PC levels as higher indices 
indicate greater national commitments towards the sustainable management o f the
12 Household solid waste accounts for 60 percent o f  the total MSW generated.
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generation and disposal of waste13. Thus, the regression model which attempts to 
explain inter-country differences in per capita MSW generation rates can be 
formulated as:
MWPC/r = a  + pi GDPPC,, + p2POPD„ + p3URJB„ + p4POLDX„ + s„ [4]
All o f the variables are expressed in log form to allow for ease of interpretation of the 
coefficients as elasticities. Note that the argument related to POPD from Matsunaga 
and Themelis (2002) implies correlation with POLDX. As such, there is likely to be 
ambiguity in the interpretation of the results as it is difficult to disentangle what the 
different variables are capturing. Furthermore, the within class variation o f POPD is 
very small indicating that there is not much variation across time. This implies that 
much o f  the same information is captured in the fixed effects. The results from the 
random effects and fixed effects models are reported in Table 3.6.
13 Note that an important, but rarely addressed, issue affecting the empirical analysis o f  public policies 
is the potential endogeneity o f the policies under study. Policy-making however would need to be 
responsive to economic and political considerations within the country for endogeneity to be an issue. 
As described in Appendix 3.2, POLDX represents the number o f initiatives a country has taken to 
sustainably address waste management. Nearly all categories however are based on and reflect top- 
down international and regional mandates, such as the Basel Convention and other EU Directives (e.g. 
on packaging laws, recycling mandates, and the Landfill Directive) and thus endogeneity issues are 
likely to be less important. The usual test for endogeneity is a Wu-Hausman test but this requires the 
existence o f  appropriate instruments that are unfortunately not readily available in the waste context. 
Policy endogeneity, if  present, can lead to biased estimates and hence one may not be able to draw firm 
conclusions regarding the importance o f X on Y. It is said however that the majority o f  studies treat 
variation in policy variables as exogenous (Besley and Case, 2000).
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Table 3.6. Param eter estim ates for M SW  Generation.
Random Effects Fixed E ffects
Co-efficient C o-efficient
(Z value) (t value)
GDPPC 0.422 0.4540
(6.28)*** (4.31)***
POPD -0.036 0.861
(-1.43) (0.21)
URB 0.477 0.557
(2.76)*** (1.88)*
POLDX -0.229
(-1.65)*
dropped
Constant 0.5769 -1.08
(0.82) (-0.80)
No. observations 110 110
No. groups 29 29
R-squared Within = 0.4197 Within = 0.5266
Between = 0.5783 Between = 0.5587
Overall = 0.5069 Overall = 0.5262
Wald x2(5)=88.21 F(3,78)=l 8.88
Prob>x2=0.000 Prob>F= 0.000 
F test that all u_i=0: F(28, 78) = 5.44 
Prob > F = 0.0000
*** significant at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.
In both the RE and the FE models, GDP per capita and URB are positive and 
statistically significant indicating that higher income levels and the more urbanised a 
country is, the higher is the generation o f MWPC. In both models, URB reveals a 
stronger influence than GDPPD. POPD is statistically insignificant in both the RE 
and FE models. It should be noted that the urbanisation rate and the population 
density are not highly correlated. In the sample, the correlation coefficient between 
the two is only -0.2422, thus it does not seem to be the case that a large part o f the 
variation on POPD is explicable by the variation o f URB. POLDX shows the 
intuitively correct negative sign but is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Assessing the overall fit in panel data is undertaken by examining the overall R2 for a 
random effects model and the within R2 for a fixed effects model. The Hausman test 
statistic with %2(3) = 2.08, Prob>x2= 0.5568 suggests that the random effects 
regression is the appropriate model for this data. The R2 o f 0.51 suggests a relatively 
good fit. Diagnostic tests are conducted to test for heteroskedasticity and serial
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correlation in the data. The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity with x2(l)  = 12.14, Prob > x20 )  = 0.0005 which is greater than 
the critical x20 )  = 3.84. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is therefore 
rejected. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation with F (l, 19) = 15.071, indicates 
that there is autocorrelation in the data (Prob > F = 0.0010). The method o f feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) is therefore used to estimate the model in STATA 
which allows estimation of panel data with missing variables and allows for the 
presence o f AR(1) autocorrelation within panels, as well as heteroskedasticity across 
panels (STATA, 2003; Johnstone et al. 2004). The results are presented in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7. FGLS Estimates of MSW Generation
Co-efficient Std. Error z P>|z
GDPPC 0.4356 0.0352 12.36 0.000
POPD -0.0395 0.0067 -5.92 0.000
URB 0.4718 0.0645 7.31 0.000
POLDX -0.1884 0.0387 -4.86 0.000
Constant 0.3739 0.3505 1.07 0.286
Wald x2 (4) = 458.92, Prob > x2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = 2.2594
The results are fairly consistent with the RE and FE estimates above, with the 
exception that in the FGLS model, POPD is now statistically significant. This 
suggests that an increase in population density does have a significant downward 
impact on the amount o f MWPC generated. All the other variables continue to exhibit 
the same signs on the coefficients. The positive and significant sign on URB is not 
encouraging as projections show that the share o f total population living in urban 
areas will continue to grow in the future (WRI, 1996). In addition, the waste 
legislation and policy index, though negative, is statistically insignificant (P-value = 
0.255) suggesting that the national commitments towards sustainable waste 
management have not had a major impact on reducing the amount o f MSW 
generated14.
14 One caveat is that the variable POLDX does not vary over time and the coefficient may therefore not 
adequately capture all the relationship between MWPC generation. Moreover, POLDX is an 
aggregated proxy and therefore it is not possible to determine the incremental effects o f each policy.
93
Conforming with the results of Johnstone and Labonne (2004), MWPC is indeed 
income-inelastic. The strongest impact on MWPC however is urbanization. 
Furthermore, in this model, the waste legislation and policy index is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that greater national commitments to sustainable 
waste management have had an impact in reducing the amount o f MWPC generation.
Neither o f these models are ideal and the analysis is restricted by the capacity o f 
STATA to address models in which the panel data is affected by heterskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Though the FGLS model addresses this to an extent by making 
assumptions on the nature o f the autocorrelation, the accepted norm is to report the 
range o f estimates provided by the preferred RE/FE model and the FGLS model (see 
e.g., Johnstone et al.)
Finally, the interpretation of the POLDX may perhaps be ambiguous. For example, if 
policy stringency also captures enforcement, it may result in a reduction o f the waste 
disposed o f illegally and hence in an increase in the generation o f  waste. Furthermore, 
in many cases the incentives may not be transmitted back to the generators o f waste.
3.4 Conclusions and Policy Implications
An examination the relationship between o f the income per capita and MSW 
generation reveals that the results confirm with previous studies o f this nature 
conducted in the 1990s. There does not seem to be strong evidence to suggest that 
MSW generation is initially increasing with rising incomes, and after attaining a 
turning point, that these levels begin to decline with continued economic growth.
The subsequent analysis examines the determinants o f MSW generation rates in 
OECD countries in more detail. It provides evidence on the economic and 
demographic determinants of generation rates in municipal solid waste and has made 
a first attempt at including an important potential influence on municipal solid waste 
generation, namely that o f public policy, as proxied by the waste legislation and
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policy index. From a policy perspective, the results are not particularly encouraging. 
Conforming with previous studies, the data indicate that per capita MSW generated is 
increasing monotonically with GDP per capita. M oreover in addition to GDP per 
capita, the degree of urbanisation also has a positive impact on the generation of 
municipal waste. This is discouraging given that projections show that the share of 
total population living in cities will grow at a fast rate in the future (WR1, 1996). 
There is however some evidence suggesting that national commitments towards 
sustainable waste management may have a positive effect in reducing the levels of 
MSW generation. A clearer understanding of the determinants of MSW generation is 
an important prerequisite for planning and implementing sustainable MSW policies. 
The results suggest that policy-makers may wish to focus their efforts in addressing 
waste generation levels in urbanized areas, to promote a shift in the structure o f 
consumption and production so as to reduce the environmental impacts o f waste. 
Greater emphasis needs to be placed on reducing the environmental and resource 
intensity that is linked to the consumption and production o f different goods and 
services. Waste policies, as proxied by the waste legislation and policy index, seem to 
have had an impact on the rates of MSW generation across different countries. 
However, as noted earlier, results from the POLDX variable need to be interpreted 
with care given that this only provides a rough proxy for waste management policies. 
Further efforts for future research could focus on obtaining comparable and consistent 
data on individual waste management policies in OECD countries and their 
development over time.
Though household level studies are better suited to examining the specific waste 
policies that are more effective in encouraging a transition to sustainable waste 
management practices, the analysis conducted here yields some interesting insights 
into the determinants o f MSW generation across OECD countries.
This analysis however does not provide any information on the way that the volume 
of waste is managed. As noted by Cole et al. (1997), the actual environmental impact
95
of municipal solid waste is masked by the fact that the volume o f municipal waste 
does not indicate just how much of that waste is recycled. Waste disposal 
management and its determinants is an area that has been negligibly addressed in the 
literature and can provide additional and important insights into the waste issue. This 
issue is examined in Chapter 4.
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Appendix 3.1. The Waste Legislation and Policy Index
List o f  countries and the waste legislation and policy index (POLDX).
Country Waste policy index (11 point scale)
Australia 8
Austria 10
Belgium 10
Canada 8
Czech Republic 5
Denmark 10
Finland 10
France 10
Germany 9.5
Greece 9
Hungary 5
Iceland b
Italy 9
Ireland 8
Japan 8
Korea 7
Luxembourg 7
Mexico 6.5
Netherlands 10
New Zealand 7
Norway 10
Portugal 6
Poland 5
Slovak Republic 5
Spain 6
Sweden 9
Switzerland 6
Turkey 6
UK 9
USA 6
Source: Adapted from Guerin, Crete, Mercier, 2001
EEA Europe’s Environment: The Second Assessment 1998. Luxembourg.
The waste legislation and policy index is computed by summing each country’s scores based 
on their policy initiatives concerning different aspects o f waste management. The scores are 
based on national government policy in 10 categories: 1) Waste management plans; 2) 
Priority to prevent and reduce waste harmfulness; 3) Waste eco-taxes; 4) Producer 
responsibility; 5) Prevention, 6) Recovery/recycling programs; 7) Hazardous waste reduction; 
8) Ratification o f the Basel Convention on the control o f transboundary movements of 
hazardous wastes; 9) Bans on hazardous waste; 10) Bans on other waste. Each category is 
assigned one point, with the exception o f the category on waste eco-taxes which can score 1 
point for one eco-tax or two points for two eco-taxes (e.g. packaging tax, and tax on waste 
generation).
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The 10 countries with regular font is taken from Guerin. Crete. Mercier, (2001) who used 
data from the EEA (1998) to construct the index. Scores in italics have been created from the 
EEA (1998) for the remaining countries for which information is directly available. The other 
scores are estimated based on information from the Secretariat o f the Basel Convention, 
UNEP, at http://www.basel.int/. the OECD Environmental Taxes database, and other sources.
An excerpt of the scores of several countries is illustrated in the matrix table below.
Countries Waste
Mngmt
Plans
Priority to 
prevent and 
reduce 
waste
harmfulness
Waste
eco-
taxes
Producer
Responsi­
bility
Prevent­
ion
Recovery/
Recycling
Hazardous
waste
reduction
Basel
Conve
ntion
Bans on 
hazardous 
waste
Bans on 
other wa
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 2 1 - 1 1 1 1 1
Finland 1 1 2 1 X 1 1 1 1 1
France 1 1 2 1 - 1 1 1 1 1
Germanv 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Greece 1 1 X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ireland 1 1 X 1 X 1 1 1 1 1
Italy 1 X 2 1 X 1 1 1 1 1
Luxem­
bourg
1 1 X 1 X - 1 1 1 1
Nether­
lands
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal - - X 1 X 1 1 1 1 1
Spain 1 X X 1 X - 1 1 1 1
Sweden 1 1 X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
UK 1 1 1 1 X 1 1 1 1 1
1 Only in some laenders or communities.
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Appendix 3.2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDPPC 750 17935.898 7374.898 1122.97 55102.73
POPD 750 129.716 122.3737 1.91 488.03
URB 750 72.23851 12.729 29.44 97.23
MWPC 110 448.3636 135.7516 190 760
POLDX 750 7.7 1.7975 5 10
NB: The negative minimum for ldtax and rldtax within is not a mistake; the within is showing 
the variation o f (r)ldtax within country around the global mean 4.899
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CHAPTER 4
The Determinants of MSW Disposal and Recycling: 
Examining OECD Inter-Country Differences 
for Waste Management
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4.1 Introduction
Though the general trend in MSW generation in OECD countries has been on the 
incline over the past 20 years, this does not provide any information on the way the 
MSW is being managed. It has been argued that the environmental impact of 
municipal waste is masked by the fact that the volume o f municipal waste does not 
indicate just how much o f that waste is recycled (Cole et al., 1997). Indeed, the 
proportion of waste disposed o f at landfills is on the decline and, in terms o f recycling 
for paper/cardboard and glass, the past two decades have witnessed an overall 
increase in recycling rates1. Moreover, there is wide variation in the proportion of 
MSW disposed o f at landfills and in recycling rates across OECD countries. For 
example several countries such as the UK, Poland, and Greece landfill more than 70 
percent o f  the MSW generated, whereas other countries such as Denmark and 
Sweden dispose o f less than 20 percent o f the MSW in this manner (Eurostat, 2003).
This chapter examines the underlying factors that determine the way MSW is 
managed once it has been generated. More specifically, it examines (a) the proportion 
of MSW that is disposed o f at landfills, (b) the proportion o f paper and cardboard that 
is recycled as a percentage o f apparent consumption, and (c) the proportion o f glass 
that is recycled as a percentage o f apparent consumption. An analysis o f what the 
main determinants o f landfill disposal and recycling rates is important for 
understanding the degree o f policy flexibility in affecting these rates. For example, 
Berglund et al. (2002) argue that if recycling rates are largely determined by 
important cost elements (e.g. population density), it may be costly to pursue very 
ambitious recycling targets and also to implement harmonised policy targets across 
countries.
In addition to economic and demographic variables, this study analyses the effects of 
two policy variables on landfill disposal and recycling rates, namely a waste 
legislation and policy index, and the level o f landfill taxes that have been introduced
' See Chapter 1, Figures 1.8 and 1.9.
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in a number of OECD countries. The results reveal some interesting insights into the 
nature o f future waste trends and the effect that public policy may have on these.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the existing macroeconomic 
literature on waste management. Section 4.3 presents the data to be used in this 
analysis and the panel data regression models that are estimated to identify and 
analyse the main determinants o f MSW landfill disposal and recycling rates. Finally, 
Section 4.4 concludes and discusses implications for policy.
4.2. A Review of the Macroeconomic Waste Literature
Though only a few studies have examined the determinants o f MSW generation at the 
macroeconomic level, notably less empirical analysis has examined how MSW is 
disposed of between landfill, incineration, and recycling. A small but growing 
literature has examined the determinants o f recycling at the household level. For 
example, many o f the studies reviewed in chapter 2 that examine the effects of 
economic and regulatory instruments on recycling rates (e.g., unit pricing programs 
and kerbside recycling programs) have also analysed the effects o f economic and 
demographic characteristics o f the households and the impacts these have on 
recycling rates. Results indicate that socio-economic factors such as income, 
population density, single or multi-family dwellings, household size, education, and 
average age o f the head of the household influence recycling behaviour (Hong et al. 
1993; Jenkins et al. 2003; Halvorsen and Kipperberg, 2003, among others). 
Specifically, income, education, age and household size have a positive impact on 
recycling whereas population density is negatively associated with recycling and 
home composting o f organic waste. Ando and Gosselin (2003) find that multi-family 
dwellings are less likely to recycle than single-family dwellings. Most of these studies 
however are conducted using datasets from the U.S. and it is not clear whether these 
results carry over to other countries.
102
Two studies that do provide some evidence on the determinants o f recycling at the 
macroeconomic level are those by Terry (2002) and Berglund et al. (2002). Terry 
(2002) uses time-series data from 1960-1990 in the U.S. and regresses the proportion 
o f M SW recovered from generation on income, MSW composition, landfill disposal, 
and other demographic characteristics. The results indicate that income has a positive 
coefficient but is not significant at the 5% level. In contrast, the percentage o f 
population between the ages o f 25-44, landfill disposal, durable and packaging waste 
and the time trend are statistically significant. Berglund et al. (2002) examine the 
determinants o f paper recycling and regress the paper recovery rate on GDP per 
capita, population density, the percentage of total population living in urban areas, 
and waste paper prices. Using cross-sectional data from 89 countries, they find that 
the coefficients on GDP per capita and population density are statistically significant 
with a positive sign. The adjusted R-squared value however is only 0.24, and they 
argue that the study might benefit from the use o f panel data and the inclusion of 
policy variables.
The purpose o f this analysis is to analyse the determinants o f MSW landfill disposal 
and recycling at the macroeconomic level. Specifically, this chapter:
(i) Analyses MSW landfill disposal and recycling using similar datasets.
(ii) Uses cross-sectional time-series data and therefore can provide more 
information than the studies by Berglund et al. (2002) and Terry (2002). This 
enables an examination of the main determinants that account for the different 
rates o f waste management performance both across countries and over time, 
and to assess whether country-specific findings carry over to the OECD 
countries as a whole.
(iii) Includes two variables to proxy for policy, namely the waste legislation and 
policy index, and the landfill taxes that have been introduced in a number of 
countries to divert waste away from landfill disposal.
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4.3 The Determinants of Waste Disposal and Recycling: Methods and Results
4.3.1 Description o f the Data
The data used in this analysis and their sources are described in Table 4.1 below. 
Definitions of the waste data are provided in Appendix 4.1.
Table 4.1 Description and Sources o f the Data
%LDFL Proportion o f MSW disposed o f at landfills. 1995-2003 for the EU-25 countries. 
Source: Eurostat, 2004.
PAPER Paper and cardboard recycled, defined as percentage o f apparent consumption. 
1980-2000. Source: OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002.
GLASS Glass recycled, defined as percentage o f apparent consumption. 1980-2000. 
Source: OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2002.
GDPPC Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, in 1995 prices and purchasing power 
parities (PPP) in U.S. dollars. 1980-2004.
Source: World Development Indicators, 2004
POPD Population density, defined as people per square kilometre. 1980-2004 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2004.
URB Urban population, defined as percentage o f total. 1980-2004 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2004.
LDTX Landfill taxes. 1980-2004.
Source: OECD/EEA Environmentally Related Taxes database 2006.
POLDX Waste legislation and policy index. 1995
Source: Adapted from Guerin et al. 2001; European Environment Agency 1998.
Due to some missing observations, the data constitutes an unbalanced panel. The 
descriptive statistics of the all the variables are reported in Appendix 4.1. The 
correlation matrix o f all variables indicates that none o f the independent variables are 
highly correlated.
For each o f the variables, total variation is decomposed into between and within class 
variation and an F test is conducted to test the hypothesis that between classes 
variation is large relative to within class variation. For all o f the variables, Prob > F = 
0.000, indicating that between class variation is large relative to within (Table 4.2).
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Table 4.2. Analysis o f Variance for the Data
Variable Between Within Total F test
GDPPC 3.074e+10 1.000e+10 4.074e+10 76.32
POPD 11168657 47867.975 11216525 5792.82
URB 114956.95 6401.52 121358.47 445.85
LDFILL 16.6544 1.2292 17.8836 92.42
PAPER 60548.703 26675.463 87224.117 31.95
GLASS 94217.602 83488.934 177706.54 14.81
POLDX 2420 0 2420 -
LDTX 62646.854 98329.536 160976.39 15.82
RLDTX 40133.496 76412.595 116546.09 12.82
4.3.2 Landfill Disposal of MSW
Given that landfill deposition is the lowest on the waste hierarchy, and that 
environmental quality is a normal good, one would intuitively expect that as income 
levels rise, the percentage of MSW disposed of at landfills will decline2. To examine 
this hypothesis, recently available data on the proportion o f MSW generated that is 
disposed o f at landfills (%LDFL) is used as the dependent variable. The variable 
GDPPC is included as an independent variable to examine its impact on %LDFL, and 
is expected to be negative. Variables for population density (POPD) and urbanization 
(URB) are also included in the model and are expected to be negative. This is because 
in densely populated regions and/or in which people live clustered in highly 
urbanized areas, the likelihood for high landfill prices will be high, and so will the 
cost o f landfill disposal. Furthermore, higher population density lowers the cost of 
recycling, thereby indirectly lowering the demand for landfill disposal. The waste 
policy and legislation index (POLDX) is also included to test the assumption that 
ceteris paribus , the higher the POLDX, the lower the %LDFL is likely to be. The 
final variable included in the regression is the real landfill tax (RLDTX) in various 
countries.5 The purpose o f the landfill tax is to raise the costs o f landfill disposal
2
Similarly, it is anticipated that as income levels rise, the proportion o f  waste recycled will increase. 
Perhaps the only method o f  MSW disposal that may exhibit an inverted U EKC shape is incineration 
whereby at low levels o f income, incineration increases as landfill decreases, followed by a decline in 
incineration as recycling increases. Unfortunately, the lack o f  consistent panel data on the proportion 
of MSW sent to incineration makes it impossible to test this hypothesis.
3 Converted from nominal landfill taxes using the GDP deflator (WD1, 2004).
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relative to alternative disposal routes (e.g., incineration and recycling) and thus to 
divert waste away from landfill. Thus, higher landfill taxes are anticipated to be 
inversely related to the percentage of MSW generated disposed o f at landfill.
The role of prices and/or taxes has not been fully examined in either the EKC debate 
(De Bruyn et al., 1998) nor in the scant (macroeconomic) literature on waste disposal 
management. There are to date only a few EKC studies that have included a price 
variable in the regression analysis. De Bruyn et al. (1998) for example include energy 
prices in their model to examine CO2, NOx and SO2 emissions in four countries 
(Netherlands, UK, USA, and western Germany). These turn out to be statistically 
insignificant in two o f the cases. Agras and Chapman (1999) include energy prices 
(i.e., gasoline) in their analysis of CO2 emissions and find that income is no longer the 
most relevant indicator o f environmental quality. Lindmark (2002) investigates the 
relationships among CO2 emissions and proximate explanatory factors including 
economic growth, fuel prices, technology and income levels in Sweden during the 
19th and 20th centuries and finds that fuel prices are statistically significant. Finally, 
Culas and Dutta (2002) include an export price index to assess the effect this has on 
deforestation. Their results indicate that the export price index is only significant for 
Latin America. Though the effect o f prices has been examined in studies using 
household-level data as a result o f an increasing number o f pay-as-you-throw 
programs (see chapter 2), to my knowledge, no existing study has explicitly included 
landfill prices and/or taxes at the macroeconomic level. This may not be surprising 
given that landfill prices are set at the local level. However, landfill taxes are set at 
the national level.
In the case o f waste, average national prices for landfill disposal (also known as 
tipping fees) have been rising over time making it more expensive to dispose of waste 
at landfills. In the U.S. for example, average tipping fees increased from $10 in 1983 
to $50 in 1990. For the analysis undertaken here, ideally data on average national 
tipping prices at landfills along with data on landfill taxes should be used. Panel data 
on the former however is not readily available, and to some extent, POPD may serve
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as a proxy for landfill prices. In addition, any inter-country differences in the 
proportion o f MSW deposited at landfills may show up most clearly as a result of 
changes in landfill taxes as these are specifically intended to help divert waste away 
from landfill disposal, i.e., to incineration and recycling4.
The equation for the proportion of municipal waste disposed of at landfills is written 
in log-linear form and is formulated as:
% L D FU  = a  + piGDPPC it + p2PO PD ,, + (33URB „ + 04POLDX „ + (35RLDTX u + s it 
[5]
As before, Equation 5 is estimated using random and fixed effects models. The results 
are presented in Table 4.3 below.
Table 4.3. Parameter estimates for the percentage o f MSW landfilled
Random Effects Fixed Effects
Co-efficient Co-efficient
(Z value) (t value)
GDPPC -0.469 -0.024
(-2.87)*** (-0 .10)
POPD -0.257 -0.16
(-3.19)*** (-0 .11)
URB -0.13 -7.55
(-1.75)* (.3 .44)***
POLDX -0.017
(-0.04)
dropped
RLDTX -0.011 -0.010
(-6.14)*** (-5.59)***
Constant 9.99 32.62
(3.76)*** (4.70)***
No. observations 220 220
No. groups 29 29
R-square Within = 0.2489 Within = 0.2944
Between = 0.5107 Between = 0.0917
Overall = 0.4670 Overall = 0.1637
Wald x \ 5) = 87.76 F(4,187) = 19.50 
Prob>F = 0.0000
4 NB. Similar assumptions have been made by Rietveld and van Woudenberg, (2005) in their analysis 
o f  why fuel prices differ.
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Prob>x2 = 0.0000 F-test that all u 1 = 0:
F(28, 187) = 37.56, Prob>F= 0.000
*** significant at the ; % level, ** 5% level, * 10% leve
NB %Ldfl data not available for Canada
All the signs on the regression coefficients are as intuitively expected. In the RE 
model, GDPPC has the largest influence on the amount o f waste disposed of at 
landfills, followed by POPD. The POLDX is negative but insignificant, and the 
RLDTX is negative and statistically significant suggesting that the higher is the real 
landfill tax in a country, the lower is the amount o f waste that is deposited at landfills. 
In the FE model, only URB and RLDTX are statistically significant with the expected 
negative signs. The FE (within) estimator ignores the between state variation in the 
data which explains why POPD is insignificant (see Table 4.2). The Hausman statistic 
is x2(3)= 14.22, Prob > y?= 0.0026, suggesting the FE model is preferred. The within 
R2 is not particularly high, indicating that a relatively large proportion o f the variation 
in the dependent variable remains unexplained.
Diagnostic tests for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation indicate that these are 
both present in the data. The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-W eisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity is significant with % (1) = 30.69 therefore the null hypothesis o f 
constant variance is rejected. Similarly, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the 
data is significant with F (1, 24) = 21.895 therefore the null hypothesis o f no first- 
order autocorrelation is rejected. As such, feasible generalized least squares is used 
for estimation and the results are presented in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Feasible Generalized Least-Squares Estimates o f % Landfilled_____________
Co-efficient_________Std. Err._______________ Z___________P > \z\
GDPPC -0.3524 0.0789 -4.46 0.000
POPD -0.1913 0.0253 -7.56 0.000
URB -0.7808 0.2814 -2.77 0.006
POLDX -0.3844 0.1365 -2.82 0.005
RLDTX -0.0009 0.0014 -0.66 0.512
Constant 7.7867 1.0473 7.43 0.000
Wald x2(5) = 126.44 , Prob > x2 = 0.000 
Log likelihood = 202.9489____________
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In the FGLS model, all the variables are significant, with the exception of the 
RLDTX. The estimated coefficient on GDPPC is -0.3524, whereas in the FE model it 
is -0.024. POPD and URB are both negative indicating that as these levels increase, 
the percentage o f waste deposited at landfills declines. The magnitude of the co­
efficient on POPD is similar in the FE and FGLS model and ranges from -0.16 to -  
0.19. A 10% increase in the population in urban areas results in a 7.8% decrease in 
the proportion of MSW generation disposed o f at landfills. The sign on the estimated 
co-efficient on POLDX is negative and statistically significant implying that a higher 
POLDX is associated with a lower percentage o f waste deposited at landfills. The 
RLDTX is insignificant in the FGLS model but statistically significant in the RE and 
FE model with the correct sign.
To my knowledge, this is the first study that has empirically investigated the socio­
economic and policy determinants o f the proportion o f MSW generated that is 
disposed of at landfills. Using panel data on OECD countries, this analysis provides 
evidence that higher levels o f GDP per capita are associated with a smaller fraction o f 
MSW deposited at landfills. Population density and urbanization also seem to have an 
effect on the proportion o f MSW landfilled, with a significant and negative influence. 
Furthermore, there is some indication that greater national commitments to 
sustainable waste management, as measured by the waste legislation and policy 
index, have been effective in reducing the amount of MSW disposed of at landfills. 
The impact o f the other policy variable, RLDTX, seems to be weaker in the FGLS 
model, though it is significant in the FE and RE model.
4.3.3 Paper/ Cardboard and Glass Recycling
The relationship between recycling and economic growth can provide further useful 
insights into the dynamics o f waste. Ideally one would like to examine the proportion 
o f MSW recycled, as was done in section 4.3.2. for MSW disposed o f at landfills. 
Unfortunately, panel data on the percentage o f MSW generated that is recycled is not
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available for all countries. The OECD does however have annual cross-sectional and 
time-series data on the waste recycling rates for paper and cardboard as well as glass, 
as a percentage of apparent consumption, over the period 1980-2000.
As before, it is assumed that economic growth may have an impact on preferences for 
environmental quality and thus that higher levels o f income will be associated with 
higher recycling rates o f both paper/cardboard and glass. In addition, costs of 
collection and recovery are also likely to be important economic factors in 
determining recycling rates. The marginal cost o f recovery is dependent on the size o f 
the waste stream and hence areas with higher population densities and degree o f 
urbanisation are assumed to be related to collection costs o f recycling materials. 
Finally, these collection costs may not be purely market driven but may also be 
affected by government policies including landfill taxes and other policies that raise 
the costs of alternative waste disposal treatments in relation to recycling.
Thus, the recycling equations for each o f the two materials is written in log-linear 
form and are formulated as:
%RCYC„ = a + f] GDPPC,, + p2POPD„ + p3URB„ + p4POLDX„ + p5RLDTX„ + e„ [6]
For both paper and cardboard, and glass, it is anticipated that all o f the coefficients on 
the independent variables are positive: As income levels rise, preferences for 
environmental quality improvements become stronger as the environment is 
considered to be a normal good. Population density affects the economics of 
recycling, as recycling materials becomes more viable in densely populated and 
urbanized areas where the costs of collecting and separating waste decrease. Further it 
is expected that higher policy indices indicate greater efforts towards implementing 
sustainable waste management, and that higher real landfill taxes will divert greater 
portions of the two materials away from landfill disposal to recycling.
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A similar analysis for paper recovery rates has been conducted by Berglund et al. 
(2002) in which they regress GDP per capita, population density, and the percentage 
of total population living in urban areas on paper recovery rate. Using cross-sectional 
data from 89 countries, they find that the coefficients on GDP per capita and 
population density are statistically significant with a positive sign. The adjusted R- 
squared value however is only 0.24. Equation 6 above extends their analysis by 
examining paper recovery in a panel data setting, and by including two waste 
management policy variables in the regression model, i.e., the waste legislation and 
policy index and the real landfill tax. Similar analysis is then undertaken to 
investigate the determinants o f glass recycling.
Table 4.5 presents the parameter estimates for the coefficients in the RE and FE 
models for paper and cardboard. Each o f the models is jointly significant as measured 
by the respective %2 and F statistics. In the RE model only GDPPC is statistically 
significant. The impact of GDP per capita has the expected positive sign, indicating 
that a 10% increase in GDP per capita will result in a 7.2% increase in the proportion 
of paper and cardboard recycled. The demographic variable POPD has the expected 
positive sign whereas URB does not. The variable POLDX does not exhibit the 
intuitively expected sign and is statistically insignificant. Finally, though higher 
landfill taxes are positive as expected, this variable is insignificant. In the FE model, 
POPD is also statistically significant and shows the intuitively correct (positive) sign. 
The Hausman test statistic with a x2(4) = 11.24 indicates that the fixed effects model 
is preferred over the random effects model. The R2 values are very low indicating 
that a large proportion o f the variation in the %paper/cardboard recycled remains 
unexplained by the model.
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Table 4.5. Parameter estim ates for the percentage o f paper and cardboard recycled
Random Effects Fixed Effects
Co-efficient Co-efficient
(Z value) ( t value)
GDPPC 0.719 0.576
(6.72)*** (4.45)***
POPD 0.106 1.95
(1.58) (3.39)***
URB -0.209 -0.58
. (-0.64) (-1.45)
POLDX -0.310
(-0.91)
dropped
RLDTX 0.002 0.001
(1.12) (0.75)
Constant -2.348 -8.47
(-1.62) (-3.54)***
No. observations 408 408
No. groups 28 28
R-squared Within = 0.1286 Within = 0.1521
Between = 0.2070 Between = 0.0385
Overall = 0.1840 Overall = 0.0633
Wald x2(5) = 61.25 
Prob>x2 = 0.000
F(4, 3 7 6 )=  16.86 
Prob>F = 0.000 
F-test that all u I = 0:
F(27, 376) =29.66, Prob>F= 0.000
*** significant at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
D iagnostic tests indicated the presence o f  both heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the data. The Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-W eisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
is significant with a x2(l) = 106.91, and the W ooldridge test for first-order 
autocorrelation in the data is significant with F (1, 25) =  15.644. The estim ates from 
the feasible generalized least-squares estim ates are reported in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6. FGLS Estim ates o f  % Pa 3er and Cardboard R ecycled
Co-efficient Std. Err. Z P > |zj
GDPPC 0.4302 0.0714 6.03 0.000
POPD 0.1461 0.0334 4.37 0.000
URB -0.0592 0.1506 -0.39 0.694
POLDX -0.2484 0.1208 -2.06 0.040
RLDTX 0.0015 0.0007 2.24 0.025
Constant -0.4672 0.7906 -0.59 0.555
Wald x2(5) = 67.20 , Prob > x2 = 0.000 
Log likelihood = 394.5131
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In the FGLS model, all the variables except URB are statistically significant. As 
before, GDPPC and POPD have the strongest impact on paper and cardboard 
recycling, and the RLDTX now also exhibits a statistically significant and positive 
sign. The coefficient on POLDX exhibits a statistically significant but inverse 
relationship with recycling which is counter-intuitive and signals the need for further 
research. One caveat with respect to data quality is that the POLDX variable is time- 
invariant. This is due to a lack of data availability, and the coefficient is therefore 
unlikely to capture the full relationship with the dependent variable. Furthermore, the 
POLDX variable only reflects the degree o f national and international commitment 
towards sustainable waste management, rather than actual effort, and the variable 
does not account for monitoring or enforcement o f these national commitments. This 
is a weakness in data quality.
These models therefore provide further evidence on the importance o f population 
densities as opposed to urbanization on paper and cardboard recycling rates. There is 
also some indication that higher landfill taxes are associated with more paper and 
cardboard recycling. From the RE and FE models, the R values are all quite low 
indicating that a large proportion of the variation in paper recycling rates remains 
unexplained, and the inclusion of the policy variables does not make a substantial 
contribution. Further research efforts should be put in identifying the main 
determinants o f paper and cardboard recycling rates.
Turning to the results o f the RE and FE models for the percentage o f glass recycled 
presented in Table 4.7 it can be seen that, as in the case o f paper and cardboard 
recycling, the impact o f GDPPC on the percentage o f glass recycled also has the 
expected positive sign and is statistically significant. A 1% increase in GDP per 
capita will result in a 1.9-2.2% increase in the proportion o f glass recycled (for the 
RE and FE model respectively). With regard to the demographic variables, POPD is 
positive and statistically significant in the RE model, again suggesting that the lower 
the cost o f glass collection and recovery, in terms o f transport etc, the higher the rate 
of recycling. Similarly, urbanization is positive but insignificant in both models. The
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policy index is statistically significant but intuitively incorrect with a negative sign
implying that countries with a lower waste legislation and policy index recycle more
glass. The real landfill tax is statistically significant in both models, suggesting that
higher taxes on the waste disposed of at landfills does have a positive impact on the
amount o f glass that is recycled. The Hausman test statistic o f % (A) = 99.56
2 .
indicating that the fixed effects model is preferred. The within R in the FE model is 
represents a good fit.
Table 4.7. Parameter estimates for the percentage o f glass recycled
Random Effects Fixed Effects
Co-efficient Co-efficient
(Z value) (/ value)
GDPPC 1.983 2.217
(15.59)*** (13.92)***
POPD 0.210 0.500
(2.90)*** (0.82)
URB 0.323 0.303
(0.83) (0.63)
POLDX -0.895
(-2.22)***
dropped
RLDTX 0.005 0.004
(3.28)*** (2.66)***
Constant -16.208 -21.64
(-10.09)*** (-9.38)***
No. observations 354 354
No. groups 26 26
R-squared Within = 0.6158 Within = 0.6174
Between = 0.1897 Between = 0.2574
Overall = 0.2534 Overall = 0.2598
Wald %2(5)  = 444.17 F(4, 324)=  130.70
Prob >x2 = 0.000 Prob >F = 0.000 
F-test that all u 1 = 0:
F(25, 324) =38.50, Prob >F= 0.000
Diagnostic tests are undertaken to examine the existence o f heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the data. The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity with x2( 0  = 17.71 therefore the null hypothesis o f
homoskedasticity is rejected. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the data is 
significant with F (1, 21) = 57.906, indicating the presence of serial correlation. The
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model is therefore estimated using the FGLS method and the results are reported in 
Table 4.8.
Table 4.8. Feasible Generalized Least-Squares Estimates oi'%  Glass Recycled
Co-efficient Std. Err. Z P > |z |
GDPPC 1.0743 0.0788 13.63 0.000
POPD 0.1984 0.0418 4.75 0.000
URB 0.4321 0.2460 1.76 0.079
POLDX -0.3046 0.1506 -2.02 0.043
RLDTX 0.0013 0.0012 1.16 0.247
Constant -9.0678 1.1810 -7.68 0.000
Wald x2(5) = 342.75, Prob > x2 = 0.000 
Log likelihood = 153.6321
In the FGLS model, the estimated co-efficients on GDPPC, POPD, and URB are 
somewhat smaller than in the FE model but are all statistically significant and 
positive. POLDX is statistically significant but negative. As before, the possible 
explanation suggested here is the same as that in the case o f the % o f paper recycled. 
The RLDTX remains positive but is now insignificant.
This leads to the conclusion that higher levels o f GDPPC unambiguously have a 
positive influence on the percentage o f glass that is recycled, with a range in the 
estimated coefficients o f 1.07 to 2.22. POPD and URB exhibit the strongest influence 
on glass recycling in the FGLS model that accounts for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the data. From a policy perspective, this is a promising 
phenomenon suggesting that these trends are likely to increase in the future. With 
regard to the policy variables POLDX and RLDTX included in the regression 
however, there does not seem to be consistently statistically significant evidence that 
existing waste management policy has been effective in achieving its objectives. The 
POLDX variable has been used as a proxy for national efforts towards sustainable 
waste management. Perhaps this variable inadequately reflects national effort as 
opposed to simply national commitments towards sustainable waste management.
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4.4 Conclusions and Policy Implications
With the use o f panel data from approximately 30 OECD countries over 20 years, this 
chapter has attempted to identify and analyse the main trends and determinants in 
municipal solid waste landfill disposal and the recycling rates of paper/cardboard and 
glass. The results reveal some interesting insights into the issue o f MSW management 
(see Table 4.9 for a summary o f results).
With regard to the disposal o f municipal solid waste, in the preferred fixed effects 
model for the waste deposited at landfills, the results indicate that urbanization and 
the real landfill tax introduced by national governments both have negative impacts. 
This implies that though urbanization is associated with higher amounts o f generated 
waste (chapter 3), the waste is managed in a more environmentally friendly way (i.e., 
either via incineration or via recycling). The negative sign on the real landfill tax 
indicates that the higher the landfill taxes on waste, the smaller is the proportion of 
waste that is deposited at the landfills. This is strictly a policy variable and should be 
very encouraging to governments wishing to divert additional waste away from 
landfills. With regard to the amount of paper and cardboard, and glass that is 
recycled, the main determinants o f recycling are economic growth, followed by 
population density. In the case o f glass recycled, this is also affected by the real 
landfill tax. Recycling o f these two materials is therefore determined more by market 
forces rather than by policy forces. Higher population densities are expected to lower 
the collection and recovery costs o f recycling, thus increasing the economic viability 
o f this disposal option.
Thus, waste disposal and recycling are affected by economic as well as demographic 
variables, and the results reveal that countries with higher GDP per capita perform 
better in terms o f diverting waste away from landfill disposal, and achieve higher 
recycling rates for both paper and cardboard, and glass.
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To the degree to which population density serves as a proxy for landfill prices and/or 
the cost o f collection and recovery for recycling, the results provide evidence 
suggesting that trends in waste generation and disposal are also market driven.
Overall, the waste policy and legislation index provides weak evidence as a 
determinant in improving waste generation and disposal. For landfill disposal, the 
variable is negative and statistically significant, and thus intuitively correct. For 
paper/ cardboard and glass recycling, the variable is negative, usually statistically 
significant, and thus intuitively incorrect. One important caveat however is that the 
index is fixed across time and may not accurately reflect the changes in national 
policy targets over the 20 year time period examined here. Further, the index may 
reflect national commitments, but may not adequately capture actual national efforts 
or concrete measures towards sustainable waste management. Guerin, Crete, and 
M ercier (2001) offer a similar explanation with regard to their results and refer to 
Read (1999) who argues that often, the pace o f policy making (for waste) has not 
been matched by an equal effort to provide effective policy implementation. Future 
research effort should therefore focus on obtaining more accurate indices for this 
purpose, one that reflects policy change over time. Ideally, data on individual national 
policies should be collected and included separately as dummy variables in the 
regression analysis5. Public policy variables that reflect the amount o f resources spent 
on waste management per capita at the national level, as well as indices for 
monitoring and enforcement could also be useful.
Finally, the results provide evidence that real landfill taxes have a significant impact 
on sustainable waste management. Fligher landfill taxes are associated with lower 
proportions of landfill disposal, and higher rates o f paper/cardboard and glass 
recycling. This implies that governments wishing to divert waste away from landfill
5 Concerted collaborative international efforts need to be undertaken to ensure that this data is accurate 
and consistent across countries. An attempt was made here to disaggregate the waste legislation and 
policy index and to update it over time but due to lack o f data availability and inconsistency, this was 
ad hoc and therefore not feasible.
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disposal, which entail the highest external cost to incineration and recycling, are 
likely to do so successfully via the introduction of landfill taxes.
Table 4.9. Summary o f Results
Random Effects Fixed Effects FGLS
Sign Significance Sign Significance Sign Significance
LANDFILL DISPOSAL
GDPPC - 3 - - 3
POPD - 3 - - 3
URB - 3 - 3 - 3
POLDX - Dropped - 3
RLDTX - 3 - 3 -
PAPER RECYCLING
GDPPC + 3 + 3 + 3
POPD + + 3 + 3
URB - - -
POLDX - Dropped - 3
RLDTX + + + 3
GLASS RECYCLING
GDPPC + 3 + 3 + 3
POPD + 3 + + 3
URB + + + 3
POLDX - 3 Dropped - 3
RLDTX + 3 + 3 +
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Appendix 4.1. Definitions of Landfill and Recycling Data
Municipal Waste Landfilled presents the amount of municipal waste disposed of 
through landfill. The bulk o f this waste stream is from households, though "similar" 
wastes from sources such as commerce, offices and public institutions are included. 
Landfill is defined as deposit o f waste into or onto land, including specially 
engineered landfill, and temporary storage o f over one year on permanent sites. The 
definition covers both landfill in internal sites (i.e. where a generator o f waste is 
carrying out its own waste disposal at the place o f generation) and in external sites. 
The quantity o f waste landfilled is expressed in kg per capita per year.
Paper and Cardboard Recycling
Recycling is defined as reuse o f material in a production process that diverts it from 
the waste stream,except for recycling within industrial plants and the reuse of 
material as fuel.The recycling rate presented here is the ratio o f the quantity collected 
for recycling to the apparent consumption (domestic production +imports -exports).lt 
corresponds to the CEP1 collection rate.
Glass Recycling
Recycling is defined as reuse o f material in a production process that diverts it from 
the waste stream,except for recycling within industrial plants and the reuse of 
material as fuel.The recycling rate is the ratio o f the quantity collected for recycling 
to the apparent consumption (domestic production +imports -exports).
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Appendix 4.2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDPPC 750 17935.898 7374.898 1122.97 55102.73
POPD 750 129.716 122.3737 1.91 488.03
URB 750 72.23851 12.729 29.44 97.23
%LDFL 220 0.5524 0.2857 0.0267 1
PAPER 408 39.083 14.6393 1.6 73.09
GLASS 354 41.7259 22.4370 4.96 93
LDTX 750 4.8999 14.6602 0 83.61
RLDTX 750 3.9813 12.5752 0 83.61
POLDX 750 7.7 1.7975 5 10
N B ; The negative m inim um  for ldtax and rldtax w ithin is not a m istake; the within is sh ow in g  
the variation o f  (r)ldtax within country around the global m ean 4 .899
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CHAPTER 5
Spatial Interaction in Waste Management 
and Policy-Making
Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things.
Tobler’s First Law
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5.1 Introduction
Just as individual recycling behaviour may in part be induced by the recycling 
behaviour of their neighbours (Gamba and Oskamp, 1994; Werner and Makela, 
1998), so perhaps may national governments be influenced by waste policies 
introduced in countries nearby. If this conjecture is true, this would constitute a form 
o f so-called spatial interaction or structure, which refers to the importance of “space’' 
(or geography) in some specified relationship. In a general context, spatial interaction 
may arise due to social norms, neighbourhood effects, copy-catting, peer group 
effects, and the strategic nature o f government policy making (Anselin, 1999). 
Though these are likely to be interrelated to some degree, they are nevertheless 
distinct. Social norms refer to shared beliefs o f what is normal and acceptable and 
contribute to shaping and enforcing the action o f people (and government) in a 
society. Neighbourhood effects occur as a result information spillovers and diffusion 
effects. Copy-catting concerns the adoption o f ideas and policies due to their 
beneficial effects. Peer group effects pertain to the pressure to conform to the group 
o f peers with whom one interacts e.g. an EU member. Finally, the strategic nature o f 
policy-making refers to games and either co-operative or non-co-operative behaviour 
taken to improve actions and the economic position o f  a player.
The possibility o f spatial relationships in environmental policy-making has been 
gaining increasing attention. The interjurisdictional regulatory literature is now well 
established and has been amply surveyed by Wilson (1996, 1999) and Oates (2001). 
It has a history in a parallel literature o f fiscal federalism 1 and tax competition 
wherein the work by Oates and Schwab (1998) and Wilson (1996) have a corollary to 
the seminal papers by Zodrow and Mieskowski (1986), Wilson (1986) and Wildasin 
(1989)2. On the one hand, interjurisdictional competition is viewed as a beneficent 
force, compelling public agents to make efficient decisions; on the other hand there is
1 Fiscal federalism addresses the vertical structure o f the public sector. See Oates (1999) for a good
introduction to this. The literature on fiscal competition originates from the seminal paper by Tiebout 
(1956).
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the contention that competition is a source of distortion in public choices. It is the 
latter view that has raised considerable concern and debate on the possibility of a 
‘race-to-the bottom ’ in environmental standards. This term reflects the notion that, 
due to government and business perception of a significant trade-off between 
economic growth and environmental protection, pursuit of economic development in 
a competitive setting may drive governments to lower their environmental standards 
and/ or curtail their environmental enforcement efforts (see Esty, 1996; Engel, 1997; 
Woods, 2005)3.
There is also a case for interaction effects for localised pollution problems where 
governments may strategically manipulate environmental standards in an attempt to 
attract capital (Markusen et al. 1995). This would result in an under-provision of 
public goods. Markusen et al. (1995) also demonstrate that a race-to-the-top dynamic 
can emerge if jurisdictions compete to avoid an undesirable facility, such as a 
hazardous waste treatment plant or nuclear power plant, by raising their 
environmental standards. This is the NIMBY effect associated with negative 
externalities. Additional papers on strategic environmental policy include those by 
Barrett (1994) who examine the competitiveness o f existing industries in the context 
of international trade, and Ulph (1999). Murdoch et al. (1997) find empirical evidence 
to suggest that there is the possibility that a country will limit its cleanup efforts as 
others reduce emissions.
The literature on the conditions under which local government authority would lead 
to the same Pareto-optimal environmental regulations as a welfare-maximising 
centralised authority are fairly restrictive and have been neatly summarised by 
Levinson (2002). These are (i) No cross border externalities; (ii) Many jurisdictions4; 
(iii) All economic rents earned locally by the competing jurisdiction; (iv) Welfare
‘ Their work shows that non-benefit taxation o f capital by local governments leads not only to regional 
misallocation of capital but also to distorted local public finance.
3 This relates directly to the issue o f environmental federalism i.e. the role o f  different levels of 
government in environmental management, and is o f interest given the recent US devolution o f  
authority from federal level to state governments, and the contrasting shift in the EU to harmonise 
environmental legislation.
123
maximising local regulators5; (v) No constraints on available policy instruments; and 
(vi) No redistributive policies (all taxes are benefits taxes6). Oates (2001) reminds us 
however that even if  lax local environmental standards is the case, the alternative 
which is central intervention in the form of standards for environmental quality on a 
nation-wide/regional scale is also not an efficient, first-best rule. See Ulph (2000) for 
a detailed discussion on this.
There is also the case however in support o f the so-called ‘Porter hypothesis’ (Porter, 
1991). This hypothesis asserts that stringent environmental regulation can lead to a 
situation whereby both social welfare and the private net benefits o f firms can be 
increased. Thus, governments may act strategically and set policies which are too 
high relative to the first best rule (marginal abatement costs exceed marginal damage 
costs) in an effort to provide their producers with incentives to innovate green 
technologies ahead of their rivals and thus to gain a long-term competitive advantage. 
Jaffe et al. (1995) who review 16 empirical studies on the effects o f environmental 
regulation on competitiveness in the U.S., as well as other more recent studies, do not 
find conclusive evidence either for or against this hypothesis. See also Becker and 
Henderson (2000).
Though the discussion thus far has focused on competition induced by migration o f 
mobile factors (e.g. capital, goods, and wealthy taxpayers), information and ideas can 
also cross jurisdictional borders. For a seminal paper on policy innovation and 
diffusion, see Walker (1969). Bennet (1991); Dolowitz and M arsch (2000); and Oates 
(1999) discuss the dynamics o f policy transfer. In addition, jurisdictions may also be 
interdependent when it comes to setting well established policy instruments -such as 
taxes, environmental standards, and minimum wages- not only the novel policies 
typically examined in the context of policy diffusion and transfer. This idea is
4 See Markusen et al. 1995.
5 If instead the objective was tax revenue maximisation, local regulators would ease environmental 
regulations in order to attract capital and inflate the tax base.
6 Benefit taxes reflect social marginal cost and therefore lead consumers and firms to choose 
jurisdictions efficiently.
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examined by Breton (1991), Hall (1993) and Besley and Case (1995) using a
•y
yardstick competition model .
Furthermore, individual regions may not compete with one another by may instead
follow one or two innovators. Vogel (1995) for example argues that in the case o f the
US, increased regulatory stringency in California is matched by the rest of the country
(at least with regard to automobile emission standards), a trend which has been coined
the ‘California effect’. He states further:
‘The term ‘California effect ’ is meant to connote a much broader phenomenon  
than the impact o f  American federalism on federal and state regulatory 
standards. The general pattern suggested by this term, namely, the ratcheting  
upward o f  regulatory standards in competing political jurisdictions, applies to 
many national regulations as well
Fredriksson and Millimet (2002a) present a simple model of yardstick competition in 
pollution abatement costs and investigate California’s leadership role empirically 
using state-level panel data across the U.S. Their results indicate at best a minor role 
for California. In a tax competition context, Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) test 
whether European countries set capital tax rates in response to U.S. rates in a
D
Stackleberg model . The empirical evidence suggests that European countries interact 
strategically with their neighbors to set capital tax rates but not to set labor tax rates 
and follow the lead o f the United States in setting capital tax rates after 1986.
To examine the extent to which states or nations look to others in determining the 
appropriate composition o f taxes or tariffs, levels o f expenditure, and public good 
provision for example, requires the use of spatial econometric methods. This 
approach is adopted here to examine two particular issues of interest. First, the aim is 
to account for the effects from the interaction o f neighbouring governments in the 
determination o f waste generation and disposal performance. The second, perhaps 
more interesting objective, is to examine whether countries choices o f tax rates on
7 The yardstick competition model refers to a set-up where agents use the performance o f others as a 
benchmark. For a discussion o f the yardstick model o f tax competition as a model o f  information 
spillovers, see Brueckner (2003).
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landfill disposal are affected by choices made in neighbouring countries. Both of 
these are examined within the context o f OECD member countries. Evidence for 
spatial interaction in the determination o f landfill taxes and waste management 
performance has important policy implications in so much as that changes in the tax 
rate and performance in one country will imply cascading ramifications into other 
countries waste management if there is interaction. Thus, this paper is related to the 
theoretical literature on tax competition (Brueckner, 2000), and on the theoretical 
literature on capital competition using environmental policy (Oates and Schwab, 
1988; Markusen et al. 1995; Ulph, 2000). It is not possible to tie the empirical results 
to any single strand of economic theory because these may in fact operate in tandem. 
Instead, empirical analysis can shed some light onto which, if any, o f  the theoretical 
motivations o f spatial interaction dominate9.
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes the theoretical 
background o f spatial econometric methods. Section 5.3 presents a brief summary of 
previous applications with an emphasis on studies that have examined the strategic 
nature o f government policy-making. In section 5.4 the case for spatial 
interdependencies in the case o f waste management and policy is presented, along 
with the econometric model. The results are reported and discussed in section 5.5, and 
section 5.6 concludes with some policy implications.
5.2 Spatial Econometrics
Spatial econometric methods deal with the incorporation o f spatial interaction (spatial 
autocorrelation) and spatial structure (spatial heterogeneity) into regression analysis 
(Anselin, 1999). More specifically, spatial autocorrelation in a collection o f sample 
data observations refers to the fact that one observation associated with a location i 
depends on other observations at locations j ^  i. Spatial heterogeneity refers to
8 The Stackleberg model tries to capture the essence o f  a market where firms are competing but, for 
some reason, there is a dominant firm, or leader.
9 See Brueckner (2003) for a clarification o f  the theoretical roots o f  empirical studies o f strategic 
interaction among governments.
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variation in relationships over space (LeSage, 1988). These methods are appropriate 
when the focus o f interest is the assessment o f the existence and strength o f spatial 
interaction, or when one would like to test for autocorrelation in the error terms.
Spatial econometric methods require the use of a spatial weight or spatial lag 
operator. Let W denote a (N  x N) spatial weights matrix describing the spatial 
arrangement o f the spatial units and w,y the (i, j)th element of W, where i and j  = 
(1 ,..., N). W is assumed to be a matrix of known constants and that all elements on 
the diagonal are equal to zero. A spatial lag for the dependent variable y  at location i 
is then expressed as:
[wyl = * y ,
j = l , . N
where i, j  refer to individual observations (locations). The elements of the weight 
matrix should be non-stochastic and exogenous to the model and can be formed in a 
variety ways. Probably the simplest method is to assign a weight o f zero to non­
contiguous countries (i.e., those that do not share a common border) and equal 
weights to contiguous countries. Alternative methods include using k nearest 
neighbours, economic distance, and distance decay (inverse distance or inverse 
distance squared), among others.
The spatial relationships can be modelled in two distinct ways: Models in which 
spatially lagged weighted averages of the dependent variable are included as 
independent variables are referred to as spatial lag models. These models assume that 
the spatially weighted average of waste generation/disposal in a region affects the 
generation/disposal of waste in each country (indirect effects) in addition to the 
standard explanatory variables of country characteristics (direct effects). This can 
formally be expressed as:
y  = pWy + X(3 + e
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where p is a spatial autoregressive coefficient, and 8 is a vector of independently and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) error terms. Using OLS here would lead to biased and 
inconsistent results due to simultaneity bias and the model must be estimated using 
maximum likelihood techniques.
A spatial error model is a special case of a regression with a non-spherical error term. 
This model does not include indirect effects but is based on the assumption that there 
may be omitted variables in the equation and that these vary spatially. Thus the error 
term tends to be spatially autocorrelated:
y  — X fd  + s
and
s  = XWe + u
where X is the spatial autocorrelation coefficient and u is a vector of i.i.d. errors 
(Anselin 2001, Elhorst, 2003). For example, waste levels at any location would be a 
function o f country characteristics but also of the omitted variables at neighbouring 
locations. OLS here would remain unbiased, but would lose the efficiency property.
Given the cross-sectional time-series nature o f the data set used in this analysis, we 
are specifically interested in spatial panel data models (see Elhorst, 2003). One 
potential specification is the so-called pure space-recursive model in which 
dependence pertains to neighbouring locations in a different time period (Anselin, 
2001):
y it= Y [Wy t-i], + f(z ) + s lt
where [Wy t.]], is the /-th element o f the spatial lag vector applied to the observations 
on the dependent variable in the previous time period, and f(z) is a generic 
designation of regressors which may be lagged in time and/or space. Such models are 
therefore also referred to as spatio-temporal models. In contrast to the above models,
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this model does satisfy the assumptions of the classical linear model and can be 
estimated by OLS.
Other potential specifications are the time-space recursive model in which the 
dependence relates to the same location as well as the neighbouring locations in 
another period:
y ,t= A-y h-i + y [Wy t-i], + f(z) + s lt
and the time-space simultaneous model, with both a time-wise and a spatially lagged 
dependent variable:
y »t= Ay it-i + p [Wy t], + f(z) + s it
where is the z'-th element of the spatial lag vector in the same time period. 
Instrumental variables methods are necessary here due to correlation with the 
residuals (see Kelejian and Robinson 1993, Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). Others who 
have used this approach are Buettner (2001), Fredriksson and Millimet (2002b), 
Levinson (2002) and Hemandez-Murillo (2003). The alternative method is to use 
maximum likelihood techniques10.
5.3 Previous Applications
Applications o f spatial econometrics were initially found in specialised fields such as 
regional science, urban and real estate economics and economic geography. More 
recently however, spatial econometric methods have been applied to studies in labour 
economics, public economics and local public finance, as well as agricultural and 
environmental economics. The latter include studies by Benirschka and Binkley 
(1994), Murdoch et al. (1997), Bell and Bockstael (1999), Fredriksson and Millimet 
(2002b), Levinson (2002), Fredriksson et al. (2004), Kim et al. (2003), Konisky 
(2005), Maddison (2006), and Eliste and Fredriksson (forthcoming). Fredriksson and
10 Maximum likelihood techniques have been used by Besley and Case (1995) and Brueckner and 
Saavendra (2001). These methods however can be computationally demanding (see Konisky, 2005).
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Millimet (2002b) for example analyse whether U.S. states are engaged in strategic 
environmental policy-making. They regress two measures o f environmental policy 
stringency in state /' on a number o f state Vs characteristics (e.g., population, 
population density, degree o f urbanisation, per capita state income), as well as a 
spatially weighted variable o f other states environmental policy stringency. They find 
that states are influenced by both their contiguous and regional neighbours in that 
they are ‘pulled’ to higher levels of abatement costs by improvements in neighbours 
with regulations that are already relatively stringent. Levinson (2002) extends this 
study by examining whether regulatory competition became more severe during the 
Reagan Administration, testing the hypothesis that competition should become more 
intense during periods o f greater state control o f environmental policy. He does not 
find convincing evidence for this. Fredriksson et al. (2004) consider strategic 
behaviour across multiple interrelated policies, namely environmental regulation, 
taxation, and infrastructure investment and find that uni-dimensional studies may 
provide lower bound estimates o f strategic interaction. Eliste and Fredriksson 
(forthcoming) find evidence for strategic interaction across countries in the 
determination o f environmental policy in the agricultural sector. The degree of 
regulatory interaction is found to depend on geographical distance and the degree of 
openness to trade between trade partners. Murdoch et al. (1997) derive an 
econometric specification for the demand o f sulphur and nitrogen oxides that adjusts 
for the spatial dispersion o f the pollutant in European countries. They include a 
spatially lagged variable o f voluntary sulphur or NOx emission reductions as an 
independent variable and find that strategic behaviour, whereby a country limits its 
cleanup efforts as others reduce emissions, characterises both problems but appears 
stronger for NOx. Konisky (2005) examines strategic interaction in the U.S. with 
regard to water, air and waste regulation and finds strong evidence in support o f this. 
Maddison (2006) is the first to employ spatial econometric techniques in the 
estimation of EKCs for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, VOC’s and carbon 
monoxide emissions. He finds that SO2 and NOx emissions are positively influenced 
by neighbouring countries’ emissions and finds no evidence that per capita emissions 
are affected by proximity to high per capita income neighbours. Finally, Kim et al.
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(2003) develop a spatial-econometric hedonic housing price model and estimate the 
marginal value of improvements in sulphur dioxide and NOx concentrations for the 
Seoul metropolitan area. They find that the spatial lag model is valid for their specific 
housing market.
With regard to the strategic behaviour o f governments in the determination of taxes, 
Case (1993), Besley and Case (1995), and Hernandez-Murillo (2003) examine the 
strategic interaction in (income) tax policies among U.S. states. See also Brueckner 
and Saavendra (2001) for property taxes, and Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) for local 
income and property taxes among Belgium municipalities. Levinson (2002) examines 
the interaction in the setting o f hazardous waste disposal taxes among U.S. states.
Thus, the majority of the studies have focused primarily on the U.S., and no previous 
study examines the possible existence of strategic interaction or behaviour of 
environmental policy in an OECD country context. Furthermore, no previous study 
has examined this issue in the context o f municipal solid waste management. Given 
the magnitude of the waste problem and the large fraction o f total environmental 
expenditures on this resource (i.e. 40% in the EU -  see chapter 1 for more detail), this 
is an important issue that merits further consideration.
The remainder o f the chapter explores the spatial aspects o f waste generation and 
disposal management. Three reasons for spatial autocorrelation in particular seem 
pertinent in the context o f waste disposal management. These are (i) policy- 
mimicking, (ii) cross-border waste trade, and (iii) recycling technology spillovers and 
diffusion effects.
(i) Policy-mimicking may be induced by a greater degree o f political interactions 
and information exchange in neighbouring countries. This could be due to 
historical relationships (e.g. Norway-Sweden-Finland) or a lack of language 
barriers (e.g. Germany-Austria, France-Switzerland). Policy-mimicking may 
also be related to similar socio-cultural habits, sense of civic solidarity, and
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“environmental awareness”, as well as to economising on the costs of policy- 
setting. See Ladd (1992) on the mimicking o f local tax burdens among 248 
counties in the U.S.
(ii) There may be similar landfill prices in neighbouring countries for competitive 
reasons, i.e., to prevent cross-boundary dumping o f waste from countries with 
high landfill prices to countries with low landfill prices, and analogously for 
landfill taxes. This would imply some form o f regulatory or tax competition. 
Indeed, Levinson (1999) has found that in the U.S., waste disposal taxes deter 
interstate transport of hazardous waste. Furthermore, the cost o f transporting 
waste to far away places implies spatial restrictions11.
(iii) Neighbouring countries may have similar recycling technologies that lower 
the cost o f recycling. Research and development (R&D) spillovers may be 
restricted in space implying that geographical proximity matters. Case (1992) 
for example examines the adoption o f technological innovations in a study on 
new harvesting tool among Indonesian farmers. Likewise, there could be 
spatial aspects in terms of specializing production and generalizing 
consumption patterns (global branding and life-styles), called diffusion 
effects.
These avenues for spatial interaction can fall under a number o f the theoretical roots 
of strategic government interaction, as discussed by Brueckner (2003). Brueckner 
categorises these into spillover models (environmental and yardstick competition 
models) and resource flow models (tax competition and welfare competition).
11 Thus perhaps a neighbouring country will wish to raise landfill taxes to avoid imports o f  waste but 
countries further away from the exporter do not need to do so because the resulting transport costs do 
not make it economically viable to export so far. If this is the case, distance from a country will affect 
waste policy. Note however that Britain is exporting large amounts o f  waste to China where the cost 
from the UK for a 26-tonne container o f waste plastic is £500. Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands 
tend to be net exporters o f waste whereas Spain, Great Britain, Denmark and France are net importers. 
Source: Dopp, J.,1997 http://www.american.edu/TED/mswen.htm
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To test for the presence o f  spatial interactions and strategic environmental policy­
making in the waste management context, an adequate measure of national waste 
regulations is required. Since such a measure does not exist, the data to be used is the 
same as that in Chapter 4 where the waste data serve as a proxy for waste 
management performance. Moreover, the data on landfill taxes will is used to test for 
strategic behaviour in waste management policy-making.
5.4 Spatial Econometric Model and Results
In order to test for spatial effects in the determinants of MSW generation and 
disposal, the analysis in Chapter 3 and 4 is augmented by spatially weighted values of 
the dependent and independent variables. To do this, it is first necessary to prepare 
the data for the spatial-econometric analysis. The first step is to create a weight 
matrix.
The most popular approach for a weight matrix, which also ensures exogeneity, is for 
the matrix to reflect the inverse geographical distances between observations (i.e., 
inverse distance and inverse distance squared). Alternative forms o f weighting 
include contiguity weights, simple average weights, population weights, and gravity 
w eights12. All five forms of weight matrices are created and tested for in the data. 
These are described in turn:
The inverse distance weight: To create the inverse geographical distance weight 
matrix, denoted WD, the geographic co-ordinates of OECD country centroids are
1 3obtained from the CIA WorldFact Book where data on the centroid in Cartesian 
space is represented by latitude and longitude. The Haversine formula is used to 
calculate the distances between latitude and longitude from each country (see 
Appendix 1 for a description).
12 For example, inverse distance weights have been used by Hemandez-Murollo (2003), Levinson 
(2003), Konisky (2005), Madisson (2006); Contiguity weights by Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), 
Konisky (2005); Population weights by Brueckner and Saavendra (1999) and Fredriksson and Millimet 
(2002).
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When using the Haversine formula, it is important to have positive and negative 
values correspond appropriately with North (+), South (-), East (-), and West (+), so 
that the distances are calculated correctly. The leading diagonals should equal to zero. 
Once the distance matrix Dy is obtained, the inverse distance matrix 1/ Dij can be 
calculated, which is o f course time invariant (Appendix 2 provides a subsection o f the 
distance matrix for illustrative purposes). The inverse distance weight is meant to 
examine whether a country competes with all other countries, and that the degree of 
competition is a function o f proximity. In effect, by using the inverse distance weight, 
an attempt is made to identify whether, via policy diffusion, transfer, or other, a 
country adopts policies that have been implemented in other countries in close 
proximity.
The contiguity weight: The contiguity weight matrix is created by assigning a value 
o f 1 to a contiguous neighbour and a value o f zero if  otherwise, and is denoted Wc. 
This implies that Ej WytYjt simplifies to the mean o f the environmental stringency in 
neighbouring states. As in the inverse distance weight, the weights for each country 
are time invariant. The contiguity weight is very similar in nature to the inverse 
distance weight except that it only considers whether a country is influences by 
policies implemented by their contiguous neighbours.
The population weight: The population weight is created whereby competing country 
j is given a weight equal to its population in time t. The resulting weight matrix, 
whose representative element is W jJt = P)t for j ^  i is denoted Wp (Brueckner and 
Saavendra, 1999). The use of population in the weight matrix aims to elicit whether 
countries may be more responsive to neighbouring states that are larger or where the 
generation o f pollution is greater. In contrast to the inverse distance and contiguity 
weight, the population weight is time variant.
13 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
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The gravity weight: This weight is created by calculating the product of the two 
populations in country i and j  divided by the square of the distance D , j 2 and is denoted 
WG. It therefore reflects a combination o f the inverse distance weight and the 
population weight. It is reasonable to expect that a country may be influenced jointly 
by the distance to as well as the size of neighbouring countries.
The simple average weight: The simple average weight is created by assigning a 
weight o f EYj / J for each t (and is therefore time variant) and is denoted WSA. For 
example, in the case o f MSW generation, the average MWPC over all j countries is 
obtained by adding MWPC over all countries (except country 7) and dividing by j  (= 
29). This weight is used to assess whether the average performance in the OECD 
countries is affecting country i. For example, if the general trend is a relaxation of 
environmental stringency, a country may be tempted to relax its own environmental 
policies to prevent adverse competitiveness effects.
With the exception o f the simple average weight, all o f the weights are row 
standardised14 using (w1Jt) / 1  WjJt i.e., the spatial weight matrix is normalised so that 
the rows sum to unity: Thus for each i,
2 X =1
j
This normalisation facilitates the interpretation and makes the parameter estimates of 
alternative models comparable (see Anselin, 2002).
One additional type o f weight was constructed, referred to as the Ybest weight. This 
weight is created by calculating the difference between ylt and the best level o f yjt in
14 The simple average weight is not row-standardised because o f the nature o f how the weight is 
constructed.
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that year, and is denoted by WB. The purpose of this weight is to examine whether 
country i is affected by the leader in waste performance and regulation15.
In the spatial econometrics literature, all o f the studies examine more than one type of 
spatial weight. The nature o f this analysis is somewhat exploratory and the purpose is 
to identify whether there is indeed a spatial relationship, and if  so, to identify in what 
manner it operates most strongly. With the exception o f the Ybest weight, each of the 
weights described above are commonly found in the literature, and have been applied 
to a number of different contexts.
In spatial econometric analysis, dealing with missing values in the data is not simply 
a case o f dropping the observation in question. This is because, depending on the type 
of the weight matrix employed, if just one country has a missing value, then some or 
all o f the spatially weighted variables cannot be created (Maddison, 2006). Ignoring 
the problem leads to error-in-variables bias (Cressie, 1993). Due to missing data in 
the waste data, it was necessary to linearly interpolate some o f the variables so that 
the spatially weighted variables could be created.
Stationarity was then tested for in the data using the Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) test. 
This is because in the absence of stationarity in the data, the regression is subject to 
the risk o f spurious results (see e.g., Perman et al. 2003). Results from the IPSHIN 
command in STATA 9.0 indicated the presence o f non-stationarity which was 
consequently removed once the data had been first-differenced16.
*y = y, -y ,-i
The results from the tests are summarized in Table 5.1.
!5 The Ybest weight attempts to examine the possibility o f  the “California” effect. See Fredriksson and 
Millimet (2002a) for a similar example. Note that it is also not possible to row standardise this weight.
16 Note that Besley and Case (1995) use first-differenced data for their y  and wy variables as they are 
interested in state’ changes in tax liabilities, rather than on states’ levels. Moreover, Figlio et al. (1999) 
also choose to estimate their model o f state benefits in first-differences rather than levels, to account 
for the trend that state benefits have been trending downwards over the time period for which they had 
data.
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Table 5.1: Panel Unit Root Test Statistics
Without time trend With time trend
Log(GDPPC) -1.539 -2.111 Do not reject unit root null
Alog(GDPPC) -3.040 -3.253 Reject unit root null
Log(MWPC) -1.556 -1.726 Do not reject unit root null
Alog(MWPC) -1.858 -2.206 Reject unit root null at 5%
Log(LDFL) -0.650 -2.130 Do not reject unit root null
Alog(LDFL) -2.376 -2.574 Reject unit root null
Log(PAPER) -1.306 -1.746 Do not reject unit root null
Alog(PAPER) -3.258 -3.745 Reject unit root null
Log(GLASS) -1.944 -1.731 Do not reject unit root null
Alog(GLASS) -2.882 -3.220 Reject unit root null
Each o f the spatial weight matrices were then applied to the first-differenced data to 
create the spatially weighted variables.
As explained in section 5.2 above, two estimation techniques are used to test for 
spatial interaction, namely ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables 
(IV). OLS may be used for spatio-temporal models. Since influences from 
neighbouring countries are not assumed to occur instantaneously but rather with a 
time lag, three spatially weighted temporal lags were created, (t-1), (t-2), (t-3) for 
each o f  the dependent variables. These temporal lags also serve to circumvent the 
problem o f potential endogeneity of environmental policies o f other countries. More 
specifically, if  there is some form o f strategic interaction among the countries with 
regard to how they select their waste management policies, then this may cause 
concern regarding the direction of causation. The temporal lags eliminate this concern 
and will control the bias that may arise due to spatially correlated, time-specific 
unobservables (Frederiksson and Millimet, 2002; Levinson, 2002).
The second estimation procedure adopted is to instrument for the spatial lags. IV 
estimation is necessary when purely spatial models are examined, and also has the
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benefit of providing consistent estimates of the parameters even in the presence of 
spatially correlated error terms (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Saavendra, 2000). This is 
very important because the presence of spatially correlated unobservables could lead 
one to incorrectly conclude that strategic behaviour is evident. Following Figlio et al. 
(1999) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), among others, the instruments used are 
some o f the attributes included in Xjt for neighbouring states.
Both o f the estimation procedures are run with and without country and time fixed 
effects, the significance o f which are jointly tested using a Wald test as performed by 
the testparm command in STATA 9.0. The country fixed effects capture time- 
invariant country-specific attributes. The time fixed effects will control for events that 
occur in a given period and may impact all countries through a reshaping o f attitudes 
(Fredrkisson and Millimet, 2002).
In examining the nature o f the spatial interaction in the data, the estimated regression 
equation takes the general form:
AMWPCn = a,j + yt + 5 E CDjJt AMWPCJt + pAXlt + £jt
where AMWPC,t is the waste variable in country / at time t\ a, are country fixed 
effects; yt are time fixed effects; c% is the weight assigned to country j  by country i at 
time t (j =* i), where some o f the weights may be zero, AMWPCjt is the measure of 
relevant waste variable in country j; 6 is the parameter o f interest; X lt is a vector of 
country characteristics (i.e., GDP per capita, population density, and urbanisation); 
and 8,t represents idiosyncratic shocks uncorrelated across time and space. Analogous 
equations are specified for the proportion disposed at landfill, paper or glass recycled, 
and finally, the level o f the landfill tax.
As explained above, the test for spatial interaction among countries requires the 
testing o f the significance o f 5; a non-zero coefficient implies that one country’s 
waste or recycling performance depends on the performance in other countries. The
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measures of waste management performance are the same as before: (!) MWPC 
generation, (2) the proportion o f MWPC disposed o f at landfills, (3) the proportion of 
paper and cardboard consumed that is recycled, and (4) the proportion of glass 
consumed that is recycled. The final issue examined is (5) whether the introduction 
and/or change in landfill taxes in one country is influenced by landfill tax policy in 
neighbouring countries.
The OLS (i.e. the spatio-temporal model) and IV parameter estimates for these results 
are presented in tables 5.2 and 5.3 respectively and are discussed below. Each o f the 
regressions is run with and without country and time fixed effects (FE), and all the 
regressions include per capita GDP, population density, and urbanisation. ‘Robust’ 
estimates are also obtained to account for potential heteroskedasticity in the data. For 
the IV estimation, the instrument set includes population density and urbanisation 
from neighbouring countries, using the same weighting scheme as the dependent
1 7variable .
17 As such, IV estimation for the Ybest weighted variables was not undertaken.
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Table 5.2. OLS with and without FE
Without FE With FE Wald test
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat robust Prob>F
Contiguity
Mwpct-1 0.156 2.37 0.057 0.73 0.91 0.0000
Mwpct-2 0.157 2.39 0.055 0.68 0.76 0.0000
Mwpct-3 0.160 2.43 0.059 0.68 0.70 0.0000
Ldflt-1 0.223 1.64 0.037 0.23 0.41 0.0004
Ldflt-2 0.369 2.64 0.122 0.76 0.66 0.0010
Ldflt-3 0.318 1.38 -0.201 -0.67 -0.40 0.0003
Papert-1 -0.073 -1.01 -0.05 -0.68 -0.83 0.0000
Papert-2 -0.134 -1.76 -0.12 -1.55 -1.68* 0.0000
Papert-3 0.138 1.67 0.134 1.58 1.64 0.0000
Glasst-1 0.107 1.96 0.031 0.52 0.35 0.0446
Glasst-2 0.049 0.89 -0.02 -0.32 -0.26 0.0461
Glasst-3 0.11 1.94 0.047 0.76 0.52 0.0757
Ldtxt-1 0.151 1.88 0.147 1.68 0.98 0.0341
Ldtxt-2 -0.053 -0.63 -0.07 -0.78 -1.47 0.0395
Ldtxt-3 0.043 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.0562
Distance
Mwpct-1 0.56 2.54 -0.299 -0.99 -1.13 0.0000
Mwpct-2 0.576 2.61 -0.089 -0.28 -0.30 0.0000
Mwpct-3 0.609 2.74 0.175 0.53 0.55 0.0000
Ldflt-1 -0.026 -0.10 0.579 1.11 1.34 0.0001
Ldflt-2 0.596 2.31 0.817 1.52 1.70* 0.0004
Ldflt-3 0.236 0.69 1.92 2.21 1.33 0.0001
Papert-1 -0.177 -1.16 0.025 0.08 0.07 0.0000
Papert-2 -0.475 -3.01 -0.653 -1.97 -1.95* 0.0000
Papert-3 0.140 0.85 0.351 1.00 0.94 0.0000
Glasst-1 0.594 3.44 0.063 0.21 0.15 0.1420
Glasst-2 0.419 2.31 -0.0774 -0.25 -0.19 0.0936
Glasst-3 0.534 2.79 -0.0148 -0.05 -0.03 0.1515
Ldtxt-1 0.108 1.09 0.33 1.34 0.81 0.0276
Ldtxt-2 -0.095 -0.95 -0.185 -0.72 -1.64 0.0437
Ldtxt-3 0.042 0.40 -0.09 -0.36 -0.75 0.0542
Population
Mwpct-1 -0.24 -1.42 -10.46 -13.53 -14.13** 0.0000
Mwpct-2 -0.30 -1.79 -8.67 -10.28 -10.13** 0.0000
Mwpct-3 -0.32 -1.87 -6.72 -7.25 -6.43** 0.0000
Ldflt-1 -0.49 -0.57 5.15 1.02 1.05 0.0002
Ldflt-2 -0.11 -0.16 6.13 1.22 1.43 0.0001
Ldflt-3 -0.32 -0.5 13.54 2.59 1.28 0.0000
Papert-1 -0.17 -0.77 -2.05 -1.44 -0.88 0.0000
Papert-2 -0.53 -2.34 3.79 2.63 1.98** 0.0000
Papert-3 -0.34 -1.41 1.77 1.17 0.67 0.0000
Glasst-1 0.45 2.82 -0.58 -0.63 -0.54 0.0831
Glasst-2 0.52 2.97 -0.68 -0.67 -0.83 0.1357
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Glasst-3 0.87 4.82 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 0.6051
Ldtxt-1 0.19 0.77 3.46 1.35 1.64* 0.0247
Ldtxt-2 -0.21 -0.84 2.08 0.79 1.51 0.0414
Ldtxt-3 0.15 0.58 3.09 1.15 1.54 0.0451
Gravity
Mwpct-1 0.16 1.81 0.04 0.36 0.63 0.0000
Mwpct-2 0.16 1.84 0.06 0.61 0.96 0.0000
Mwpct-3 0.17 1.97 0.12 1.04 1.49 0.0000
Ldflt-1 0.59 2.40 0.41 1.18 1.08 0.0006
Ldflt-2 0.63 2.55 0.05 0.14 0.10 0.0011
Ldflt-3 0.40 1.46 0.63 1.32 1.07 0.0002
Papert-1 -0.164 -1.64 -0.17 -1.32 -1.32 0.0000
Papert-2 -0.33 -3.28 -0.32 -2.37 -2.62* 0.0001
Papert-3 0.066 0.63 0.21 1.46 1.49 0.0000
Glasst-1 0.292 3.14 0.16 1.35 1.07 0.0800
Glasst-2 0.251 2.61 0.11 0.93 0.87 0.1039
Glasst-3 0.288 2.94 0.05 0.44 0.27 0.1515
Ldtxt-1 0.14 2.58 0.18 1.30 0.91 0.0352
Ldtxt-2 -0.072 -0.77 -0.08 -0.56 -1.52 0.0430
Ldtxt-3 -0.039 0.41 -0.05 -0.37 -0.72 0.0541
Simple Average
Mwpct-1 0.0002 0.30 -0.204 -3.62 -3.22* 0.0000
Mwpct-2 0.000019 0.25 -0.0016 -2.57 -2.58* 0.0000
Mwpct-3 0.0004 0.46 -0.0075 -1.05 -1.02 0.0000
Ldflt-1 -0.0008 -2.46 0.0044 2.00 1.22 0.0051
Ldflt-2 0.00055 1.41 0.0048 2.18 1.27 0.0694
Ldflt-3 -0.0007 -1.08 0.01834 5.81 2.75* 0.0004
Papert-1 -0.0002 -1.33 0.0012 1.19 0.49 0.0000
Papert-2 -0.00039 -2.14 0.0041 3.88 2.48* 0.0000
Papert-3 1.26 x 10-6 0.01 0.0004 0.06 0.03 0.0000
Glasst-1 0.003 1.27 0.0004 0.31 0.19 0.0308
Glasst-2 -0.00001 -0.07 -0.0007 -0.40 -0.36 0.0386
Glasst-3 0.0002 0.75 0.0022 1.67 1.71* 0.0280
Ldtxt-1 0.0003 0.68 0.0072 2.09 2.04* 0.0147
Ldtxt-2 -0.0004 -0.70 0.0058 1.64 2.09* 0.0273
Ldtxt-3 0.0003 0.61 0.0077 2.08 2.17* 0.0258
Ybest
Mwpct-1 0.00006 6.52 0.00017 7.43 6.69* 0.0000
Mwpct-2 0.00006 7.02 0.0002 9.06 8.06** 0.0000
Mwpct-3 0.00007 7.43 0.0002 10.20 8.77** 0.0000
Ldflt-1 -0.0016 -4.16 0.0050 3.30 2.78** 0.0006
Ldflt-2 -0.0012 -3.24 0.0013 1.38 1.58 0.0016
Ldflt-3 -0.0009 -2.49 0.0009 1.16 1.26 0.0007
Papert-1 -0.0005 -1.41 0.0021 2.58 1.29 0.0000
Papert-2 -0.0004 -0.96 0.0012 1.36 0.66 0.0000
Papert-3 -0.0006 -1.52 -0.0006 -0.66 -0.30 0.0000
Glasst-1 -0.00003 -0.11 0.0028 4.95 4.04** 0.0001
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Glasst-2 0.00004 0.15 0.0029 4.66 3.96** 0.0002
Glasst-3 -0.00002 -0.10 0.0031 4.69 4 11** 0.0003
Ldtxt-1 0.0077 1.11 0.1119 5.48 2.47** 0.0000
Ldtxt-2 0.0068 0.92 0.1089 4.96 2.38** 0.0002
Ldtxt-3 0.0086 1.10 0.1109 4.64 2.33** 0.0007
Significant at: **<5% and *10%
Table 5.3. IV with and without FE
Without FE With FE Wald test
Coeff t-stat robust Coeff t-stat robust Prob>F
Contiguity
mwpc 0.574 2.72 3.30 -2.850 -1.69 -1.17 0.0444
ldfl 0.247 0.30 0.33 -0.538 -0.96 -0.87 0.0055
paper 0.017 0.03 0.05 0.216 0.34 0.46 0.0002
glass 0.538 0.56 0.53 0.311 1.04 0.96 0.5744
Idtx 1.062 0.83 2.17 1.266 0.37 0.75 0.9969
Distance
mwpc 2.108 1.03 1.23 -0.455 -0.27 -0.36 0.0000
ldfl 0.257 0.19 0.21 -2.695 -1.20 -0.97 0.0003
paper 1.05 1.00 0.97 1.02 0.20 0.24 0.0054
glass 1.08 2.44 2.04 1.99 0.82 0.92 0.9830
ldtx 0.873 2.18 2.40 3.47 0.97 1.15 1.0000
Population
mwpc 0.371 1.73 1.70 -5.39 -1.19 -1.57 0.0000
ldfl 2.604 0.48 0.63 -35.67 -1.15 -0.88 0.0000
paper 1.608 0.71 0.99 -1.92 -0.11 -0.18 0.0000
glass 0.75 4.23 4.41 -3.11 -1.72 -2.85* 0.0814
ldtx 1.89 2.49 1.91 11.48 0.04 0.11 0.9999
Gravity
mwpc 0.134 0.43 0.49 -1.37 L -3.42 -2.20 0.0000
ldfl 0.5763 0.71 0.66 -2.577 -0.98 -0.63 0.0184
paper 0.491 0.52 0.80 1.13 0.68 0.90 0.0077
glass -0.216 -0.19 -0.18 0.047 0.08 0.10 0.03929
ldtx 1.242 1.58 2.62 1.32 0.87 1.68* 0.9999
Simple Average
mwpc 0.0004 0.79 0.66 0.0156 2.14 2.43* 0.0000
ldfl 0.0024 2.49 2.55 -0.0336 -3.28 -1.94* 0.0000
paper 0.0002 0.39 0.49 -0.047 -2.06 -1.34 0.0000
glass -0.00017 -0.21 -0.21 -0.0207 -7.93 -6.99** 0.0000
ldtx 0.0027 2.96 2.46 -0.0625 -14.71 -7.04** 0.0000
Significant at: **<5% and *10%
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The overid command in STATA computes versions o f Sargan's (1958) and 
Basmann's (1960) tests o f overidentifying restrictions for a regression estimated via 
instrumental variables in which the number of instruments exceeds the number of 
regressors: that is, for an overidentified equation. These are tests o f the joint null 
hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with 
the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A rejection casts 
doubt on the validity of the instruments.
Table 5.4 Sargan and Basman Tests
Sargan test Basman test
Contiguity
mwpc 0.671 (0.1962) 1.659 (0.1978)
ldfl 0.758 (0.3410) 0.737 (0.3908)
paper 0.005 (0.9430) 0.005 ( 0.9433)
glass 0.311 (0.5772) 0.308 (0.5791)
ldtx 0.053 (0.8188) 0.052 (0.8195)
Distance
mwpc 0.620 (0.4310) 0.615 (0.4331)
ldfl 2.310(0.1285) 2.265 (0.1324)
paper 0.280 (0.5969) 0.277 (0.5987)
glass 0.146(0.7021) 0.145 (0.7036)
ldtx 0.034 (0.8527) 0.034 (0.8533)
Population
mwpc 0.935 (0.3335) 0.927 (0.3355)
ldfl 0.777 (0.3782) 0.755 (0.3849)
paper 1.449 (0.2288) 1.437(0.2306)
glass 1.392 (0.2381) 1.380 (0.2401)
ldtx 0.006 (0.9380) 0.006 (0.9382)
Gravity
mwpc 9.892 (0.0017) 9.958 (0.0016)*
ldfl 1.301 (0.2541) 1.268 (0.2601)
paper 0.221 (0.6380) 0.219(0.6397)
glass 0.325 (0.5686) 0.322 (0.5705)
ldtx 0.001 (0.9731) 0.001 (0.9732)
Simple Average
mwpc 0.4333 (0.5106) 0.429 (0.5126)
ldfl 0.107 (0.7432) 0.104 (0.7471)
paper 1.002 (0.3169) 0.993 (0.3190)
glass 10.545 (0.0012) 10.613 (0.0011)*
ldtx 1.129 (0.2882) 1.121 (0.2897)
P-values are in parenthesis; (*) indicates instruments are not exogenous
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As one can see from the results in Table 5.3, in most cases the OLS-FE and IV-FE is 
the appropriate model as indicated by the magnitude of the Wald tests. In a small 
number o f cases, the fixed effects are not significant. For these regressions, the Wald 
test was repeated once the robust command was included in the regression. With the 
exception of FDWIV for ldtx, these all yielded results o f Prob> F = 0.0000 
suggesting that the model with fixed effects is the appropriate one. The model without 
fixed effects is more appropriate for the landfill tax model for all weights used, with 
the exception of the simple average weighting model.
The results from the Sargan tests in Table 5.4 indicate that in nearly all cases, the 
instruments are exogenous. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) also obtain results where 
in some regressions their instruments are exogenous and in others they are not, 
despite using the same instruments in all their regressions.
The results reveal that the existence o f spatial interaction in waste management 
performance and landfill tax policy is dependent on the type o f spatial weight that is 
adopted. For each variable examined, at least two weights indicate the presence of 
spatial interaction in the data. The results are summarised in Table 5 .518.
18 Recall that the sample average and Ybest weights are not row standardised and are therefore not 
directly comparable to the other weights. Moreover, the Ybest weight created here presents one 
approach for the weight construction to examine the role o f  environmental leadership. Additional 
weights should ideally be constructed to more rigorously analyse this topic but this lies beyond the 
scope o f  this existing study (see Fredriksson and Millimet 2002a for alternative weighting schemes to 
assess whether a country is affected by the environmental leader).
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Table 5.5. Summary o f  Significant Results
Significant weights
OLS
Mwpc Population, Simple Average, Ybest
Ldfl Distance, Simple Average, Ybest
Paper Contiguity, Distance, Population, Gravity, Simple Average
Glass Simple Average, Ybest
Ldtx Population, Simple Average, Ybest
IV
Mwpc Simple Average
Ldfl Simple Average
Paper -
Glass Population, Simple Average
Ldtx Gravity, Simple Average
An anomaly in the results occurs in the population-weighted data for MWPC in that 
the coefficients are much larger. In particular, the coefficients in the results without 
the fixed effects look “normal” but once the fixed effects are introduced, the 
coefficients increase dramatically19.
19 The waste data has been checked, and is correct and identical to the data used in all other 
regressions. The original population weight data was also checked. This is correct given the way in 
which it has been defined, which is the same as that in F&M (2002). 1 have experimented by deleting 
an outlier (Spain, 2000), and the coefficients in FDWIVreg become even larger (on absolute scale) and 
more significant. (Results with lagged variables would not change because t-1 from the year 2000 
would have that data deleted anyway). The nature o f this particular weight is such that each element of 
waste data is multiplied by exactly the same weight (except the appropriate zero’s, see table below) 
hence perhaps small differences in the waste data result in magnified changes using this weight matrix.
Stylised Example o f Population Weight Matrix
AUS AUT BEL DEN
AUS 0 X Y Z
AUT w 0 Y Z
BEL w X 0 z
DEN w X Y 0
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The coefficients on the spatio-temporal weights on LDFL are positive and statistically 
significant in three o f the six weighting indices. They are negative and statistically 
significant in the IV simple average scheme and albeit negative, statistically 
insignificant in the other IV models. The coefficients are negative on the temporally 
lagged simple average weights and positive on the Ybest weights. Note that 
Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) and Konisky (2005) for example also find positive 
and negative coefficients depending on the weights that are used.
With regard to paper recycling rates, though the results reveal that the spatially 
augmented dependent variables are not significant in the instantaneous case where IV 
is used, the spatio-temporal lags however are statistically significant in five out of six 
formulations o f  the weighted variables. The coefficients on the spatio-temporal 
contiguity, distance and gravity weighted data are negative in the 2-year lag. It is 
positive in the analogous population and simple average weights, and positive and 
statistically significant in the first lag o f the Ybest weight.
Referring to the performance o f glass recycling, this tends to be positive with the 
spatio-temporally weighted data (with a 3 year lag in the simple average weight, and 
for all lags with the Ybest weight) whereas in the IV results, the coefficients are 
negative (i.e., for the population and simple average weights).
With regard to the differences in the weights in relation to the results where they have 
found to be significant, the following points are in order:
• The results using the Ybest weights need to be conservatively interpreted as 
this represents just one possible weighting methodology to evaluate whether 
countries are influenced by the leader in environmental policy. Though the 
results present some preliminary evidence that the Ybest weight is significant, 
further analysis is warranted to analyse the existence of this effect with the use 
of additional weighting approaches.
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• It is not possible to directly compare the results from the simple average 
weights and the distance, contiguity, population and gravity weights because 
the simple average weight has not been row-standardized.
• The OLS results from the regression on paper/cardboard recycling provide the 
most concrete evidence for the existence o f spatial interaction, as is revealed 
by the number of weights with statistically significant coefficients. The results 
using weights that incorporate an element o f distance, imply that an increase 
in the neighbours recycling rate will lead to a decrease in one’s own recycling 
rate (for paper/cardboard). The results using the population weight indicate 
that an increase in a neighbours recycling rate where population levels are 
high will lead to an increase in one’s own recycling rate.
The results provide some support to the evidence by Konisky (2005) who examines 
state enforcement of hazardous waste pollution control regulation, namely the 
Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) across the U.S. Using data on 
the annual number of sampling inspections taken by state governments divided by the 
number of regulated facilities under RCRA, he finds strong evidence o f strategic 
interaction. More specifically, using contiguity, inverse distance and other weights, he 
finds that a 10% increase in competitors enforcement effort leads to about a 6% to 
16% increase in one’s own enforcement effort.
The results for the case o f the landfill tax are elaborated in more detail as this is 
arguably the more interesting variable to examine. To summarise briefly, the landfill 
tax change is modelled as a function o f state economic variables (change in income 
per capita) and state demographic variables (change in POPD and URB), as well as 
changes in landfill taxes in neighbouring countries. This is quite similar to a model by 
Besley and Case (1995) for tax-setting behaviour across U.S. states. Note that the 
nominal landfill tax, as opposed to the real landfill tax (adjusted for inflation) is the 
relevant variable of interest because this is the level o f the tax as perceived by the
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public20. There may be strategic interaction in the imposition and level o f landfill 
taxes as voters and politicians tend to be sensitive to events outside their boundaries. 
Introducing a tax may be easier for a government who can refer to similar taxes in 
comparable regions (Heyndels and Vuchanen, 1998). In the OLS model, the results 
are statistically significant when the population, simple average and Ybest weights 
are used; in the IV model, the results are statistically significant when the gravity and 
simple average weights are used. Recall that the gravity weight is a function o f both 
population and distance from country z, thus the results from these weights (which are 
comparable as they are both row-standardised) lend support to the conjecture of 
spatial interaction in waste policy, suggesting that a government reacts to landfill 
taxes introduced in larger and geographically more proximate countries. Specifically, 
a 10% increase in another countries landfill taxes will lead to a 16.4% to 16.8% 
percent increase in one’s own country’s landfill tax. The simple average weight 
(which is not row-standardised) is significant in both models. Furthermore, these 
weights are positive in four o f the cases, and negative in the IV simple average weight 
model. A positive parameter coefficient indicates that as neighbouring countries 
increase their landfill disposal taxes, country /' will increase its’ own landfill tax in 
response. The positive and significant coefficient on the Ybest weight provides some 
indication that countries may perhaps be responding to the environmental leader 
when selecting their landfill tax policy, and is therefore in support of the so-called 
California effect. However, further analysis would be necessary to assess the 
robustness o f these results, including the use o f different types o f weights and models 
to examine this issue in more detail.
In comparing these results with the IV results o f Levinson (2002) on U.S. hazardous 
waste taxes, he finds that the instrumented variable o f other states hazardous waste 
taxes is insignificant when they are weighted by an inverse distance square and by 
tons o f waste exported. However when these weights are combined with a post-1992
20 Case (1993), Besley and Case (1995), Hemandez-Murillo (2003), Brueckner and Saavendra (2001) 
and Levinson (2002) use nominal tax rates in their analysis as well.
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dummy21, the coefficients on the parameters (0.52 and 0.57 respectively) become 
statistically significant.
5.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
The theoretical literature on interjurisdictional environmental regulatory competition 
is now well established. This paper adds to the empirical literature on interactive 
environmental policy behaviour by examining waste management performance and 
policy-making. Using spatially weighted values o f the dependent variables, this 
chapter has investigated the degree of national policy interdependence in waste 
management performance and landfill tax-setting across OECD countries. The results 
reveal that some form of spatial interactions are present in the data, and that these are 
dependent on the type o f spatial weight that is adopted. This has important 
implications for practitioners in the field of interjurisdictional policymaking in that 
the selection o f weighting methodology might lead one to conclude that there is no 
strategic behaviour when an alternative weighting structure may have led to the 
opposite conclusion, and vice versa. The importance o f selecting the most appropriate 
weights, and that indeed several weights should be tested for, should not be 
underestimated.
In addition, given the restrictive assumptions under which local environmental 
authority will lead to efficient regulations, it is unlikely that the waste policies 
selected are efficient. If  it is the case that tax competition leads to inefficiently low 
taxes on pollution and reduces welfare, then the policy implications are that co­
ordination of environmental taxes or standards among a group of countries may 
improve welfare under certain circumstances. The results presented here provide 
some evidence to suggest that waste management and landfill taxes in one country do 
impact the decisions of neighbouring countries. This is consistent with the literature
21 In 1992, the Supreme Court ruled the practice o f states explicitly imposing higher taxes on disposal 
o f waste by out-of-state entities than they imposed on local waste generators unconstitutional. 
Levinson (2002) argues that since 1992, the tax asymmetry has taken on more subtle forms.
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on strategic environmental policy-making, appealing to capital competition and 
transboundary pollution spillovers as the motivating factors.
There is also some support to indicate that countries respond to the environmental 
leader, as is indicated by the results using the Ybest weight. However, these results 
are preliminary and further analysis is suggested to examine if this finding holds 
under different model specifications.
A further suggestion for future research is to examine whether countries’ regulatory 
waste management expenditures are influenced by the magnitude of expenditures 
made in neighbouring countries, as well as to devise alternative instruments for waste 
management policy. Given the large fraction o f waste management expenditures in 
the total environment budget, waste is a particularly interesting topic to examine in 
the realm o f strategic environmental policymaking.
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Appendix 5.1. The Haversine Formula
Presuming a spherical Earth with radius R, and that the locations of the two points in 
spherical co-ordinates (longitude and latitude) are lon l, latl and lon2, lat2 , then the 
Haversine formula is given by:
Alon = lon2 - lonl 
Alat = lat2 - latl
a = (sin(Alat/2))A2 + cos(latl) * cos(lat2) * (sin(Alon/2))A2 
c = 2 * atan2(sqrt(a), sqrt(l-a)) 
d = R * c
and will give mathematically and computationally exact results. The intermediate 
result c is the great circle distance in radians. The great circle distance d will be in the 
same units as R22.
The historical definition o f a "nautical mile" is "one minute o f arc of a great circle o f 
the earth." Since the earth is not a perfect sphere, that definition is ambiguous. 
However, the internationally accepted (SI) value for the length o f a nautical mile is
22 Most computers require the arguments o f trigonometric functions to be expressed in radians. To 
convert lonl, latl and lon2, lat2 from degrees, minutes, and seconds to radians, these must first be 
converted to decimal degrees. To convert decimal degrees to radians, the number o f degrees is 
multiplied by pi/180 = 0.017453293 radians/degree.
Inverse trigonometric functions return results expressed in radians. To express c in decimal degrees, 
multiply the number o f radians by 180/pi = 57.295780 degrees/radian. (The number o f RADIANS 
must be multiplied by R to get d.)
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1.852 km (or 1.151 miles). Thus, the implied "official" circumference is 360 degrees 
times 60 minutes/degree times 1.852 km/minute = 40003.2 km. The implied radius is 
the circumference divided by 2n: R = 6367 km = 3956 mi (Source: Math Forum23).
23 http://mathforum.org/librarv/drmath/view/51879.html
Appendix 5.2. An Example of a Weight Matrix: The Inverse Distance Matrix
lat long lat rad long rad Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech
Republic
Denmark Finland
...etc
Turkey United
Kingdom
United
States
SUM
-27 -133 2.042035 -2.32129 Australia 0 0.030037 0.028774 0.029031 0.030388 0.029779 0.031958 0.034521 0.028229 0.028347 1
47.33 -13.33 0.744732 -0.23265 Austria 0.002472 0 0.045411 0.00551 0.113524 0.035855 0.01769 0.017965 0.027196 0.004288 1
50.83 -4 0.683645 -0.06981 Belgium 0.002073 0.03976 0 0.005427 0.037705 0.044532 0.015952 0.011333 0.057807 0.004143 1
60 95 0.523599 1.658063 Canada 0.013579 0.031318 0.035234 0 0.03198 0.036471 0.037611 0.024933 0.038846 0.082402 1
49.75 -15.5 0.702495 -0.27053 Czech Rep 0.002423 0.110025 0.041736 0.005453 0 0.043783 0.020217 0.017679 0.026755 0.004182 1
56 -10 0.593412 -0.17453 Denmark 0.002953 0.043208 0.061291 0.007732 0.05444 0 0.034209 0.016237 0.05379 0.005698 1
64 -26 0.453786 -0.45379 Finland 0.005452 0.036679 0.037776 0.013719 0.04325 0.058858 0 0.025912 0.038239 0.009659 1
46 -2 0.767945 -0.03491 France 0.002956 0.051433 0.080928 0.007437 0.041432 0.03626 0.018118 0.016139 0.048257 0.005869 1
51 -9 0.680678 -0.15708 Germany 0.002119 0.06026 0.088461 0.005233 0.064512 0.055453 0.017695 0.012823 0.038105 0.003988 1
39 -22 0.890118 -0.38397 Greece 0.005269 0.061675 0.037224 0.009422 0.055057 0.034316 0.025651 0.063815 0.029129 0.007596 1
47 -20 0.750492 -0.34907 Hungary 0.002837 0.077851 0.031699 0.005829 0.087152 0.032407 0.020434 0.026136 0.022744 0.004531 1
65 18 0.436332 0.314159 Iceland 0.006107 0.034562 0.046316 0.025007 0.03634 0.051772 0.045281 0.021132 0.061926 0.016318 1
53 8 0.645772 0.139626 Ireland 0.00365 0.035003 0.066902 0.011458 0.034466 0.047544 0.025109 0.015923 0.139091 0.008589 1
42.83 -12.83 0.823272 -0.22393 Italy 0.003405 0.097735 0.044073 0.007168 0.06161 0.033182 0.01963 0.025751 0.029751 0.005719 1
36 -138 0.942478 -2.40855 Japan 0.034221 0.026019 0.025671 0.028982 0.026909 0.027735 0.03241 0.028153 0.025857 0.023964 1
37 -127.5 0.925024 -2.22529 Korea Rep 0.032449 0.026974 0.026322 0.027096 0.027939 0.028549 0.033663 0.030017 0.026325 0.022049 1
49.75 -6.17 0.702495 -0.10769 Luxembourg 0.001993 0.050106 0.151675 0.005006 0.044243 0.040014 0.015023 0.011567 0.040455 0.003848 1
23 102 1.169371 1.780236 Mexico 0.0191 0.028032 0.030443 0.066715 0.02809 0.030196 0.029609 0.02347 0.032271 0.159632 1
52.5 -5.75 0.654498 -0.10036 Netherlands 0 002158 0.040562 0.144653 0.005657 0.042988 0.067161 0.018535 0.0119 0.059149 0.004268 1
-41 -174 2.286381 -3.03687 NZ 0.125899 0.027772 0.027248 0.036593 0.028144 0.028302 0.030416 0.030757 0.027453 0.040444 1
62 -10 0.488692 -0.17453 Norway 0.00363 0.031648 0.040213 0.010343 0.037088 0.078018 0.062318 0.016969 0.045955 0.007293 1
52 -20 0.663225 -0.34907 Poland 0.003105 0.061018 0.038672 0.006866 0.107059 0.054618 0.031268 0.023286 0.029078 0.005195 1
39.5 8 0.881391 0.139626 Portugal 0.004418 0.037165 0.045545 0.011641 0.032952 0.031592 0.020354 0.019475 0.042654 0.00969 1
48.67 -19.5 0.721345 -0.34034 Slovakia 0.002578 0.074353 0.031553 0.005458 0.114119 0.034569 0.020512 0.021899 0.022434 0.004206 1
40 4 0.872665 0.069813 Spain 0.004064 0.039946 0.047462 0.01021 0.034355 0.03132 0.019462 0.019359 0.04111 0.008423 1
62 -15 0.488692 -0.2618 Sweden 0.003711 0.031979 0.037073 0.010042 0.038366 0.07205 0.087528 0.018054 0.039232 0.007111 1
47 -8 0.750492 -0.13963 Switzerland 0.002433 0.088879 0.06963 0.005756 0.05686 0.035593 0.016442 0.015272 0.034251 0.004499 1
39 -35 0.890118 -0.61087 Turkey 0.007953 0.050298 0.036239 0.012281 0.051071 0.037722 0.034989 0 0.030757 0.009799 1
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54 2 0.628319 0.034907 UK 0.003029 0.035458 0.086081 0.008911 0.035994 0.058197 0.024046 0.014323 0 0.006637 1
38 97 0.907571 1.692969 USA 0.015287 0.0281 0.031007 0.095008 0.028279 0.030986 0.030529 0.022937 0.033359 0 1
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CHAPTER 6
A Choice Experiment to Evaluate Household Preferences 
for Kerbside Recycling in London
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6.1 Introduction
Recent developments in national and European Union (EU) waste management policy 
has prompted considerable interest into alternative waste management programs that 
would divert a portion o f the municipal solid waste (MSW) stream from landfills. 
This is particularly relevant in certain European countries that have recently become 
signatories to the EC Landfill Directive (99/31/EEC)1 and are far from attaining their 
targets. A prime example o f this is the United Kingdom (UK), that currently has one 
of the poorest records in Europe with regard to the proportion o f MSW that is sent to 
landfills (Eurostat, 2003). This is in the order o f 80%, though it is expected to 
decrease in the future as a result of government policy, including the implementation 
of the landfill tax and the requirement that 25% of MSW is recycled2.
The EC Landfill Directive sets targets to reduce the landfilling o f biodegradable 
municipal waste to 75% of 1995 levels by 2006, 50% by 2009, and 35% by 2016, 
though for the UK and Greece, these deadlines have been extended3. Biodegradable 
waste is defined as waste that is capable of undergoing anaerobic or aerobic 
decomposition, such as food and garden waste, and paper and paperboard (Article 2). 
Failure to meet the targets of the Directive would mean that the UK could face a non- 
compliance fine o f up to £500,000 per day after the first target date in 2010. 
Furthermore, the government has reserved the right to pass on any European fine 
imposed on the UK for missing the Landfill Directive targets onto the local 
authorities or devolved administrations responsible for the UK missing its targets. 
This could mean that failing councils would be responsible for their share o f fines 
reaching £180 million a year until the Directive's demands are met4.
1 Official Journal L 182 , 16/07/1999 P. 0001 -0 0 1 9 .
2 Government national recycling targets for England are: 17% recycling or composting by 2003-4; 
25% recycling or composting by 2005; 30% recycling or composting by 2010 and 33% recycling or 
composting by 2015 (Waste Strategy, 2000).
3 The Directive allows member states which landfilled over 80% o f their municipal waste in 1995 to 
postpone the targets by up to four years. The Government intends to use this four year derogation, 
making the target dates for the UK 2010, 2013 and 2020 respectively.
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In this chapter, a stated preference choice experiment (CE) method is employed to 
estimate household’s valuation, in terms of willingness-to-pay (WTP) for kerbside 
waste-separation and collection services in London. The purpose o f the study is to 
examine the determinants of household recycling behaviour and to estimate the 
recycling service attributes that are valued most highly by the public. Recycling 
service attributes valued in this study include the kerbside recycling of a number of 
‘dry’ materials (i.e., paper, glass, aluminium, plastic, and textiles), the composting of 
food and garden waste, as well as the frequency o f kerbside recycling collection. 
Facing budget constraints and strict recycling targets, this information could help 
local authorities to prioritise the recycling services and facilities they offer to their 
residents.
The contribution of this study to the literature is threefold. Firstly, several studies 
have employed stated preference methods (e.g., the contingent valuation method, 
contingent ranking method) to estimate the economic value o f recycling (see, e.g., 
Jakus et al. 1996; Lake et al. 1996; Tiller et al. 1997; Huhtala, 1999; Kinnaman, 2000; 
Caplan et al. 2002; Aadland and Caplan, 2003, which are reviewed in section 6.2). 
There is to date only one existing CE study on recycling for Macao, China (Jin et al. 
2006)5. The CE presented in this paper is the first such study applied to estimation of 
the WTP for the kerbside collection of dry materials, compost and textiles. Secondly, 
to this date there is only one study that examines recycling behaviour in London (in 
the borough of Kensington and Chelsea) (Robinson and Read, 2005). Consequently, 
there is an urgent need for more information on recycling costs and benefits in 
London so as to develop efficient and effective recycling services. Finally, studies on 
composting are limited to Sterner and Bartelings (1999) who study inter alia the 
determinants of composting in a small Swedish municipality, and Kipperberg (2003) 
who examines composting o f yard and food waste in Seattle. Since around 40 
percent o f household waste could be composted, this is an extremely important part of
4 www.letsrecycle.com
5 Another more general application o f CE to waste management does exist, namely that by Garrod and 
Willis (1998) who examine lost amenity due to landfill waste disposal.
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the waste stream, which should be studied in greater detail6. Moreover, the collection 
of compost is a relatively new feature of waste services provided in London and was 
recently introduced in the borough Richmond-upon-Thames in November 2005. This 
study therefore represents a timely and interesting opportunity to estimate the 
economic value of composting to households, an issue which has not generally been 
examined previously.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 discusses the motivation for this 
research and reviews existing studies that have examined WTP for recycling. The 
theory underlying the choice experiment method is described in section 6.3, along 
with some o f its previous applications. Section 6.4 discusses the design and 
administration o f the CE survey, and the results are presented and analysed in section 
6.5. Section 6.6 discusses policy implications and finally, section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Previous Literature
Large-scale waste disposal experiments in which kerbside waste and recyclables are 
weighed can be extremely expensive and time-consuming and require that policy 
evaluation is ex-post1. Instead, stated preference techniques are able to evaluate 
hypothetical changes in policy and to determine which policies are valued most 
highly. Several studies have taken this route to estimate WTP for recycling and find 
that households value recycling. These include Jakus et al. (1996), Lake et al. (1996), 
Tiller et al. (1997), Huhtala (1999), Kinnaman (2000), Caplan et al. (2002), and 
Aadland and Caplan (2005). In an earlier study, Lake et al. (1996) conduct a 
contingent valuation study using 285 households in the village of Hethersett, South 
Norfolk, U.K. and estimate a mean household WTP of £35.60 to continue a green bag 
kerbside recycling scheme. Other studies using contingent valuation such as Jakus et
6 When organic waste is deposited at a landfill, biodegradation results in the generation and release of 
methane and carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, contributing to the global problem o f climate change. 
Estimates suggest that 6% o f  all methane emissions from the atmosphere occur from landfill sites 
(Beede and Bloom, 1995). In the UK, landfill gas methane emissions contributed around 25 percent of 
total methane emissions in 2001, and about 2 percent o f UK total greenhouse gas emissions (Source: 
http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/yourenv/eff/resources_waste/213982/207743/?lang=_e).
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al. (1996) and Kinnaman (2000) estimate households are willing to pay an average of 
$5.78 and $7.17 per month, respectively, for kerbside recycling in the U.S. Tiller et 
al. (1997) estimate rural households would pay an average o f $4.00 per month for 
drop-off recycling facilities in a rural/suburban area o f Tennessee. Caplan et al. 
(2002) uses contingent ranking analysis to examine residents support for kerbside 
services that would enable separation o f green waste and recyclable material from 
other sold waste. Using a sample of 350 individuals in Ogden, Utah, they find 
residents are WTP approximately 3.7-4.6 cents per gallon of waste diverted. Aadland 
and Caplan (2003) use data on more than 1,000 households in Utah to value either 
their actual kerbside recycling program or a hypothetical program if  one is currently 
not provided by their community. They find that WTP for kerbside recycling is 
approximately $7 per month and that young, well-educated women who are members 
of environmental organisations, who recycle out of an ethical responsibility, who are 
not frequent drop-off users and who reside in large households are willing to pay the 
most for these programs. Only very recently has there been an application o f the 
choice experiment approach to estimate WTP for recycling, namely that by Jin et al. 
(2006) who examine preferences for kerbside recycling collection, noise reduction, 
and frequency of collection using a sample o f 244 individuals in Macao, China. 
Studies that are specific to composting are more limited and include Sterner and 
Bartelings (1999) who study the determinants o f disposal, recycling and composting 
in a small Swedish municipality, and Kipperberg (2003) who examines composting o f 
yard and food waste in Seattle. Another study by Daneshvary et al. (1998) looks 
specifically at kerbside textile recycling (Table 6.1 presents a summary of these 
findings).
7 Several important studies o f this kind were reviewed in Chapter 2.
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Table 6.1 Existing WTP Estimates for Recycling and Composting
Study and Location WTP bid levels and estimates
Jakus et al. 1996 
Tennessee, USA
Implied WTP to recycle paper and glass is $5.78 per household 
per month.
Lake et al. 1996 
South Norfolk, U.K.
Use dichotomous choice CV approach to estimate WTP per 
annum for recycling. Mean WTP for kerbside recycling is £35.69 
per annum (£2.97 per month)
Tiller et al. 1997
Tennessee, USA
Estimate household WTP for drop-off recycling in a 
rural/suburban area o f Tennessee. Using contingent valuation, the 
most conservative mean household WTP is near $4.00 (£2.22) per 
household per month.
Daneshvary et al. 1998 
Southern Nevada
Use univariate analyses and binary logit regression to determine 
resident’s support for kerbside textile recycling policy from 817 
mail surveys.
Sterner and Bartelings, 1999 
Tvaaker, Sweden
Elicited WTP to have someone else sort their waste -  420 SEK 
per year. Alternative measure o f WTP was via time spent -  2500 
SEK per year
Aadland and Caplan, 1999 
Ogden, Utah
Mean WTP for kerbside recycling estimated at $2.05 per 
household per month.
Huhtala, 1999 
Helsinki, Finland
WTP for recycling o f FIM 110 (£12.84) per month per household.
Kinnaman, 2000 WTP estimate o f $7.17 per month for kerbside recycling
Caplan, et al. 2002 
Ogden, Utah, USA
WTP of 3.7-4.6 cents per gallon o f waste diverted that enables 
separation of green waste and recyclable material from other solid 
waste.
Kipperberg, 2003 
Seattle, USA
Average WTP for composting is $49 (£27.16) per household for 
yardwaste and $12 (£6.65) per household for foodwaste.
Aadland and Caplan, 2005 
40 western U.S. cities
Generate random values between $2-10 for WTP.
Overall mean WTP o f $5.35 per month (£2.97 per month)
Jin et al. 2006 
Macao, China
WTP for waste segregation and recycling at source is $0.80 
WTP for noise reduction in waste collection and treatment $0.77 
WTP for increase in frequency o f collection (2x per day) is $0.10. 
All estimates are per person per month.
The only London specific recycling study examines recycling behaviour in the 
borough o f Kensington and Chelsea by Robinson and Read (2005). This is a revealed 
preference study that addresses household participation in recycling, types o f services 
used, frequency of recycling, the materials recycled and the problems encountered. 
The study does not report on any information that was collected with regard to the 
socio-economic characteristics o f the households. As such, this study presented here 
is the first study to specifically investigate the household determinants in recycling 
preferences in the London area, and it is the first that employs the choice experiment
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approach to estimate WTP for the kerbside collection o f dry materials, compost and 
textiles.
All three methods mentioned above i.e., contingent valuation (CV), contingent 
ranking (CR) and choice experiments (CE), fall under the category of a stated 
preference elicitation technique. Stated preference methods assess the value of non- 
market goods by using individuals’ stated behaviour in a hypothetical setting. The CV 
method is able to elicit individuals’ preferences, in monetary terms, for changes in the 
quantity or quality of a non-market environmental resource. Valuation is dependent or 
‘contingent’ upon a hypothetical situation or scenario whereby a sample o f the 
population is interviewed and individuals are asked to state their maximum WTP (or 
minimum willingness to accept [WTA] compensation) for an increase (decrease) in 
the level o f environmental quantity or quality.
In CR, individuals are asked to rank a discrete set of hypothetical alternatives from 
most to least preferred. Each alternative varies by price and a variety o f other choice 
attributes. The CR method can offer several advantages over contingent valuation 
(Caplan et al. 2002). For example, Smith and Desvouges (1986) note that “although 
rankings o f contingent market outcomes convey less information than total values 
obtained by contingent valuation, individuals may be more capable o f ordering these 
hypothetical combinations than revealing directly their WTP for any specific change 
in these amenities”.
However, there are also disadvantages with the use o f CR. Firstly, respondents are not 
asked to make a choice (as they are in a real setting), but rather to rank the 
alternatives. Though this may provide the analyst with information on preferences, 
this is not choice. Secondly, individual respondents are assumed to use the response 
scale in a cognitively similar fashion (Hensher et al. 2005, p.90).
In contrast, in a CE, individuals are given a hypothetical setting and asked to choose 
their preferred alternative among several alternatives in a choice set. The CE is a
161
multi-attribute stated preference elicitation technique because each alternative is 
described by a number of attributes or characteristics. A monetary value is included 
as one o f the attributes, along with other attributes o f importance, when describing the 
profile o f the alternative presented. Thus, when individuals make their choice, they 
implicitly make trade-offs between the levels o f the attributes in the different 
alternatives presented in a choice set (Alpizar et al. 2003). Furthermore, the CE 
method avoids many o f the problems associated with the CV method such as 
information bias, design bias (starting point bias and vehicle bias), hypothetical bias, 
yea-saying bias, strategic bias (free-riding), substitute sites and embedding effects 
(see Boxall et al. 1996; Bateman et al., 2003; Hanley et al. 1998).
The choice experiment method was initially developed by Louviere and Hensher 
(1982) and Louviere and Woodworth (1983) in the marketing economics and 
transportation literature. More recently it has been applied in the field of 
environmental economics for valuation of non-marketed environmental goods. 
Earliest applications are those by Adamowicz et al. (1994) on recreation and Boxall et 
al. (1996) on recreational moose hunting. More recent applications include inter alia 
Layton and Brown (2000) on climate change, Rolfe et al. (2000) on forests, Carlsson 
et al. (2003) on wetlands, and Birol et al. (2006) on home gardens. Choice 
experiments are becoming ever more frequently applied to the valuation o f non- 
market goods. This method gives the value o f a certain good by separately evaluating 
the preferences o f individuals for the relevant attributes that characterize that good, 
and in doing so it also provides a large amount o f information that can be used in 
determining the preferred design o f the good. The next section outlines the theory 
behind this preference elicitation technique in more detail.
6.3 Choice Experiment Method: Theory and Models
The CE method has its theoretical grounding in Lancaster’s attribute theory of 
consumer choice (Lancaster, 1966) and an econometric basis in random utility models 
(Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1974). Lancaster proposed that consumers derive utility not
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from the goods themselves but from the attributes they provide. Consider a 
household’s or individual’s choice and assume that utility depends on choices made 
from a set C, i.e. a choice set, which includes all possible recycling alternatives. The 
individual is assumed to have a utility function o f the form:
U i j = V (  Zy,S,) + e ( Z ip Sd (1)
where for an individual i, a given level of utility will be associated with any 
alternative recycling scheme j. Utility derived from any of the recycling scheme 
alternatives depends on the attributes of the recycling scheme Z, and the social and 
economic characteristics o f the individual S„ since different individuals are likely to 
receive different levels of utility from these attributes.
The random utility theory (RUT) is the theoretical basis for integrating behaviour 
with economic valuation in the CE method. According to RUT, the utility o f a choice 
is comprised of a deterministic component (V) and an error component (e), which is 
independent of the deterministic part and follows a predetermined distribution. This 
error component implies that predictions cannot be made with certainty. Choices 
made between alternatives will be a function of the probability that the utility 
associated with a particular option j  is higher than those for other alternatives8. 
Assuming that the relationship between utility and attributes is linear in the 
parameters and variables function, and that the error terms are identically and 
independently distributed with a Weibull distribution, the probability o f any particular 
alternative i being chosen can be expressed in terms o f a logistic distribution. 
Equation (1) can be estimated with a conditional logit (CL) model (McFadden 1974; 
Greene 1997, pp. 913-914; Maddala 1999, pp. 42), which takes the general form:
8 Prob/; = Prob [(V>y- + e/y) > (Vjh + ejh) V h e  C, j^h] In words, the probability o f an individual 
choosing alternative j is equal to the probability that the utility o f  alternative j is greater than (or equal 
to) the utility associated with alternative h after evaluating each and every alternative in the choice set 
o f h = 1, . ..i .. .H  alternatives.
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(2)
Equation (2) states that the probability o f an individual choosing alternative j  out of 
the set of h alternatives is equal to the ratio of the (exponential o f the) observed utility 
index for alternative j  to the sum of the exponentials o f the observed utility indices for 
all J alternatives, including the j  alternative (Hensher et al. 2005, p. 86). The 
conditional indirect utility function generally estimated is given by:
where /3 is the alternative specific constant (ASC) which captures the effects on utility 
of any attributes not included in choice specific attributes. The number o f recycling 
scheme attributes considered is n and the number o f socio-economic and attitudinal 
characteristics of the respondent employed to explain the choice o f the recycling 
scheme is m. The vectors of coefficients /?, to (3n and S ] to 8, are attached to the 
vector o f attributes (Z) and to vector of interaction terms (S) that influence utility, 
respectively. Since social, economic and attitudinal characteristics are constant 
across choice occasions for any given respondent, these only enter as interaction 
terms with the recycling scheme attributes.
The assumptions about the distributions o f error terms implicit in the use of the CL 
model impose a particular condition known as the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) property. This property states that the probability of a particular 
alternative being chosen is independent o f other alternatives. Whether the IIA 
property holds can be tested by dropping an alternative from the choice set and 
comparing parameter vectors for significant differences. If  the IIA property is 
violated then CL results will be biased and hence a discrete choice model that does 
not require the IIA property, such as random parameter logit (RPL) model, should be
(3)
164
used. Inclusion of socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics is also beneficial in 
avoiding IIA violations, since these are relevant to preferences of the respondents and 
can increase the deterministic component of utility while decreasing the error one 
(Rolfe et al. 2000; Bateman et al. 2003).
Though the use of socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics help to detect 
conditional, observed heterogeneity, these methods do not detect for unobserved 
heterogeneity. It has been demonstrated that heterogeneity can be present in 
significant residual form even when conditional heterogeneity is accounted for 
(Garrod et al., 2002). Unobserved heterogeneity in preferences across respondents 
can be accounted for in the RPL model. The random utility function in the RPL 
model is given by:
Similarly to the CL model, utility is decomposed into a deterministic component (V) 
and an error component stochastic term (e). Indirect utility is assumed to be a 
function of the choice attributes (ZJ) with parameters /? , which due to preference
heterogeneity may vary across respondents by a random component 7/,, and o f the 
social, economic and attitudinal characteristics (Si) if  included in the model. By 
specifying the distribution of the error terms e and rj, the probability o f choosingy in 
each o f the choice sets can be derived (Train, 1998). By accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity, equation (2) now becomes:
Ulj=V(Zi (P^ril\ S ^ e ( Z p Sl) (4)
exp(U ( Z j  ( /3  + rj,),  S .))
(V
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Since this model is not restricted by the IIA assumption, the stochastic part of utility 
may be correlated among alternatives and across the sequence of choices via the 
common influence of rjj . Treating preference parameters as random variables
requires estimation by simulated maximum likelihood. Procedurally, the maximum 
likelihood algorithm searches for a solution by simulating m draws from distributions 
with given means and standard deviations. Probabilities are calculated by integrating 
the joint simulated distribution.
Recent applications of the RPL model have shown that this model is superior to the 
CL model in terms o f overall fit and welfare estimates (Breffle and Morey, 2000; 
Layton and Brown, 2000; Carlsson et al., 2003; Lusk et al., 2003; Morey and 
Rossmann, 2003). It should also be noted however that even if  unobserved 
heterogeneity can be accounted for in the RPL model, the model fails to explain the 
sources o f heterogeneity (Boxall and Adamowicz, 1999). One solution to detecting 
the sources o f heterogeneity while accounting for unobserved heterogeneity is by 
including respondent characteristics in the utility function as interaction terms. This 
enables the RPL model to pick up preference variation in terms o f both unconditional 
taste heterogeneity (random heterogeneity) and individual characteristics (conditional 
heterogeneity), and hence improve model fit (e.g., Revelt and Train, 1998; Morey and 
Rossmann, 2003).
The CE method is consistent with utility maximisation and demand theory (Bateman 
et ah, 2003). When parameter estimates are obtained, welfare measures can be 
estimated using the following formula:
In J ]  exp(PA’) -  In 2 ] exp(K,°)
WTP =  k-------------------- k--------------  (6)
a
where WTP is the welfare measure, a  is the marginal utility o f income (generally 
represented by the coefficient o f the monetary attribute in the CE), and P / and V\
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represent indirect utility functions before and after the change under consideration. 
For the linear utility index the marginal value of change in a single attribute can be 
represented as a ratio of coefficients, reducing equation (6) to:
WTP = -1 attribute
y  P m oneta ry  v a r  table J
(7)
This part-worth (or implicit price) formula represents the marginal rate of substitution 
between income and the attribute in question, i.e., the marginal WTP for a change in 
any o f the attributes. Compensating surplus welfare measures can be obtained for 
different recycling services scenarios associated with multiple changes in attributes, 
i.e., equation (7) simplifies to
Compensating S U r p lU S =  -(V°~ V1) / p monetaiy variable (8)
6.4 Survey Design and Administration
6.4.1 Design o f  Choice Sets
A choice experiment is a highly ‘structured method o f data generation’ (Hanley et al., 
1998), relying on carefully designed tasks or “experiments” to reveal the factors that 
influence choice. Experimental design theory is used to construct profiles for the 
environmental good in terms of its attributes and levels o f these attributes. Profiles 
are assembled in choice sets, which are in turn presented to the respondents, who are 
asked to state their preferences in each choice occasion.
The first step in choice experiment design is, therefore, to define the recycling service 
in terms of its attributes and levels these attributes take. Prior to the development of 
the CE questionnaire, a focus group was conducted in November 2005 to obtain 
background information and perceptions o f recycling from residents in London. A 
pilot survey was then carried out in December using the contingent valuation (CV)
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method and an open-ended elicitation format, to obtain bid estimates of WTP for the 
existence o f a kerbside recycling scheme. This also served to test the language used in 
the survey and to  ensure that respondents were able to understand the concepts and 
the manner in which they were described (Dillman, 2000). A total of 30 pilot surveys 
were collected where WTP ranged from £0 to £20 per month. The mean monthly 
WTP for recycling scheme services obtained from the CV surveys was £9.53.
The selection o f recycling attributes for the final CE survey was conducted as a result 
o f an extensive literature review, the focus group, and the CV pilot study. The five 
attributes selected, along with their respective levels, are reported in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2. Recycling Attributes and their Levels
Attributes Definition Levels
Number o f materials 
collected
Paper and glass, aluminium, plastic 2, 3 ,4
Compost Collection Food and garden waste Yes, No
Textile Collection Clothing and textiles Yes, No
Frequency o f collection 
per month
Number of times per month recycling 
vehicles pick-up
2, 4, 8
Cost per month (£) Increase in monthly bills per household 1 , 2 , 5 , 1 0 , 2 0
A large number o f unique recycling service descriptions can be constructed from this 
number o f  attributes and levels9. Statistical design methods (see Louviere et al., 
2000) were used to structure the presentation o f the levels o f the five attributes in 
choice sets. More specifically, an orthogonalisation procedure was employed to 
recover only the main effects, consisting o f 24 pair wise comparisons o f recycling 
service profiles. These were randomly blocked to three different versions with eight 
choice sets10. Each respondent was presented with eight choice sets, each containing 
two recycling scheme profiles and an option to “opt out” by selecting neither, in 
which case the respondents were told that there would be no kerbside recycling at all. 
Such an “opt out” option can be considered as a status quo or baseline alternative,
9 The number o f recycling services scenarios that can be generated from 5 attributes, 2 with 2 levels, 2 
with 3 levels and one with 5 levels is 32*22*5=160.
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whose inclusion in the choice set is instrumental to achieving welfare measures that 
are consistent with demand theory (Bennett and Blarney, 2001; Bateman et al., 2003; 
Kontoleon, 2003). Figure 6.1 provides an example of a choice set.
Figure 6.1 Example o f a Choice Set
Choice Experiment 1.1
Which o f the following schemes do you  favour? Option A and option B would entail a cost to your 
household. Alternatively, you might favour neither scheme: Monthly bills w ould not rise, but all rubbish left 
fo r  collection would be deposited at landfills or incinerated.
Choice A Choice B Choice C
Materials Collected 
Collection of Compost 
Collection of Textiles 
Frequency of Collection 
Cost per Month
Paper, glass and aluminium 
No 
Yes 
Fortnightly 
£5
Paper and glass 
No 
Yes 
Weekly 
£2
Neither Option A nor B: 
I do not wish to 
participate in kerbside 
recycling
6.4.2 Selected Boroughs and Sampling
The CE survey was implemented in January and February 2006. A stratified sampling 
approach was adopted for the survey. Randomly selected individuals were surveyed 
in primarily three areas of London, namely the boroughs of Camden, Kensington and 
Chelsea, and Richmond-upon-Thames. Though surveys were conducted in other parts 
of London, due to time and budget constraints it was necessary to focus in certain 
areas. The boroughs were chosen so as to represent a variety of commercial and 
residential areas, the types of homes that predominated, and the recycling and 
composting services offered. This is explained in more detail below:
10 The optimal number o f choice sets presented to each respondent varies depending on the difficulty 
of the choice tasks, and the conditions under which the survey is conducted, where 4 to 16 choice sets 
are generally considered to be efficient (Louviere et al. 2000).
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Camden, District o f  Bloomsbury. Located in central London, this borough covers an 
area o f 22 km2 (2,180ha). Camden is a highly commercial area and the respondents 
surveyed are therefore likely to reflect a greater diversity in terms o f socio-economic 
characteristics and the areas in which they reside.
Kensington and Chelsea, District o f  Bayswater: The Royal Borough o f Kensington 
and Chelsea is one of the most densely populated areas o f the United Kingdom. It has
164,000 residents and 83,000 households in an area o f slightly under 12 km2. It is 
cosmopolitan, with marked ethnic diversity and a wide range o f housing types 
(Robinson and Read, 2005).
Richmond-upon-Thames, District o f  Barnes: Located in Southwest London (part of 
Outer London), Richmond-upon-Thames covers an area o f 57 km2 and is not entirely 
urbanised. The kerbside collection of food waste for compost was recently introduced 
in this borough. The housing composition leans more towards detached, semi­
detached (terraced) residences, rather than flats and block mansions (i.e. single-family 
vs multi-family dwelling) which may affect recycling rates.
Table 6.3. Background Information on Selected Boroughs
Camden Kensington and 
Chelsea
Richmond-upon-
Thames
Westminster
Households with 
kerbside collection
53,869 63,358 60000 52,000
Recycling and 
composting rate 
(TCR)
19.1% 18.08% 23.8% 15.3%
Collection per 
month
Weekly Twice weekly Weekly Weekly
‘Dry’ Materials Empty
aerosols
Glass
bottles/jars
Light
cardboard
Paper
Mixed cans
Textiles
Shoes
Empty aerosols
Paper
Cardboard
Glass
Cans/tins
Plastic bottles
Paper
Glass bottles/jars 
Mixed cans 
Yellow pages 
Aluminium foil 
Textiles 
Shoes
Yellow pages
Empty aerosols 
Paper 
Cardboard 
Glass bottles/jars 
Tins/cans 
Plastic bottles
Food waste No (home No (home Yes No (home |
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collection composting composting composting only)
only) only)
Source: www.capitalwastefacts.com
Face-to face interviews were conducted on the street, in parks, and other public 
areas11. The CE survey was administered to be representative of the population in 
terms o f gender and age, and only individuals aged 18 or over were surveyed.
The final data set consists of 188 useable surveys12. With respect to sample size, 
Hensher et al. (2004) discuss sampling for choice data and explain that in practice, the 
somewhat arbitrary number of 50 decisions per alternative has been suggested as an 
experimental lower limit which provides adequate variation in the variables of 
interest for which robust models may be fitted. The sample size used in this analysis 
therefore lies above the lower limit (as there are three alternatives in the recycling 
CE).
Given that there were 3 versions of choice sets, each with 8 choice sets, this 
constitutes a total of 1504 observations for the analysis (i.e., 188 * 8). The number of 
surveys collected for each of the London boroughs is reported in Table 6.4 with a 
map o f the London boroughs depicted in Figure 6.2 below13.
Table 6.4. Number o f surveys from each London borough
Borough Sample size
Barking and Dagenham 1
Barnet 3
Brent 6
Bromley 1
Camden 12
Croyden 1
Ealing 10
Enfield 1
Greenwich 2
Hackney o
11 Though door to door surveys may be more appropriate, this was not possible to due time and budget 
constraints as well as safety considerations for the surveyors. Face-to-face interviews are preferred 
over mail surveys and telephone interviews (Arrow et al. 1993, NOAA Panel Guidelines).
The response rate was about 70%.
13 There are a total o f  33 boroughs in London. The sample consisted o f randomly selected respondents 
residing in 28 boroughs.
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Hammersmith and Fulham 11
Haringey 7
Havering 2
Hillingdon 1
Hounslow 4
Islington 3
Kingston-upon-Thames 3
Kensington and Chelsea 25
Lambeth 7
Redbridge 1
Richmond-upon-Thames 24
Southwark 4
Sutton 2
Tower Hamlets 5
Waltham Forest 1
W andsworth 8
W estminster 22
M issing data 18
TOTAL 188
Figure 6.2. Map o f  London Boroughs
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6.4.3 Data Preparation and Coding
The data were then coded according to the levels o f the attributes. Attributes with two 
levels (i.e., collection of compost and collection of textiles) entered the utility 
function as binary variables that were effects coded. For the collection of compost, 
yes level was coded as 1 and no level was coded as -1 . Similarly, for the collection of 
textiles, if  the service was available (yes), the level was coded 1 whereas no 
collection o f textiles (no) was -1 . The levels for the number of materials collected 
and the frequency o f collection per month were entered in cardinal-linear form and 
consequently took the levels o f 2, 3, 4 and 2, 4, 8 respectively. Similarly, the payment 
attribute was coded as 1 ,2 ,  5, 10, and 20. The attributes for the ‘neither kerbside 
recycling scenario’ option were coded with zero values for each of the attributes.
In addition to collecting data on the socio-economic characteristics of the individual, 
several motivational and attitudinal questions were also asked, including their 
preferences for the use o f economic incentive methods to reduce waste generation and 
encourage recycling.
The survey included nine specific questions probing household’s motivations for and 
against recycling (see Appendix 6.2). The questions were selected based on previous 
literature and adapted from other recycling surveys including Aadland (2003) and 
Halvorsen and Kipperberg (2003). The questions were phrased as: “7 recycle partly 
because ...” and “I f i n d  it difficult to recycle partly because...” with options to choose 
between strongly agree, partly agree, partly disagree, strongly disagree, and don’t 
know. To facilitate analysis, these were coded as binary variables where agree entered 
as 1 and disagree as 0.
The attitudes o f the respondents for environmental issues were elicited through a 
series o f questions that are now widely used to measure pro-environmental 
orientation (Dunlap et al. 2000). The New Ecological Paradigm Scale (revised from
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the 1978 New Environmental Paradigm Scale) originally consists of a set o f 15 
questions which are designed to tap into five hypothesised facets of an ecological 
worldview. These are the reality o f limits to growth, antianthropocentrism, the 
fragility o f nature’s balance, rejection of exemptionalism, and the possibility o f an 
ecocrisis. Given the nature o f this particular survey, that many other questions 
needed to be addressed, and that it was unrealistic for the survey duration time to last 
for more than 20 minutes, it was necessary to extract only a few o f the full NEP 
Scale questions to include in the survey. Four o f the 15 questions were selected, such 
that each o f the five facets mentioned above were addressed, and so that two o f the 
questions were worded so that agreement indicated a pro-ecological view, and two 
were worded so that disagreement indicates a pro-ecological view. The questions are 
the first four questions in the “Attitudes” section of the Recycling Survey in 
Appendix 2. These were measured on a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 reflecting a strong anti- 
ecological view, 3 reflecting “Don’t know” and thus uncertainty with regard to the 
question, and 5 reflecting a strong pro-ecological view. An NEP score was then also 
created in which the total was added across the four questions.
In addition to this measure o f pro-environmental orientation, actual household 
behaviour was assessed via questions eliciting each respondents purchase o f organic 
produce, donations to environmental organisations, the purchase o f environmental 
publications, fair-trade products and shopping at environmentally friendly shops. 
These were measured on a Likert-scale ranging from zero (never) to 4 (always). An 
environmental consciousness index (ECI), ranging from 0 to 20, was calculated using 
the Likert scores. Respondents were also asked whether they are a member o f an 
environmental group, along with a series of questions on household characteristics, 
including age o f the respondent, age o f the oldest person in the household, highest 
education level attained in the household, occupation, type of home, the number of 
people in the household, the borough o f residence, car ownership and household 
income. A selection o f the descriptive statistics on the recycling behaviour, attitudes 
and socio-economic characteristics o f the households are reported in Table 6.5.
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Table 6.5. Descriptive Statistics o f  Respondents, N = 188
Social and Economic Characteristics
Mean (s.d.)
Age o f  the respondent 36.80(13.20)
Household size 2.71 (1.43)
Income (£/hh) 69,684 (52,853)
Percent
Gender (female=l, 0 otherwise) 56%
Education (university degree and above=l, 0 otherwise) 77%
Occupation (full-time= 1, 0 otherwise) 78%
Type o f home (house=l, 0 otherwise) 44%
Dependent children (yes=l, 0 otherwise 26%
Tenure (own house=l, 0 otherwise) 52%
Car (yes=l, 0 otherwise) 57%
Recycling Behaviour and Services
Percent
Household recycles (yes=l, no=0) 81.9%
Household composts (yes=l, no=0) 23%
Kerbside recycling in the borough(yes=l, no=0) 0.845
Kerbside composting in the borough (yes=l, no=0) 0.276
Household used drop-off site (yes=l, no=0) 0.889
Mean (s.d.)
%  o f  paper recycled 50.67 (37.8)
%  o f glass recycled 53.61(39.46)
% o f can recycled 38.44 (40.01)
% o f plastic recycled 27.00 (34.73)
% o f textiles recycled 37.17 (37.71)
% o f food recycled 11.97 (28.64)
%  o f garden waste recycled 14.69 (30.85)
Minutes per week spent on recycling 17.9(24.14)
Minutes walk to drop-off site 13.19(18.59)
Use drop-off site (yes=l, no=0) 0.47 (0.50)
Motivations for Recycling
Percent
To contribute to environment (yes=l, no=0) 99%
To be a responsible person (yes=l, no=0) 96%
It is a pleasant activity (yes=l, no=0) 46%
Neighbours recycle (yes=l, no=0) 31%
It is required by the local authority (yes=l, no=0) 48%
Difficulties in Recycling
Percent
Lack o f storage space (yes=l, no=0) 55%
Inconvenient /poor service (yes=l, no=0) 37%
Lack o f information (yes=l, no=0) 35%
Lack o f time (yes=l, no=0) 19%
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On average, the households’ mean income and percentage o f those with university 
degrees are higher than the London population means for these variables 
(www.ons.gov). This may be explained by the fact that many o f the respondents are 
from Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster, two o f the relatively wealthier 
boroughs o f London. Based on data from the most recently available 2001 UK 
Census for London, females represent 51.6% of the population; households with one 
or more cars represent 62.5% of the London population; average London household 
size is 2.35; and owner-occupied housing represents 56.5% o f the London population 
(www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001). In comparison with the social and economic 
characteristics o f the sample collected for the CE, the sample has a slightly larger 
proportion of women (56%); a smaller proportion o f owner-occupied housing (52%); 
a smaller percentage of households owning one or more cars (57%) and larger 
average household size (2.71). Overall however, the values are comparable and the 
sample seems representative in this regard.
In the sample, 81.9% are recyclers of one form or another, whereas 23.0% compost 
food and/or garden waste. The average household spends on average about 18 
minutes per week separating, sorting and preparing their materials for 
recycling/composting. 88.9% of the sample were aware o f a drop-off site nearby, the 
average walking distance to which is about 13.2 minutes, and 47.0% of the sample 
had at one point or another used a drop-off site.
With regard to motives for recycling, 99% said that they wanted to contribute to a 
better environment, 96% want to think of themselves as a responsible person, 46% 
say that recycling is a pleasant activity in itself, 31% feel they should recycle because 
their neighbours recycle and 49% perceive it as a requirement by local authorities.
55% of the respondents said that they found it difficult to recycle because they do not 
have enough space in their households to store their recyclables, 37% said that it was 
not convenient for them to recycle because recycling services are poor. 35% felt that
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they had not been provided with adequate information regarding recycling and 19% 
said they did not have time to recycle.
Respondents were also encouraged to freely comment and express themselves on 
aspects o f recycling that were important to them. Some respondents stated that they 
did not want twice a week collection because it is too frequent, unnecessary, and 
some even said caused adverse effects to the environment due to vehicle emissions 
and congestion. On the other hand, one respondent stated that if  recycling collection 
was only offered fortnightly, she would prefer neither recycling option (i.e. option C) 
and would use the drop-off facility.
6.5 Results
6.5.1 Conditional Logit Models
The CE was designed with the assumption that the observable utility function would 
follow a strictly additive form. The model was specified so that the probability of 
selecting a particular recycling services scenario was a function o f the attributes only 
and did not include an alternative specific constant (ASC). This is because the three 
alternatives were unlabeled14. Using the 1504 choices elicited from the 188 
respondents, the highest value o f the log-likelihood function was found for the 
specification with all attributes in linear form. The results o f the CL estimates for the 
sample are reported in the first column o f Table 6 .6 .
14 It is unlabeled in the sense that “Option A”, “Option B” and “Neither Option” do not convey 
meaning to the respondent on what the alternatives represent in reality (e.g. a brand, or car vs. bus, etc) 
and do not provide any useful information to suggest that there are unobserved influences that are 
systematically different for alternatives A and B. In this case the use o f ASC makes no behavioral 
sense (p. 371). The ASC is a parameter for a particular alternative that is used to represent the role o f 
unobserved sources o f utility. One o f  the main benefits o f using unlabeled experiments is that they do 
not require the identification and use o f all alternatives within the universal set o f  alternatives. Further 
benefit: The IID assumption imposes the restriction that the alternatives used in the modeling process 
be uncorrelated. This assumption is less likely to be met under labeled experiments than under 
unlabeled experiments (p. 113). The correct way to proceed is to exclude constant terms for all 
(unlabeled) alternatives i.e, we constrain the average unobserved effect for all (unlabeled) alternatives 
to be zero. (Hensher, et al. 2005).
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2 15The overall fit o f the model, as measured by M cFadden’s p indicates a good fit , 
and the coefficients are statistically significant and intuitively correct. All of the 
recycling services attributes are significant factors in the choice o f recycling services, 
and ceteris paribus, any single attribute increases the probability that a recycling 
scenario is selected. In other words, respondents’ value kerbside recycling services 
scenarios that result in a greater number o f materials recycled, the availability of 
compost and textile collection, and a greater frequency in collection. The sign o f the 
payment coefficient indicates that the effect on utility o f choosing a choice set with a 
higher payment level is negative.
Table 6.6. Conditional Logit (CL) Model and CL Model with Interactions
CL Model CL Model with Interactions
Attributes and 
Interactions
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Materials 0.3376*** 0.0335 0.3751*** 0.0455
Compost 0.8411* 0.0507 0.0990* 0.0684
Textiles 0.1117** 0.0504 0.0422 0.0683
Frequency of 
collection
0.3511* 0.01954 0.0021 0.0259
Payment -0.1357*** 0.0079 -0.3407*** 0.0573
Pay*ECI - - 0.00933*** 0.0024
Pay* Education - - 0.10995*** 0.0357
Pay*Walk - - 0.001316*** 0.0005
Pay*TCR - - -0.00070 0.0021
Pay* Income - - 0.2x10'b* 0.1x1 O'6
Pay*Sex - - 0.00726 0.0171
Pseudo R'2 0.14113 0.13235
Log likelihood -1419.28 -785.6741
Sample size 1504 1504
Significance at *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%
15 The p2 value in multinomial logit models is similar to the R2 in conventional analysis except that 
significance occurs at lower levels. Hensher et al. (2005, p. 338) comment that values o f p2 between 
0.2 and 0.4 are considered to be extremely good fits.
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Pseudo R2 is computed as 1- (unrestricted log-likelihood/ restricted log-likelihood) and is an 
alternative measure o f goodness-of-fit for probabilistic choice models (McFadden, 1974; Garrod and 
Willis, 1998).
As explained in section 6.3, the assumptions about the distribution o f error terms 
implicit in the use of the CL model impose a particular condition known as the IIA 
property. The IIA assumption states that the ratio of two probabilities of any two 
alternatives should be preserved despite the presence or absence o f any other 
alternative within the set of alternative included in the model (i.e. Pi/Pj will remain 
unaffected by the presence or absence of any alternative within the set o f alternatives 
modeled) (Hensher et al. 2005, p. 519). To test whether the CL model is appropriate, 
the Hausman and McFadden test (1984) is used. The IIA test involves constructing a 
likelihood ratio test around the different versions of the model where the choice 
alternatives are excluded. If the IIA holds then the model estimated on all choices 
should be the same as that estimated for a sub-set o f alternatives. The results are 
shown in Table 6.7 below, indicating that the IIA property cannot be rejected at the 
5% level. Therefore the CL model is appropriate for estimation of this data.
Table 6.7. Test o f Independence o f Irrelevant Alternatives
Alternative Dropped X2(5) Probability
Option 1 11.9300 0.03576
Option 2 53.1380 0.0000
Neither Option 29.0844 0.0000
The basic conditional logit model assumes homogenous preferences across 
respondents (i.e. that tastes do not vary). As mentioned in section 6.3, it is the random 
parameter logit model that is able to accommodate the presence of unobservable 
preference heterogeneity in the sampled population. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
account for and identify observed conditional preference heterogeneity in the CL 
framework. This is undertaken via the interaction o f individual-specific 
characteristics with the attributes o f the choices16. This approach allows the /7s to 
vary across individuals in a systematic way as a function o f individual characteristics.
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The analyst can thus assess the distributional impacts o f  a particular policy change. 
Due to multicollinearity problems however, it is not possible to include all the 
interactions between the socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics of the 
respondents and the recycling attributes (see Breffle and Morey, 2000)17.
Various combinations of demographic and attributes were used18. The last two 
columns in Table 6.6 present the results from a specification that includes interaction 
terms between the payment attribute and socio-economic and attitudinal 
characteristics. Using the Swait-Louviere log-likelihood test it can be seen that the 
model with the interaction effects outperforms the simple m odel19. The results 
indicate that households who have university degrees, higher income and ECI levels, 
as well as those who have to walk longer distances to the recycling drop-off points 
are willing to pay more for kerbside recycling services. Moreover, similar to results 
found in Robinson and Read (2005), there is no statistically significant difference 
between the WTP for recycling services between women and men. Finally, the 
variable TCR, which reflects borough-level total current rate o f recycling (i.e. 
recycling and composting) and is a proxy for borough level performance indicators, is 
also not significant20.
16 Morey et al. (2002), Rolfe et al. (2000), and Scarpa et al. (2003) provide some recent examples of 
this approach.
17 Appendix 6.4 reports the correlation matrix for the data in this sample.
18 Other combinations o f interaction effects provided little improvement to overall fit and explanatory 
power to the model. The specification presented in Table 6.5 is convenient since it can easily be 
compared and contrasted with the results o f the RPL model below.
19 [-2 x (LL] -  LL2)]= -2 (1419.28 -  785.67) = 1267.22 = y j  where the critical yj{6) = 12.59 at a  = 
0.05
This consist o f the test statistic -2 (L L r  LL2) where LL] and LL2 refer to the log-likelihood statistics 
for the model with and without and . The test statistic is asymptotically follows a %2 distribution with 
degrees o f freedom equal to the difference in the numbers o f  parameters in estimated in the two 
models.
20 Data for TCR is obtained from www.capitalwastefacts.com. This variable is included so as to 
account for potential locational preference heterogeneity in the data.
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6.5.2 Random Parameter Logit Models
Recent applications of the RPL model have shown that this model is superior to the 
CL model in terms o f overall fit and welfare estimates (Breffle and Morey, 2000; 
Layton and Brown, 2000; Carlsson et al. 2003; Kontoleon, 2003; Lusk et al. 2003; 
Morey and Rossmann, 2003). The RPL model is estimated using LIMDEP 8.0 
NLOGIT 3.0. All the parameters except the payment attribute were specified to be 
normally distributed (Train, 1998; Revelt and Train, 1998; Morey and Rossmann, 
2003; Carlsson et al. 2003), and distribution simulations were based on 500 draws. 
The results of the RPL estimations are reported in the first column of Table 6 .8. RPL 
model estimates o f the sample result in significant derived standard deviations for all 
four attributes indicating that the data supports choice specific unconditional 
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences among the respondents. The log likelihood 
ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the regression parameters o f CL and RPL are 
equal at 0.5% significance level21. Hence improvement in the model fit can be 
achieved with the use of the RPL model. On the basis o f this test it can be concluded 
that the RPL model is appropriate for analysis of the data set presented in this paper
Table 6.8. Random Parameter Logit (RPL) Model and RPL Model with Interactions
RPL Model RPL with Interactions
Attributes Coefficient Coeff. Std. Coefficient Coeff. Std.
and Interactions (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Materials 0.8306***
(0.2313)
0.9357***
(0.2918)
0.3751***
(0.0638)
0.1109
(0.2576)
Compost 0.2854**
(0.1331)
1.0455***
(0.4355)
0.0989*
(0.0706)
0.0238
(1.2506)
Textiles 0.2255**
(0.1154)
0.785**
(0.5190)
0.0422
(0.0712)
0.0301
(1.1790)
Frequency o f collection 0.1043**
(0.0511)
0.457***
(0.1896)
0.0021
(0.0275)
0.0485
(0.1263)
Payment -0.294***
(0.0787)
-0.341 *** 
(0.0617)
-
Pay*ECI - 0.0093***
(0.0025)
-
Pay*Education - - 0.1099***
(0.03115
-
Pay* Walk - “ 0.001316***
(0.00056)
-
21 -2(1419.28 -  1398.66) = 41.24 > critical *2(4) -  9.49
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Pay*TCR - - -0.0007
(0.00249)
-
Pay* Income - - 0.00000023*
(0.0000001)
-
Pay*Sex - - 0.00726
(0.0185)
-
R2 0.15352 0.14985
Log likelihood -1398.657 -784.5487
Sample size 1504 1504
Significance at *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%
Even if  unobserved heterogeneity can be accounted for in the RPL model, the model 
fails to explain the sources o f heterogeneity (Boxall and Adamowicz, 1999). One 
solution to detecting the sources heterogeneity while accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity is by including interactions o f respondent-specific social, economic and 
attitudinal characteristics with choice specific attributes and/or with ASC in the utility 
function. This enables the RPL model to pick up preference variation in terms of 
both unconditional taste heterogeneity (random heterogeneity) and individual 
characteristics (conditional/systematic heterogeneity), and hence improve model fit 
(e.g., Revelt and Train, 1998; Kontoleon, 2003; Morey and Rossmann, 2003). The 
caveat o f multicollinearity mentioned above carry over. Moreover, the selection o f a 
particular multivariate distributional function describing the random parameters may 
be hard to justify (Bateman et al. 2003; Hensher et al. 2005).
The indirect utility function is extended to include these interactions and the RPL 
model with interactions was estimated using LIM DEP 8.0 NLOGIT 3.0. The results 
are reported in the last two columns o f Table 6.10. This model has a better/higher 
overall fit compared to the RPL model, with a p 2 o f 0.1498. The Swait-Louviere log 
likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the regression parameters for the 
RPL model and the RPL model with interactions are equal at 0.5% significance level, 
implying that improvement in the model fit is achieved with the inclusion of social, 
economic and attitudinal characteristics in the RPL model22. In contrast to the RPL 
model estimated above, the RPL model with interactions does not result in significant
22 -2(1398.66-784.55) = 1228.22 > critical x
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derived standard deviations for the four attributes (number o f dry materials, compost, 
textiles, and frequency of collection) indicating that data does not support choice 
specific unconditional unobserved heterogeneity for these attributes.
6.5.3 Willingness to Pay Estimates
As explained in section 6.3, the parameter estimates obtained from the different 
models can be used to estimate welfare measures. Table 6.9 reports the implicit 
prices, or marginal willingness to pay (WTP) values for each o f the recycling 
attributes with the respective 95% confidence intervals. These were calculated using 
equation 7 and the WALD procedure in LIMDEP 8.0 NLOGIT 3.0. The results from 
the CL model indicate that these are all positive implying that households have a 
positive WTP for increases in the quantity o f each attribute. The results suggest 
households are WTP on average £2.4 to £2.8 per month for each additional increase 
in the number o f materials collected (paper and glass, aluminium, plastic) and the 
value households attach to composting services are in the range o f £0.62 to £0.97 per 
month. The results indicate that on average respondents in London do not attach 
significant values to the collection of textile materials, and neither do they 
significantly value the frequency of kerbside collection.
Table 6.9. Marginal WTP for recycling services (£/househo1ds/month) and 95% C.I.
Attribute CL Model CL Model 
with Interactions
RPL Model RPL Model with 
Interactions
Materials 2.488
(2.238-2.738)
2.496
(2 .184-2 .808)
2.8230
(2 .5 9 0 2 -3 .0 5 5 8 )
2.495
(2.158 -2 .832)
Compost 0.619
(0.240-0.998)
0.658
(0 .1 9 4 - 1.122)
0.9700
(0 .6 2 0 9 - 1.319)
0.658
(0 .189- 1.127)
Textile 0.823
(0.447-1.199)
— 0.7664
(0.4381 -  1.0947)
--
Frequency 0.259
(0.118-0.400)
— 0.3544
(0 .2 2 4 9 -0 .4 8 3 9 )
—
— indicates that the Wald procedure resulted in insignificant WTP estimates for this attribute. See 
Henscher, 2005.
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6.6 Discussion and Policy Implications
The results reported from the recycling CE study are comparable to those found by 
other studies using the CV method, thus providing strong evidence of convergent 
validity. For example, Lake et al. (1996) found that residents in South Norfolk, UK, 
are WTP £2.97 monthly for kerbside recycling services. Similarly, Kinnaman (2000) 
found that respondents are WTP $7.17 (£4.13) for kerbside recycling services, 
whereas Aadland and Caplan (2003) found lower values o f $2.05 (£1.18) per 
household per month for kerbside recycling services in Utah, USA. For specific 
recycling services, Jakus et al. (1996) found that households in Tennessee, USA are 
WTP $5.78 (£3.33) for recycling of paper and glass, and for composting services 
Kipperberg (2003) estimated that households in Seattle, USA are WTP $1 (£0.55) per 
month for composting of households food waste and up to $4.08 (£2.26) per month 
for recycling o f garden waste.
Overall the results suggest positive WTP for different kerbside recycling services 
attributes, and in particular for the number o f materials collected and composting. 
Ultimately, the benefits of providing recycling services can be compared with the 
costs o f recycling in a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Based upon 
previous estimates on the cost of recycling in the UK23, the results from this analysis 
suggest that the estimated household willingness to pay for recycling is greater than 
the costs.
23 The total cost o f recycling includes cost o f  collecting, recycling, and providing households with 
recycling containers, as well as the cost o f  specially designed vehicles for collecting recyclables and 
the cost o f any sorting facilities (for materials not sorted at the kerbside). Savings also need to be taken 
into account e.g. reduced costs o f waste going to landfill or incineration, money raised by selling 
recyclable materials to reprocessors (e.g. steel industry), and the need for fewer refuse collection 
vehicles for collecting reduced amount o f  rubbish to landfill/incineration, as well as the avoidance of 
non-compliance penalties. Ecotec (2000) has estimated that the gross costs o f providing household 
recycling service for dry recyclables (e.g. newspapers, cans, plastics, textiles) in the U.K. is £7.5-£20 
(average o f £11.5) per household per year. The average net cost (accounting for revenue from sales, 
reduced disposal costs etc) is £9. Composting costs depend on type o f  composting plant, the collection 
system and the avoided disposal costs. The average net cost o f  providing a kerbside collection service 
for compostable materials is £8 per household per year. The average net cost o f providing doorstep 
recycling and composting service is £17 per household per year (Source: Friends o f the Earth website. 
Fact sheet: Recycling, Can local authorities afford it?).
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Additional issues o f  interest that can be investigated using the recycling survey data is 
the motivational factors that neighbours play in affecting household recycling  
behaviour. To som e degree, this issue w as the focus o f  Chapter 5 on spatial 
interaction effects, albeit at the m acroeconom ic level. A s m entioned earlier, Gamba 
and Oskamp (1994) find that households are indeed m otivated by the recycling  
behaviour o f  their neighbours. Preliminary statistics suggests that this may not be the 
case in the sampled population collected here. M ore sp ecifica lly , with regard to the 
motivational question: “/  r e c y c le  p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  m y  n e i g h b o u r s  recy>cle; I  f e e l  1 
s h o u ld  to o ”, 6.5% o f  the sample strongly agreed, 18.9%  partly agreed, 16.6%  partly 
disagreed, 39.6%  strongly disagreed, and 18.3% did not know .
Figure 6.3 On Neighbours as a M otivating Factor to R ecycle
3
.Neighbours
A further aim o f  the survey is to tentatively investigate which w aste policy  
instruments to encourage recycling the public w ould  find more favourable. 
Respondents were asked whether households should be charged for the collection o f  
their unsorted waste (regular rubbish) if  containers are provided for recyclable waste 
and whether there should be a deposit refund schem e. Strongly agree w as converted 
to 1, partly agree to 2, partly disagree to 3, strongly disagree to 4, and don’t know to
5. The frequency o f  responses are depicted in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 below , suggesting
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that there is a general consensus in favour o f economic instruments to encourage 
recycling, and that the preference is towards the deposit-refund scheme.
Figure 6.4 On Pay-As-You-Throw Programs (PAYT)
s-
1 2  3 4 5
payt
Figure 6.5 On Deposit Refund Schemes (DRS)
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Finally, given the way that responsibility for recycling across London is assigned to 
the individual boroughs, ideally it would have been interesting to collect data from a 
much larger number of households and to estimate marginal WTP for recycling 
services at the borough level. This would enable boroughs to target their respective 
residents more specifically, based on their socio-economic and attitudinal 
characteristics. As an example, WTP estimates have been calculated here for the three
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boroughs for which the sample sizes were the largest, namely Kensington and 
Chelsea (N=25), Richmond-upon-Thames (N=24) and Westminster (N=22). The 
results on WTP per attribute for each borough are shown in Appendix 6.5.
6.7 Conclusions
This paper has employed the choice experiment method to estimate what, if anything, 
households would be willing to pay for specific kerbside recycling services in 
London, and the social, economic and attitudinal characteristics that determine their 
willingness to pay (WTP). The impacts of social, economic and attitudinal 
characteristics o f respondents on their valuation o f recycling service attributes are 
significant and conform with economic theory. Considerable preference heterogeneity 
is observed within Londoners, which should be taken into consideration when 
designing provision of kerbside recycling services. The results indicate that on 
average households are WTP the most for an increase in the number o f dry materials 
collected, as well as for compost collection.
Given the way that responsibility for recycling across London is assigned to the 
individual boroughs, borough level preferences were estimated for Kensington and 
Chelsea, Richmond-upon-Thames and Westminster. These, however, did not seem to 
vary considerably. A larger data set from a wider array o f boroughs would have been 
preferable for estimation of more accurate borough level preferences, however budget 
constraints did not allow for that. Future research with a larger data set is prompted.
As for the economic and policy instruments that might be employed to create 
incentives for recycling, the results o f the survey reveal that the public seems to find 
the introduction of such instruments acceptable, and there is a greater preference for 
the introduction of deposit refund schemes rather than pay-as-you-throw, or unit- 
pricing, programs. Further research on economic and policy instruments to create 
incentives for recycling is also required. Appropriate economic incentives and 
efficiently designed recycling services can help London meet its recycling targets in 
the most effective and least-cost manner.
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Appendix 6.1. Introduction Sheet to the Choice Experiment
B. CHOICE EXPERIM ENT
Introduction Sheet
In this section we would like to find out what aspects o f  kerbside recycling services are 
important to households. Kerbside recycling refers to the doorstep collection o f material that 
you have sorted from the rubbish you normally generate. We have identified 5 recycling 
characteristics and present these with different levels. Recycling characteristics and their 
levels include:
A. Paper/Glass/Aluminum/Plastic collection. This refers to the kerbside collection of 
these materials. This service would enable 2, 3, or 4 o f these materials to be collected 
from your doorstep. If the service is not available, all materials will be sent to landfill 
or incinerated.
B. Compost collection. This refers to the possibility o f recycling your biodegradable 
food waste and/or your green garden waste by leaving it in a separate container on 
your kerbside for collection. This recycling collection service is either available or it 
is not. If it is not available, all compostable waste will be sent to landfill or 
incinerated.
C. Textiles collection. This refers to the kerbside collection o f textiles (i.e. clothing and 
fabric) for recycling. This service is either available or it is not. If it is not available, 
all textile waste will be sent to landfill or incinerated.
D. Frequency o f collection per month. The kerbside collection can occur 2, 4, or 8 
times per month. These levels apply to the collection o f all types o f  recyclable 
materials mentioned above.
E. Cost per month. This is the amount in say, monthly fees (e.g. via council tax), that 
you would be required to pay each month to support the continued existence of 
kerbside recycling services above. The five levels o f payment presented are £1, £2, 
£5, £10 and £20.
We have generated various recycling scenarios and present these as pairs in a series o f cards. 
We would like you to indicate out o f each pair, which recycling scenario you would prefer. 
Please imagine you are being offered various kerbside recycling options. Each o f the 
following 8 “choice experiments” will present you with three different recycling services 
scenarios: Option A, Option B, and Option C. Please compare each scenario in the following 
cards and tell me which one you prefer in each case. In making your choices, please keep in 
mind your monthly household income and expenditures, and your relevant preferences and 
budget constraints. Please imagine your household is ACTUALLY paying this amount to 
obtain the recycling services.
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Appendix 6.2: RECYCLING SURVEY
University College London (UCL) is conducting a study on recycling preferences and 
attitudes in London. As part o f this study, we are carrying out a survey in which we would 
like you to take part. You have been randomly selected and your participation is voluntary. 
All questions are hypothetical and the data obtained is strictly confidential. The survey should 
not take longer than 10 minutes. The completion o f the exercise can help policy-makers 
determine the key recycling factors o f importance to households, and to prioritise recycling 
efforts. Please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers.
A. RECYCLING BEHAVIOUR AND SERVICES
1. Does your household recycle? Yes O  No I 1
2. If yes what/how much (percentage)?
Material 0% 1-25% 26-50% 51-75% >75%
Paper □ □ □ □ □
Glass □ □ □ □ □
Cans/tins □ □ □ □ □
Plastic □ □ □ □ □
Textiles □ □ □ □ □
Other □ □ □ □ □
3. Does your household compost (food/garden waste)? Yes Q ] No I I
4. If yes what/how much (percentage)?
Type 0% 1-25% 26-50% 51-75% >75%
Food waste □ □ □ □ □
Garden waste □ □ □ □ □
5. If your household does recycle, how much time per week (in minutes) does
your household spend separating, sorting and preparing materials for
recycling? ____
6. Do you have kerbside (i.e. doorstep) recycling in your borough?
Y e s Q  No HH Don’t know I I
7. Do you have kerbside composting in your borough?
Y e s O  No (HI Don’t know O
8. Have you been provided with storage containers for recyclables? Yes I INo 1 I
9. Do you purchase special recycling bags to put your recyclables in? Yes I INo I I
If yes, what is your average monthly expenditure on bags? £_____
10. Do you have a compost bin? Yes Q  No Q
If yes, price paid for bin? £ _____  Don’t know Q
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11. Do you have a garden ? Yes EH No I 1
If yes, do you compost in your own garden? Yes EH No EH
12. Is there a recycling drop-off site nearby for paper/glass/compost/etc?
Yes EH No Q  Don’t know I I
If yes, the proximity (minute walk):_____
13. Additional information _______ _____________ _____________________
________________________  Always Often____ Sometimes Rarely Never
Do you use the recycling drop-off EH ED EH I I I I
site?
Do you recycle when you are not at EH EH EH EH EH
home (e.g. at office or throwing cans
into public recycling receptacles)?  _____________________________ _______
B. CHOICE EXPERIMENT
[PRESENT INTRODUCTION SHEET AND CHOICE SETS]
14. Answer sheet
Choice Set Option A Option B Option C
1 □ □ □
2 □ □ □
3 □ □ □
4 □ □ □
5 □ □ □
6 □ □ □
7 □ □ □
8 □ □ □
15. If you selected Option C in all 8 choice sets, please explain your reasons below.
_____________________________________ Agree Disagree Don’t know
The government is responsible for this service □ □ □
Recycling is not an issue that concerns me □ □ □
I don’t believe my payment would be used correctly □ □ □
I cannot afford to pay for kerbside recycling services □ □ □
Other (please explain):
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C. MOTIVES AND ATTITUDES
16. Motives and Attitudes for recycling waste
MOTIVES
I recycle partly because...
Strongly
Agree
Partly
Agree
Partly
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
Don’t
Know
1 want to contribute to a better 
environment
□ □ □ □ □
I want to think of myself as a 
responsible person
□ □ □ □ □
It is a pleasant activity in itself □ □ □ □ □
My neighbours recycle; I feel I 
should too.
□ □ □ □ □
I perceive it as a requirement by 
local authorities 
Other (please specify)
□ □ □ □ □
I find it difficult to recycle partly Strongly Partly Partly Strongly Don’t
because... Agree agree disagree Disagree know
I do not have enough space in my 
household to store recyclables
□ □ □ □ □
It is not convenient for me to recycle 
-current recycling services are poor
□ □ □ □ □
1 have not been provided with 
adequate information regarding 
recycling
□ □ □ □ □
1 do not have time to recycle 
Other (please specify)
□ □ □ □ □
ATTITUDES Strongly Partly Partly Strongly Don’t
Agree agree disagree Disagree know
Humans are severely abusing the 
environment
□ □ □ □ □
Humans have the right to modify the 
natural environment to suit their 
needs
□ □ □ □ □
Earth is like a spaceship with limited 
room and resources
□ □ □ □ □
Balance of nature is strong enough to 
cope with impacts of modem 
industrial nations
□ □ □ □ □
Often recycling waste causes more 
harm to the environment than 
throwing it away
□ □ □ □ □
The U.K. landfills more and recycles 
less than most other European 
countries
□ □ □ □ □
Reducing the amount of rubbish 
generation is very important
□ □ □ □ □
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17. How much (if at all) do you think a household in your community is paying per 
month for recycling/composting services?
a) Recycling: £0 £_____ b) Composting: £0 £ _____
18. In your opinion, to encourage recycling should households be charged for collection 
of unsorted waste (regular rubbish) if containers are provided for recyclable waste?
Strongly agree Agree Oppose Strongly oppose Don’t know□ □ □ . □ □
19. In your opinion, to encourage recycling, should there be deposit refund schemes whereby 
you pay a deposit on e.g. a beverage container but receive a refund if you return it for re-use?
Strongly agree Agree Oppose Strongly oppose Don’t know□
j
□
! □ □ □
20. How often does your household do the following?
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never
Buy organic produce □ □ □ □ □
Give charitable donations to 
environmental organisations 
e.g. WWF, RSPB
□ □ □ □ □
Buy fair-trade products e.g. fair-trade 
coffee or fair-trade chocolate
□ □ □ □ □
Buy environmentally based journals 
such as The Ecologist or National 
Geographic
□ □ □ □ □
Shop at environmentally 
sustainable/friendly shops e.g. Body 
Shop, OXFAM, charity shops
□ □ □ □ □
21. Does anyone in your household belong to an environmental organisation/group?
Y e sQ  No Q  If yes which one?_______
D. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
22. Age: _________  Age of oldest person in household:__
23. Gender: Female Q  . Male Q
24. Highest level of education anyone in your household has completed
a) Upper secondary school (up to 18 years) □
b) Professional Qualification □
c) University Degree □
d) Postgraduate/Doctorate Degree □
e) Other (please specify)
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25. Occupation of adult in your household with the highest income
a) Full-time job I I
b) Part-time jo b  EH
c) Unemployed EH
d) Pensioner EH
e) Student EH
f) Other (please specify) __
26. Ethnicity
a) Asian EH
b) Black EH
c) Caucasian EH
d) Hispanic EH
e) Other (please specify) __
27. What type of a home do you reside in?
a) Detached EH
b) Semi-detached EH
c) Attached EH
d) Flats/block mansions EH
e) Other (please specify) ___
28. Number of people in your household:_____
29. Number of dependent children in your household:_____
30. Tenure status
a) Home owner EH
b) Renter EH
c) Other (please specify) ______
31. What city/borough do you live in (or first 3 letters of postcode)?______
32. Does your household own a car ?YesEHI No I I
33. In which one of the following categories of income brackets does your annual 
household income lie (before tax)?
a) £0 £10,000 □
b) £10,000- £25,000 □
c) £25,000 - £50,000 □
d) £50,000 - £75,000 □
e) £75,000 - £100,000 □
f) £100,000- £150,000 □
g) £150,000 and above □
Did you find the survey difficult to understand? Yes EH No EH
Do you have any comments regarding the survey that you would like to make?
Thank you very much for your time and effort in completing this survey!
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Appendix 6.3. Description of the 24 choice sets of the choice experiment
Recycling scenario A Recycling scenario B
V CS Material | Compost | Textiles | Freq | £ Material | Compost | Textiles | Freq | £
1 1 o NO YES 2 5 2 NO YES 4 2
1 2 4 YES YES 8 20 3 YES YES 4 1
1 3 3 NO NO 8 20 2 YES NO 4 2
1 4 2 YES NO 8 2 2 NO YES 4 1
1 5 YES NO 4 20 4 NO YES 2 5
] 6 4 NO YES 2 20 2 NO NO 2 1
] 7 3 NO YES 2 5 2 YES YES 4 2
1 8 4 YES YES 8 20 3 YES YES 4 1
2 1 3 NO NO 8 20 2 YES NO 4 5
2 2 2 YES NO 8 2 2 NO YES 4 1
2 3 3 YES NO 4 20 4 NO YES 2 5
2 4 4 YES YES _j 2 2 2 YES NO 2 1
2 5 3 NO YES 2 5 2 NO YES 4 1
2 6 2 YES YES 4 2 3 YES YES 4 1
2 7 4 YES YES 8 20 3 YES NO 4 20
2 8 3 NO NO 8 20 2 NO NO 2 1
3 1 2 YES NO 4 5 4 NO YES 2 5
3 2 2 YES NO 8 2 4 NO YES 2 20
3 3 4 NO NO 2 2 4 NO NO 8 2
3 4 2 YES NO 2 10 3 NO NO 8 10
3 5 4 YES YES 4 1 2 YES NO 8 10
3 6 4 YES NO 8 2 2 YES YES 8 2
3 7 4 YES NO 8 2 2 NO YES 2 1
3 8 4 YES NO 8 2 2 YES NO 8 1
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Appendix 6.4. Correlation Matrix for the Data
cor ager ageh sex edu occup home hhsize depchd node tenure car inc emem eci nep
( o b s = 1 6 6 )
1 a g e r a g e h s e x edu o c c u p home h h s i z e d e p c h d n o d e t e n u r e c a r i n c emem
a g e r  1 1 . 0 0 0 0
a g e h  1 0 . 7 1 3 7 1 . 0 0 0 0
s e x  1 0 . 1 3 2 0 0 . 2 0 0 9 1 . 0 0 0 0
edu 1 - 0 . 1 9 1 1 - 0 . 1 6 4 0 - 0 . 0 4 0 8 1 . 0 0 0 0
o c c u p  1 - 0 . 2 8 8 2 - 0 . 2 3 0 4 - 0 . 1 3 0 8 0 . 0 3 8 3 1 . 0 0 0 0
home 1 0 . 1 7 9 3 0 . 2 9 5 9 0 . 1 4 3 2 0 . 0 4 0 8 0 . 0 4 0 8 1 . 0 0 0 0
h h s i z e  1 - 0 . 2 5 4 4 - 0 . 0 5 4 4 0 . 0 0 6 2 0 . 0 4 9 6 0 . 1 6 9 9 0 . 3 3 0 9 1 . 0 0 0 0 '
d e p c h d  1 0 . 1 0 9 6 0 . 0 4 1 6 0 . 0 5 5 0 0 . 0 5 5 0 - 0 . 0 1 3 7 0 .  1677 0 . 3 6 7 3 1 . 0 0 0 0
n o d e  1 0 . 1 1 9 4 0 . 0 5 9 1 0 . 0 1 7 6 0 . 0 9 4 8 0 . 0 2 0 9 0 . 1 7 7 2 0 . 4 7 1 5 0 . 8 8 4 2 1 . 0 0 0 0
t e n u r e  1 0 . 4 7 4 8 0 . 4 4 4 4 0 . 0 6 6 9 0 . 0 3 0 6 - 0 . 0 8 9 0 0 . 3 4 5 4 - 0 . 0 7 3 5 0 . 2 1 4 8 0 . 1 8 5 6 1 . 0 0 0 0
c a r  1 0 . 0 5 0 5 0 . 1 5 2 3 - 0 . 1 5 9 5 0 . 0 9 8 0 0 . 1 5 8 2 0 . 3 0 6 0 0 . 2 6 4 7 0 . 2 8 5 7 0 .  284 8 0 . 3 2 0 7 1 . 0 0 0 0
i n c  1 0 . 0 0 3 8 - 0 . 0 3 5 6 - 0 . 0 0 5 2 0 . 2 5 3 6 0 . 3 2 8 7 0 . 2 5 5 5 0 . 3 2 3 5 0 . 2 3 3 3 0 . 2 6 5 2 0 . 1 6 5 6 0 . 2 7 1 7 1 . 0 0 0 0
emem 1 0 . 0 2 1 1 0 . 0 8 0 4 0 . 0 6 7 0 0 . 1 9 4 2 - 0 . 0 4 1 7 0 . 1 8 8 0 - 0 . 0 6 0 7 0 . 0 6 0 7 0 . 0 1 8 6 0 . 1 4 7 1 0 .  1786 - 0 . 0 5 3 3 1 . 0 0 0 0
e c i  1 0 . 1 2 7 5 0 . 1 0 1 7 0 . 1 5 2 7 0 . 2 1 0 2 - 0 . 1 3 8 3 0 . 0 4 5 8 - 0 . 0 4 8 6 0 . 1 2 9 8 0 . 1 0 5 9 0 . 1 5 8 1 0 . 1 8 8 0 0 . 1 0 2 1 0 . 4 1 5 5
n ep  1 - 0 . 0 1 3 2 - 0 . 0 7 7 8 0 . 0 6 1 3 0 . 0 8 4 6 - 0 . 0 5 5 8 - 0 . 1 3 7 2 - 0 . 0 2 9 3 - 0 . 0 1 1 1 - 0  . 021 9 0 . 0 5 0 3 - 0 . 0 3 2 4 0 . 0 3 4 1 0 . 0 6 4 7
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0 . 1 3 5 9
nep
1 . 00 0 0
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Appendix 6.5. Borough Level WTP Estimates
K e n s i n g t o n  a n d  C h e l s e a
--> WALD
; Fnl = Bmat/(Bpay+bpe*9.2+bped*0.76+bpw*10.9+bpt*18.l+bpinc*84170+bps*0.56)
; Fn2 = Bcomp/(Bpay+bpe*9.2+bped*0.76+bpw*10.9+bpt*18.l+bpinc*84170+bps*0...
; Fn3 = Btex/ (Bpay+bpe*9 . 2+bped*0 . 7 6+bpw* 10 . 9+bpt* 18 .1+bpinc*8417 0+bps*0 . 56)
; Fn4 =Bfreq/ (Bpay+bpe* 9 . 2+bped*0 . 7 6+bpw* 10 . 9+bpt * 18 .1+bpinc* 8 417 0+bps * 0 ... .
+  +
WALD procedure. Estimates and standard errors 
for nonlinear functions and joint test of 
nonlinear restrictions.
Wald Statistic = 79.86371
Prob. from Chi-squared[ 4] = .00000
 1-
H----------------------------- i------------------------------------1----------------------------------------- 1 I H
I Variable | Coefficient I Standard Error |b/St.E r . IP[IZI>z] |
_ t- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 '  H
Fncn(l) -2.572367406 .38868745 -6.618 .0000
Fn c n (2) -.6786879768 .48556506 -1.398 .1622
Fn c n (3) -.2897311594 .48981346 -.592 .5542
Fncn(4) -. 1413809207E-01 .18810186 -.075 .9401
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.) 
R i c h m o n d - u p o n - T h a m e s  
— > WALD
; Fnl = Bmat/(Bpay+bpe*9 . 6+bped*0 . 78+bpw* 11. 2+bpt*23 . 8+bpinc*77610+bps*0 . 67) 
; Fn2 = Bcomp/(Bpay+bpe*9 . 6+bped*0 . 78+bpw* 11. 2+bpt*23 . 8+bpinc*77 610+bps*0 . . . 
; Fn3 = Btex/(Bpay+bpe*9. 6+bped*0. 78+bpw* 11. 2+bpt *23 . 8+bpinc*77610+bps*0. 67) 
; Fn4 =Bfreq/ (Bpay+bpe*9 . 6+bped* 0 . 78+bpw* 11. 2+bpt*23 . 8+bpinc*77610+bps*0 . . . .
WALD procedure. Estimates and standard errors 
for nonlinear functions and joint test of 
nonlinear restrictions.
Wald Statistic . = 43.52835
Prob. from Chi-squared[ 4] = .00000
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +
+ ------------------------1-------------------------------------------- + --------------------------------------------- 1------------------------- H-------------------------- h
IVariable | Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St.E r . |P[IZ|>z] |
+ -------------------- + -----------------------------------+ ------------------------------------- + ------------------- + --------------------- +
Fncn(l) -2.600218049 .47832511 -5.436 .0000
Fncn < 2) -.6860360315 .49819750 -1.377 .1685
Fn c n (3) -.2928680359 .49599929 -.590 .5549
Fn c n (4) -.1429116310E-01 .19010159 -.075 .9401
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.)
W e s t m i n s t e r
— > WALD
; Fnl = Bmat/(Bpay+bpe*9 . 2+bped*0 . 59+bpw* 9 . 7+bpt* 15 . 3+bpinc*72730+bps*0 . 64 )
; Fn2 = Bcomp/(Bpay+bpe* 9 . 2+bped*0 . 5 9+bpw* 9 . 7+bpt* 15 . 3+bpinc*72730+bps*0 . 64 ) 
; Fn3 = Btex/ (Bpay+bpe*9 . 2+bped* 0 . 59+bpw*9 . 7+bpt* 15 . 3+bpinc*72730+bps*0 . 64 )
; Fn4 =Bfreq/ (Bpay+bpe*9 . 2+bped* 0 . 59+bpw* 9 . 7+bpt* 15 . 3+bpinc*72730+bps*0 . 64 ) $
H----------------------------------------------------------------- h
WALD procedure. Estimates and standard errors 
for nonlinear functions and joint test of 
nonlinear restrictions.
Wald Statistic = 92.24706
Prob. from Chi-squared[ 4] = .00000
+  +
H----------------------------- 1------------------------------------------ 1------------------------------------------------- 1---------------------- 1-----------------------------h
IVariable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.E r . IP[IZI>z] |+------------ +------------------- +-----------------------+---------- +-------------+
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Fncn(l) -2.256412223 .32310953 -6.983 .0000
F n c n (2) -.5953270294 .42382955 -1.405 .1601
F n c n (3) -.2541444616 .42965081 -.592 .5542
Fn c n (4) -. 1240155806E-01 .16504050 -.075 .9401
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.)
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS
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7.1 Introduction
The thesis has focused on municipal solid waste management and policy in developed 
countries. More specifically, it has explored the underlying factors that influence the 
generation, disposal and recycling o f municipal solid waste. Understanding the causes 
and driving forces that significantly impact waste trends is a critical first step in designing 
efficient and sustainable waste management policies that can positively impact the 
economic, environmental and social outcomes. The analysis has been undertaken at the 
OECD level using macroeconomic country data, and at the household level using original 
survey data from London, UK. This chapter aims to bring the main conclusions together 
and discusses the policy implications for sustainable MSW management. Section 7.2 
summarises the key findings of the thesis and highlights the contributions to the waste 
management literature. The waste management policy implications are discussed in 
section 7.3 and finally, section 7.4 suggests areas in the field that could benefit from 
further research.
7.2 Main Findings and Contributions to the Literature
The thesis has employed three methods, namely panel data econometrics techniques, 
spatial econometrics and stated preference methods, to investigate the determinants of 
municipal solid waste generation, disposal and recycling. This was undertaken using 
cross-sectional time-series macroeconomic level data from the 30 member countries of 
the OECD, and household level choice experiment survey data, using a sample of 188 
households in London area.
The major results of this thesis are as follows:
(i) Despite recent findings by the OECD (2002) that there has been a relative 
decoupling, and in some case an absolute decoupling, between per capita 
municipal waste generation and income in certain countries, an empirical re­
investigation o f the hypothesised (inverted U-shaped) environmental Kuznets 
curve in Chapter 3 suggests that waste generation levels continue to increase
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monotonically with income. Further analysis reveals that in addition to income, 
the degree o f urbanisation is another significant determinant of MSW generation 
rates across OECD countries. Policy variables, as measured by the waste 
legislation and policy index, also tend to exert some influence on waste 
generation, though it is important to note that these results need to be interpreted 
with care given the aggregate nature o f the waste legislation and policy index.
(ii) The main determinants of the percentage of MSW generated disposed of at 
landfill are income, urbanisation and population density. The results suggest that 
landfill taxes are also significant, and can be effective policy instruments for 
diverting the waste stream away from landfill disposal.
(iii) Paper/cardboard and glass recycling rates (as a percentage o f apparent 
consumption) are positively affected by income, urbanisation and population 
density. The R2 value on the preferred model for paper/cardboard recycling rates 
is however low, indicating that a large proportion of the variation in the variable 
remains unexplained. In contrast, this issue does not arise in the analysis o f glass 
recycling rates.
(iv) In an analysis to identify and analyse the potential existence of spatial interaction 
in waste management and policy-making, the results reveal that countries do 
indeed seem to be influenced by decisions made in other countries. For example, 
landfill taxes in one country tend to be influenced by landfill taxes in other 
countries based on their size and geographical proximity. The results using the 
Ybest weight to assess for the so-called ‘California effect’ need to be interpreted 
more cautiously as only one methodology to test for this particular effect was 
used and additional weights would lead to more robust conclusions.
(v) At the household level, London residents attach the highest stated preference 
values, in terms of willingness to pay, to an increase in the number o f dry 
materials collected and the availability of kerbside compost collection, as revealed
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in the recycling attributes choice experiment survey. The WTP estimates are 
about £2.5 per household per month for an increase in the amount of dry materials 
collected, and £0.65 per household per month for kerbside compost collection. 
Despite the fact that the sample size is relatively small, the sample lies within the 
lower limit that is considered acceptable, and the sample statistics are fairly 
representative of the London population. Moreover, the results indicate that 
London households seem to look favourably upon the introduction o f economic 
policy instruments to encourage and stimulate recycling levels, with a slight 
preference towards deposit refund schemes over pay-as-you-throw programs.
With regard to the contributions of this thesis to the literature on sustainable waste
management and policy, these are as follows:
(i) Only three previous studies have investigated the existence o f an EKC for MSW 
generation and these were undertaken in the 1990s. The analysis in chapter 3 
provides an update of the EKC analysis using data from 1980 to 2000 and adopts 
a panel data approach to examine whether MSW generation continues to increase 
monotonically.
(ii) Moreover, chapter 3 adds to the scant literature on macroeconomic studies on the 
determinants o f per capita municipal solid waste generation. As previously 
mentioned, only Beede and Bloome (1995) examine the determinants o f total 
MSW generation, whereas Johnstone and Labonne (1994) look at household 
waste generation. The results obtained here conform with previous studies but 
provide additional insight into the determinants o f  waste generation rates.
(iii) Using a similar dataset and methodology, chapter 4 examines the determinants of 
landfill disposal of waste and o f recycling rates for paper/cardboard and glass. 
The analysis seeks to contribute to the literature on MSW landfill disposal and 
recycling by examining a number o f potentially significant factors using 
macroeconomic panel data. The chapter analyses the relative importance of
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economic growth and population density, as well as demographic and policy 
characteristics in OECD countries.
(iv) The analysis of the determinants of landfill disposal rates is, to my knowledge, the 
first o f  its kind. The analysis of paper/cardboard recycling rates builds on and 
extends a previous study by Berglund et al. (2002) by using panel data instead of 
cross-sectional data, and by including two public policy variables that may have a 
significant impact on paper/cardboard recycling. Moreover, the approach is 
extended to analyse the determinants of glass recycling rates which have also not 
previously been examined.
(v) Chapter 4 presents a first attempt to incorporate the influence o f national public 
waste policies on MSW generation, disposal, and recycling rates. The lack o f such 
policy variables in previous studies is generally recognised (e.g. Berglund et al. 
2002, Johnstone et al. 2004), and this chapter seeks to address this issue more 
explicitly.
(vi) The majority of the spatial interaction studies have focused primarily on the U.S., 
and no previous study examines the possible existence o f strategic interaction or 
behaviour o f environmental policy in an OECD country context. Furthermore, no 
previous study has examined this issue in the context o f  municipal solid waste 
management. Given the magnitude o f the waste problem and the large fraction of 
total environmental expenditures on this resource, this is an important 
environmental issue that merits further consideration. The analysis in Chapter 5 
extends the spatial econometrics literature to the examination o f spatial interaction 
in the imposition of landfill disposal taxes, as well as waste management 
performance more generally at the OECD level.
(vi) Estimation of household willingness to pay for various kerbside recycling 
attributes via the stated preference choice experiment method is the first
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application of this evaluation technique to recycling in a developed country1. 
Moreover, WTP estimates are derived for the kerbside collection o f dry materials 
and textiles, as well as compost. Studies on the latter are scant, and this is the first 
study that examines recycling and composting preferences in London, UK.
7.3 Policy Implications for MSW Management and Policy
The policy implications of the EKC analysis in chapter 3 suggest that there continues to 
be an upward trend in MSW generation levels and that significant policy intervention will 
need to be undertaken to mitigate and reverse these trends. More stringent and aggressive 
waste management policy will be necessary to decouple the trend between economic 
growth and waste generation levels.
Further analysis into the determinants o f MSW waste generation reveal that income is not 
the most significant factor but rather that urbanisation seems to play the dominant role in 
waste generation. The results from the analysis o f landfill disposal and recycling rates for 
paper/cardboard and glass are more encouraging from a policy perspective. Higher 
incomes are associated with a general movement along the waste hierarchy to the more 
preferred methods (i.e. from landfill disposal to recycling). Moreover, the results provide 
some evidence to suggest that landfill taxes have a significant impact on diverting waste 
away from landfill disposal, and inducing higher rates o f paper/cardboard and glass 
recycling. This implies that governments wishing to divert waste higher up on the waste 
hierarchy are likely to do so successfully via the introduction o f landfill taxes.
The results from the spatial interaction analysis suggest that landfill tax level choices in 
one country are affected by decisions made in other countries. Whether this is due to 
policy convergence in general or due to strategic government behaviour is less clear, but 
the results suggest that there are cascading effects in waste policy-making such that an
1 The only other available study that uses a CE to examine recycling preferences is by Jin et al. (2006) who 
conduct their study using a sample o f 241 respondents in Macao, China.
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increase in the landfill tax level in one country will lead to increases in other countries 
(especially so from large populated countries and those in close proximity).
With regard to the policy implications from the household choice experiment survey 
conducted in London, the results suggest that local authorities may wish to focus on 
increasing the number of dry materials offered for kerbside recycling collection, and 
moreover, that the kerbside collection of compost is another service that the London 
public value highly. Given that biodegradable municipal waste is an important 
contributor to methane gases causing climate change, and the recent landfill diversion 
targets for biodegradable waste in the EC Landfill Directive, more funds should be 
allocated to the issue of compost collection. These services are provided in many areas in 
Germany and northern Italy, and further lessons can be learned from the borough of 
Richmond-upon-Thames in London, which has recently introduced a kerbside compost 
collection service for food waste. Textile collection and increases in the frequency o f 
recyclables collection do not seem to be particularly important features o f a kerbside 
collection service.
7.4 Directions for Future Research
The need for further analysis on the determinants and underlying causes for the increases 
in waste generation levels as well as the methods in which waste is disposed o f is evident, 
given the massive expenditures spent on this resource and the environmental externalities 
that prevail in the waste sector. A key requirement for this, is the systematic collection of 
comparable and high quality data in this area. Waste data is not generally perceived to be 
as reliable and accurate as other available environmental data and this hampers the ability 
to conduct data analysis. Further efforts should be devoted to collecting these data at an 
international level to allow for larger cross-country studies, as well as the imports and 
exports of waste across countries, comparable data on incineration levels, as well as on 
the recycling data on materials other than paper/cardboard and glass. This would for 
example benefit from the type of analysis undertaken in chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis. Of
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particular relevance to the analysis undertaken in chapter 4 would be the collection of 
comparable cross-country and time-series data on average landfill prices over time. These 
could then be combined with the panel data on landfill taxes to more accurately assess the 
price-elasticity o f demand for landfill disposal, and the effects this may have on recycling 
rates. In addition, better quality national data is required for existing national waste 
policies that have been implemented across countries to more sustainably address the 
waste management issue.
With regard to the analysis conducted in Chapter 5, this may benefit from further 
research where total waste management expenditures are examined. Additional 
alternative proxies for waste policy stringency could also be useful.
Finally, the results presented in Chapter 6 are to some degree contextual in that the social 
and economic characteristics of households in London may not be representative o f the 
UK as a whole. Benefit transfer (BT) methods, which are used to estimate values for one 
context by adapting an estimate of benefits from some other context, might nevertheless 
prove useful, and further studies in similar and different areas can be conducted to 
examine how accurate BT methods might be (Bateman et al. 2003). Moreover, 
information obtained on the benefits of recycling can be aggregated over the relevant 
population and weighted against the total costs o f providing the different recycling 
attributes. In this way, the results can be used to conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit 
analysis for a socially efficient design for recycling services.
The data set obtained from the household survey is fairly rich and further research and 
analysis can be undertaken to examine different aspects of recycling preferences and 
behaviour. For example, intrinsic motivations for recycling can be further explored to 
determine whether these are an important factor in recycling. This can be undertaken via 
discrete choice models i.e. binary choice models such as the probit model, or ordered 
probit and logit models for responses that include more than two outcomes (Greene, 
1997). One could also compare urban vs. rural recycling preferences (see e.g. Hanley, 
Wright and Adamowicz, 1998) in the UK to examine whether there are different waste
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policy implications for these two demographics, and thus help decision-makers tailor 
their waste collection services in the most effective and efficient way. Given a larger 
dataset, latent class model (LCM) analysis may also prove to be useful, by accounting for 
preference heterogeneity. This was not possible with a sample size of 188.
Given that the recycling survey also collected revealed preference data (as opposed to 
only stated preference data), further analysis could be undertaken to compare these 
results with the ones obtained here. One caveat with the revealed preference data is that 
the data collected here is self-reported as opposed to actually measured, a factor that 
clearly lies beyond the budget and time scope of this particular research. In the final 
analysis, it would perhaps be possible to combine the revealed and stated preference 
methods for estimating the benefits o f recycling (Adamowicz et al. 1994).
An additional issue that may benefit from further consideration is the time spent on 
recycling. Time costs reflect another consideration in the costs o f recycling. For example, 
Bruvoll, Halvorsen, Nyborg (2002) examine households’ recycling efforts in Norway, 
with a focus on the time a household spends on sorting waste. Reasons identified for 
sorting and recycling waste include a perception that it was mandatory, and for moral 
motives. On average, respondents are WTP U.S. $20 per year to have a company take 
over sorting o f the waste, if this were possible. Sterner and Bartelings (1999) study the 
determinants o f waste disposal, recycling and composting using data from nearly 600 
households in Tvaaker, Sweden where a weight-based billing system for household waste 
had recently been introduced, along with the establishment o f  recycling centres. They 
find that the amount of time and effort invested in recycling exceeded the returns from 
lower waste management bills (see also e.g., Bruvoll, 2002; Halvorsen, 2004; Berglund, 
2005). In the sample used for the CE survey, the respondents indicated that the mean time 
spent per household on sorting, separating and preparing their materials for 
recycling/composting is 18 minutes per week. This is equivalent to 15.6 hours per year 
[(18x52)760]. Average gross weekly household income for London was £711 in 1999-
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20022. A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that households are WTP £5.33 per 
month based on their incomes .
More generally, an agenda for further action organised around improving the usability of 
waste information and improving co-ordination and sharing o f good practices would be a 
useful next step in international collaborative efforts directed towards addressing the 
waste management issue in a manner that is consistent with sustainable development.
2 www.statistics.gov.uk
3 £711 / 40 hour work week = £17.775 per hour. Divide by 60 (minutes) -  £0.29625. Multiply by 18 
(minutes) = £5.33.
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